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Abstract  
This dissertation consists of two empirical studies in corporate finance. The first 
study, The Impact of Acquisitions on the Short-Run Returns to Shareholders and 
Bondholders, investigates shareholder and bondholder wealth wirespect to 310 
acquisitions in the UK market between 1994 and 2006. It tests the 3-day and 41-day 
excess security returns with an event study. The results show positive returns for 
target shareholders and bondholders, and negative returns for acquirer shareholders 
and bondholders. Moreover, the tests on value-weight d combined security returns 
show that stockholders lose, bondholders gain, targe  firms gain, acquirer firms lose, 
and shareholders/bondholders of target and acquiring firms as a whole lose. These 
results support the co-insurance hypothesis, wealth transfer hypothesis, hubris 
hypothesis, and bond return based on hubris hypothesis, and reject the synergy 
hypothesis. The univariate and multivariate analyses on the deal characteristics find 
that target and acquirer stock returns are higher with cash payment, acquirer stock 
returns are higher in friendly and industry unrelatd akeovers, acquirer bond returns 
are higher in industry related takeovers, target firm share returns are higher when 
target size is smaller than the acquirer size, targe  and acquirer stock returns are 
higher in bull market period, and acquirer bond returns are higher in the bear market 
period.  
 
The second study, A Test of the Partial Adjustment Theory of Leverage Using 
Leverage Changes Arising from Takeovers, investigates firms’ capital structures by 
the event of takeovers. It examines 659 US acquiring f rms which involved in 
acquisitions between 1962 and 2001. These acquiring firms’ book leverage ratio 
deviations are tested in an 11-year window. This result shows that takeovers have 
significant impact on firms’ book leverage ratios in the announcement year. The 
trend that firms gradually reverse their actual leverage ratios towards their optimism 
in the five years after the takeovers supports the dynamic trade-off theory. The 
partial adjustment models on the speed of adjustment further support the dynamic 
trade-off theory and reject the alternative capital structure theories. The tests on 
method of payment and source of fund demonstrate tht cash payment and raise of 
  
funds are likely to increase firms’ leverage ratios at announcement and to maintain 
these ratios at a high level in the years after the merger. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This PhD dissertation examines two topics in corporate finance, “The Impact of 
Acquisitions on the Short-Run Returns to Shareholders and Bondholders” and “A 
Test of the Partial Adjustment Theory of Leverage Using Leverage Changes Arising 
from Takeovers”. The first study investigates shareholder and bondh lder wealth 
with respect to 310 acquisitions in the UK market bween 1994 and 2006. The 
second study investigates firms’ capital structures with 659 US acquisitions between 
1962 and 2001. Both of them are empirical studies.  
 
1.1 Motivations  
The First Topic  
With the innovation of financial instruments and the development of financial 
markets, bondholders are playing an increasingly important role in corporate finance. 
It is widely observed that firms prioritise their sources of funding with bonds over 
shares if external financing is required. The creation of the high-yield bonds market 
by Michael Milken has transferred junk bonds as an effective method of payment in 
corporate raids, which fuelled the 1980s boom in leverage buy-outs and hostile 
takeovers. With the gradual recognition of corporate bonds’ volatility and the failure 
of the merged firms, the concern of protecting bondhol ers’ rights in takeovers is 
attracting increasing attention. Numerous studies have examined the influence of 
acquisitions on shareholders’ value, but research on bondholders’ wealth is limited. 
Some cases have shown that takeovers could damage bondholders’ value by making 
the combined firm more risky. Verification of the bondholder wealth issue and 
legislation yet needs to be supplemented by more evidence. One of the most 
important pieces of evidence that needs to be collected is the quantitative research 
about the impact of M&A on bondholders’ value, and the comparison of 
shareholders’ and bondholders’ wealth. Research on bondholders’ wealth in respect 
to M&A has proceeded to some extent in the US market; however, the research in 
the UK market is still absent at the time of writing (April 2006). The above factors 
comprise the motivation for this study which is the first empirical research of 




The Second Topic 
Research on the first topic has revealed that acquisitions could influence bonds’ 
value by changing the firms’ riskiness. It signifies that acquisition as an event could 
have significant impact on firms’ capital structure which is an important indication of 
firms’ riskiness. Several theoretical and empirical studies have examined the link 
between capital structure and takeovers, and all of them conclude that takeovers 
increase firms’ capital structures significantly. However, they cannot explain the fact 
that many firms actually lever down with acquisitions. Thus, I was motivated to do a 
more objective study to interpret the fundamental re son of leverage ratio changes by 
the capital structure theories with the recently developed techniques on measuring 
optimal leverage ratios. 
 
1.2 Contributions  
The First Topic 
First, it is the first empirical research to test UK bondholders’ wealth in 
acquisitions (at the time of writing in April 2006). Second, this research does a 
thorough review on existing theories which explain the shareholder and bondholder 
wealth in M&A, and designs out five testable hypotheses to explain the potential 
results. Compared with the research on shareholder wealth in the field of M&A, 
bondholder wealth study is much less developed, and researchers are still in the 
process of developing rationales to explain the expected impact. Though they have 
brought forward some theories to explain the bond question, they have given 
different or even contradictory interpretations. For example, Lewellen (1971), Kim 
and McConnell (1977) and Billett et al. (2004) give different explanations for co-
insurance effect; in general, researchers befuddle the co-insurance effect, wealth 
transfer effect, incentive effect, and redistribution effect. This research contributes to 
describe theories and testable hypotheses through a standard and exhaustive way. 
Third, As MacKinlay (1997) argues, the power of event study increases substantially 
from reducing the sampling interval, this research utilizes daily bond price data 
which is much powerful than the recent studies which use monthly bond price data. 
This research is the second study that finds significant non-convertible bond returns 
for both target firms and acquiring firms (the other r search is Billett et al. (2004)). 
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Fourth, this research finds a significantly negative Total security return, indicating 
acquisitions are value destroying, which has never be n found by previous research. 
Fifth, this is the first research to test the effect of stock market trend on bondholder 
returns, and it finds significant results.  
 
The Second Topic 
First, the sample selection process is improved from previous papers. The study 
of takeover’s impact on a firm’s capital structure r quires isolating one deal’s 
influence from another in case the firm takes more than one deal in the object 
window. Otherwise, it is difficult to tell which deal attributes to the change of capital 
structure in a certain year. This research excludes firms that take more than one 
takeovers in the 11-year period, and avoids the overlapping problem. The studies of 
Ghost and Jain (2000), Harford et al. (2007) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) do 
not restrict series acquirers thus their samples ar contaminated. Bruner (1988) 
restricts his sample to firms that are not involved in takeovers in the previous eight 
years, but he does not exclude firms that are involved in takeovers in the years after 
the first selected deals.  
 
Second, the regression process is different. To examine the influence of M&A 
on capital structures, M&A is considered as an event, thus the features of capital 
structures after M&A should be quite different from those before M&A. As 
MacKinlay (1997) argues, the event period itself should not be included in the 
estimation period to prevent the event from influencing the normal performance 
model parameter estimates; otherwise, both the normal eturns and the abnormal 
returns would capture the event impact. Previous research such as Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Harford et al. (2007) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) estimate coefficients 
of capital structures by in-sample models, which could cause a problem by mixing 
the “estimation window” and the “event window”. This research uses out-of-sample 
regression for the coefficients estimations and the results are more objective.  
 
Third, the deviation tests split the sample into two groups on whether firms’ 
deviations increase between year -1 and year 0. It is evident that M&A increases 
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some firms’ leverage ratios but decreases other firms’ leverage ratios, and the trend 
of deviations of those two groups should be quite diff rent. Previous research such as 
Harford et al. (2007) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) do not distinguish those two 
groups, therefore the leverage deviations of firms that lever up and firms that lever 
down cancel out with each other, and the aggregate deviation trend of the sample is 
noisy. Due to the above three reasons, this research shows more significant influence 
of takeovers at the announcement year than previous research (the previous research 
find M&A reverses firms’ leverage ratios back to their optimism, but this research 
finds M&A drags firms’ leverage ratios beyond their optimism to the opposite way 
of deviation), and gives evidence of dynamic trade-off theory that firms reverse back 
to their optimal leverage ratios gradually in the years after takeovers which has not 
been reported by other papers (see Chart 5-1 and Chart 5-2).  
 
Fourth, despite that quite a few papers examine the method of payment on capital 
structures, this research is the first one to test on the source of fund on capital 
structures. 
 
1.3 Reviews of These Two Studies 
The First Topic 
Theories of this research are based on M&A motivations and shareholder-
bondholder conflicts. Motivations for M&A consist of four categories: 
macroeconomic motive, microeconomic motive, wealth transfer and managerialism. 
The macroeconomic motive includes deregulation, industrial wave, technological 
change and globalisation. The microeconomic motive includes economy of scale, 
scope and learning. Wealth transfer describes the situations that acquisitions are 
motivated by the wealth transfer from other stakeholders to shareholders, and from 
target shareholders to acquirer shareholders. Managerialism talks about the agency 
problem that acquisition is an effective weapon to remove uncompetitive target 
managers, the free cash flow theory that acquisition is a better alternative for 
acquiring firm managers to waste cash flows on internal projects, and the hubris 
hypothesis that acquiring firm managers are incorretly motivated by the non-
existent takeover gains. The shareholder-bondholder conflicts are made up of two 
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theories: the equal compensation principle and agency theory, and the corporate 
finance models. Equal compensation principle and agency theory diagnose the 
conflict between shareholders and bondholders. It argues that it is difficult for 
management to equally maximise both shareholder and bondholder values. The 
corporate finance models investigates four financial decisions which benefit 
shareholders at the expense of bondholders—dividend payout, claim dilution, asset 
substitution and under-investment.  
 
Based upon the above theories, this research is desgned around five testable 
hypotheses to investigate M&A’s impact on the excess security returns: the co-
insurance effect, the wealth transfer hypothesis, the synergy effect, the hubris 
hypothesis, and the bond return based on the hubris hypothesis. These five 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. The co-insurance hypothesis tests the wealth 
of target bondholders and acquirer bondholders. According to this effect, the 
combination of two firms whose earning streams are imperfectly correlated would 
reduce the merged firm’s default risk. Therefore, the estable hypothesis is that co-
insurance effect exists if the value-weighted combination of excess returns of bond is 
positive. Wealth transfer hypothesis talks about six situations that could lead to 
wealth transfers: 1. acquisitions are motivated by shareholders’ incentive to get hold 
of wealth at the expense of others; 2. wealth can tr sfer from bondholders to 
shareholders due to the corporate finance models; 3. shareholders may enhance their 
wealth at the expense of bondholders by taking risky projects; 4. the diversification 
effect of a merger could reduce the default risk of the combined firm, thus transfers 
wealth from shareholders to bondholders; 5. sharehold rs may transfer wealth from 
bondholders to themselves by levering up to utilize th  tax benefits from the co-
insurance effect; 6. target and acquirer bondholders transfer wealth between each 
other due to the maturity effect, leverage effect and risk effect. Therefore the testable 
hypothesis is that for the target shareholders, acquirer shareholders, target 
bondholders and acquiring bondholders, if one or moe parties observe negative 
return at the same time that one or more parties observe positive return, wealth 
transfer is present. Synergy implies the efficiencis created from macroeconomic and 
microeconomic motivations. The testable hypothesis is that a synergy exists if the 
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value-weighted sum of excess return for the target shareholders, acquirer 
shareholders, target bondholders and acquiring bondholders is positive. Hubris 
hypothesis predicts that acquiring firms overpay for the target firms and no potential 
synergy will be achieved through mergers. The testable hypothesis is that hubris 
effect exists if the excess return for acquiring firm stocks is negative, the excess 
return for the target firm stocks is positive, and the value-weighted combination of 
excess stock return is negative. The bond return based on the hubris hypothesis 
predicts that the acquiring firm bondholders lose from the non-synergistic merger, 
but the impact of merger on target bondholders is ambiguous. The testable 
hypothesis is: if the hubris hypothesis holds, there should be a negative acquiring 
firm bond return. 
 
This study examines shareholder and bondholder wealth with respect to 310 
acquisitions in the UK market between 1994 and 2006. It tests the 41-day and 3-day 
market-adjusted return (MAR) and abnormal return (AR) of target and acquiring firm 
shareholders and bondholders. The abnormal return is calculated by a short-term 
event study with daily data. The significant positive target stock return, negative 
acquirer stock return, positive target bond return and negative acquirer bond return 
preliminarily prove the wealth transfer hypothesis, the hubris hypothesis, and the 
bond return based on the hubris hypothesis. The combined security returns are 
studied by combining the excess returns of stock/bond and target/acquirer as value-
weighted average of the excess security returns to fur her test the hypotheses. These 
combined security returns show that stockholders lose, bondholders gain, target firms 
gain, acquirer firms lose, and shareholders/bondholders of target and acquiring firms 
as a whole lose. These results support the co-insura ce hypothesis, wealth transfer 
hypothesis, hubris hypothesis, and the bond return based on hubris hypothesis, and 
reject the synergy hypothesis. The univariate analysis and multivariate analysis test 
the influences of deal characteristics on the excess r turns of stocks and bonds. The 
deal characteristics include method of payment, hostility, industry relatedness, 
relative size and market trend. The univariate and multivariate analyses on the deal 
characteristics find that target and acquirer stock returns are higher with cash 
payment, acquirer stock returns are higher in friendly and industry unrelated 
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takeovers, the acquirer bond returns are higher in industry related takeovers, target 
firm share returns are higher when target size is smaller than the acquirer, target and 
acquirer stock returns are higher in bull market period, and acquirer bond returns are 
higher in the bear market period. 
 
The Second Topic 
Research on corporate finance has made substantial progress on the subject of 
capital structure. The M-M theorem proposition I states that a firm’s value is 
unaffected with its capital structure in a perfect capital market. By taking the tax 
shield of debt into consideration, the modified M-M theorem proposition I argues that 
it is advantageous for a firm to be levered as high as possible. The control hypothesis 
argues that debt helps shareholders reduce agency costs of free cash flow and 
promote managers’ efficiency, thus debt is a potential determinant of capital 
structure; the optimal capital structure is the point at which the marginal costs of debt 
equal to its marginal benefits. Based on the M-M theorem and control hypothesis, the 
trade-off theory considers that companies make financial decisions as a trade-off 
between interest tax shields and the costs of financial distress. Specifically, the static-
trade off theory considers that the leverage ratio is determined by a single period 
trade-off; the adjustment costs make the leverage rtios among firms having the same 
optimal leverage ratio randomly dispersed. The dynamic trade-off theory maintains 
that firms adjust their leverage ratios, and the deviations from their optimal leverage 
ratios are gradually removed over time. The pecking order theory disputes that firms 
do not have optimal capital structures, instead, they prioritise the financing sources 
according to the degree of effort and resistance—first with internal funds, then debt, 
last equity. The market timing theory believes that there is no optimal capital 
structure, and managers time the stock market by issuing (repurchasing) equity when 
their stocks are overvalued (undervalued). As a result, a firm’s observed capital 
structure is the cumulative outcome of historical equity performance.  
 
Based on the dynamic trade-off theory, a bunch of hypotheses link capital 
structure research with the event of takeovers, and forecast significant leverage ratio 
changes with takeovers. The co-insurance hypothesis advises that when two firms’ 
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earnings are not perfectly correlated, a merger can increase the debt capacity of the 
combined firm, so the combined firm takes advantage of the debt benefits and levers 
up. The unused debt capacity hypothesis explains that the combined firm levers up to 
consume the unused debt capacity from either the acquirer or target before the 
merger. The financial slack hypothesis uggests that the slack-rich acquiring firm 
actively searches for the slack-poor target firm with valuable investment 
opportunities, therefore the acquiring firm with low leverage ratio before the merger 
increases its leverage ratio with the merger. The commitment device hypothesis 
proposes that low leverage ratio plays a role of commitment device for the acquiring 
firm to deter its bidding rivals; after the merger, since debt loses its strategic value, 
the acquiring firm levers up to take the tax shield advantage. The wealth transfer 
hypothesis supposes that the acquiring firm levers up in takeover to expropriate 
wealth from existing bondholders to offset shareholders’ loss from the increasing 
debt capacity.  
 
This empirical research utilizes takeover as an event to investigate its potentially 
significant influences on acquiring firms’ book leverage ratios. It probes each 
acquiring firms’ book leverage ratio deviations in a standard 11-year window [-5, +5]. 
The deviations are computed in three stages. At the first stage, the tobit model runs a 
pooled cross-sectional regression on a number of lagged independent variables for 
firm-year [-5, -1] to estimate the coefficients of independent variables. At the second 
stage, the estimated coefficients are substituted into the tobit model to predict the 
optimal leverage ratios of firms in each of the elev n years. At the third stage, each 
firm’s optimal leverage ratio is subtracted from its actual book leverage ratio to get 
its deviation in each of the eleven years. The trend of the deviations in the 11-year 
window demonstrates that M&A changes firms’ leverag ratios dramatically at the 
announcement year, which fits the hypotheses that links takeovers and firms’ capital 
structures. The trend also illustrates that firms gradually converge their leverage 
ratios towards the optimisms in the years after merger, which is consistent with the 




This research then analyses the speed with which firms reverse back to their 
optimal leverage ratios by a standard partial adjustment model with OLS regression. 
It discovers a low but persistent adjustment speed, which is consistent with Fama and 
French (2002) and Flannery and Rangan (2006). In order to examine whether this 
low adjustment speed is caused by adjustment costs or by alternative theories that 
competing with the dynamic trade-off theory, variables proxy for pecking order 
theory, market timing theory and managerial inertial are added into the partial 
adjustment model for further tests. These tests reject all the alternative theories and 
find consistent evidence of dynamic trade-off effects, thus give indirect evidence that 
the low adjustment speed is caused by the adjustment costs. These results are 
consistent with Flannery and Rangan (2006). Last, this research tests the influences 
of method of payment and source of fund on leverage ratios. It reports that cash 
payment and raise of debt are inclined to increase lev rage ratios at announcement, 
and to maintain leverage ratios at a high level in the post-merger period. 
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Chapter 2 Theories on the Short-Run Returns 
2.1 Introduction 
This study is an empirical research which examines shareholders’ and 
bondholders’ wealth with respect to 310 mergers and acquisitions in the UK market 
between 1994 and 2006.  
 
Numerous studies have examined the influence of acquisitions on shareholders’ 
value, but the studies on bondholders’ wealth are limited. With the innovation of 
financial instruments and the development of financi l markets, bondholders are 
playing an increasingly important role in corporate finance. It is widely observed that 
firms prioritise their sources of funding with bonds over shares if external financing 
is required, which is explained by the pecking order th ory and signalling hypothesis. 
The creation of the high-yield bonds market by Michael Milken has transferred junk 
bonds as an effective method of payment in corporate raids, which fuelled the 1980s 
boom in leverage buy-outs and hostile takeovers. With the gradual recognition of 
corporate bonds’ volatility and the failure of the merged firms, the concern of 
protecting bondholders’ rights in takeovers is attracting increasing attention 
(McDaniel, 1988). 
 
Corporate restructuring could change the contracting relationship that exists 
between shareholders and bondholders through altering the firm’s operating 
performance, leverage ratio, cash flow variance, collateral and liquidation value 
(Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2008). Though it is controve sial among economists, 
lawyers and politicians as to whether bondholders lo e money from corporate 
restructuring, the legislation has confirmed that bondholders should be equally 
protected for their investment as shareholders. Specifically, in corporate takeovers, 
the management of a firm should not only try to get th  best price for its shareholders, 
but also try to shield existing bondholders against capital losses (McDaniel, 1988).  
 
Some cases have shown that takeovers could damage bondholders’ value by 
making the combined firm more risky. For example, the Spanish firm Grupo 
Ferrovial launched a hostile bid for BAA plc on 8th February 2006. The 
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announcement surprised the market and sent the BAA share up by 14.9% percent 
(from 655 pence on 7th February to 752.5 pence on 8th February)1. In fear that the 
takeover would make BAA bonds more risky (investors p edicted that the Spanish 
raider would load BAA with debt should it take control), BAA’s newly issued bond 
with amount of £2bn dropped to 95.16 euro from its 99.754 euro sale price 6 days 
ago2. Meanwhile, Standard & Poor's said it was likely to put BAA on credit watch 
with negative implications as long as a formal bid was on the agenda. Bondholders of 
this new bond reacted straight away—they co-ordinated a plan of action via the 
Association of British Insurers, demanding BAA insert a change of control clause 
guaranteeing that they would be bought back at par value if the company is taken 
over. Under big pressure, BAA agreed to buy back the £2bn of bonds at the issue 
price, plus interest, within 90 days of any takeover that saw them downgraded to 
below investment grade status. Analysts said that the change of control clause could 
increase acquirer’s financing needs by £2bn therefore acted as the “poison bill”, 
which would be upsetting to both acquirer and target shareholders. In the same 
month, the big European companies Scania AB and Svenska Cellulosa AB were 
forced to provide similar guarantees to sell their bonds.  
 
Verification of the bondholder wealth issue and legislation yet need to be 
supplemented by more evidence. One of the most important pieces of evidence that 
needs to be collected is the quantitative research bout the impact of M&A on 
bondholders’ value, and the comparison of shareholdrs’ and bondholders’ wealth. 
Research on bondholders’ wealth in respect to M&A has proceeded to some extent in 
the US market; however, the research in the UK market is still absent at the time of 
writing (April 2006). The above factors comprise th motivation for this topic which 
is the first empirical research of bondholders’ wealth in the UK market.  
 
Theories of this research are based on M&A motivations and shareholder-
bondholder conflicts. Motivations for M&A consist of four categories: 
macroeconomic motive, microeconomic motive, wealth transfer and managerialism. 
                                                
1 Datastream Advance. 




The macroeconomic motive includes deregulation, industrial wave, technological 
change and globalisation. The microeconomic motive includes economy of scale, 
scoop and learning. Wealth transfer describes the situations that acquisitions are 
motivated by the wealth transfer from other stakeholders to shareholders, and from 
target shareholders to acquiring firm shareholders. Managerialism talks about the 
agency problem that acquisitions is an effective weapon to remove uncompetitive 
target managers, the free cash flow theory that acquisitions is a better alternative for 
acquiring firm managers to waste cash flows on internal projects, and the hubris 
hypothesis that acquiring firm managers are incorrectly motivated by the non-
existent takeover gains. The shareholder-bondholder conflicts are made up of two 
theories: the equal compensation principle and agency theory, and the corporate 
finance models. Equal compensation principle and agency theory diagnose the 
conflict between shareholders and bondholders. It argues that it is difficult for 
management to equally maximise both shareholder and bondholder values. The 
corporate finance models investigates four financial decisions which benefit 
shareholders at the expense of bondholders—dividend payout, claim dilution, asset 
substitution and under-investment.  
 
Based upon the above theories, this research is desgned around five testable 
hypotheses to investigate M&A’s impact on the excess security returns: the co-
insurance effect, the wealth transfer hypothesis, the synergy effect, the hubris 
hypothesis, and the bond return based on the hubris hypothesis. These five 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. The co-insurance hypothesis tests the wealth 
of target bondholders and acquirer bondholders. According to this effect, the 
combination of two firms whose earning streams are imperfectly correlated would 
reduce the merged firm’s default risk. Therefore, the estable hypothesis is that co-
insurance effect exists if the value-weighted combination of excess returns of bond is 
positive. Wealth transfer hypothesis talks about six situations that could lead to 
wealth transfers: 1. acquisitions are motivated by shareholders’ incentive to get hold 
of wealth at the expense of others; 2. wealth can tr sfer from bondholders to 
shareholders due to the corporate finance models; 3. shareholders may enhance their 
wealth at the expense of bondholders by taking risky projects; 4. the diversification 
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effect of a merger could reduce the default risk of the combined firm, thus transfers 
wealth from shareholders to bondholders; 5. sharehold rs may transfer wealth from 
bondholders to themselves by levering up to utilize th  tax benefits from the co-
insurance effect; 6. target and acquirer bondholders transfer wealth between each 
other due to the maturity effect, leverage effect and risk effect. Therefore the testable 
hypothesis is that for the target shareholders, acquirer shareholders, target 
bondholders and acquiring bondholders, if one or moe parties observe negative 
return at the same time that one or more parties observe positive return, wealth 
transfer is present. Synergy implies the efficiencis created from macroeconomic and 
microeconomic motivations. The testable hypothesis is that a synergy exists if the 
value-weighted sum of excess return for the target shareholders, acquirer 
shareholders, target bondholders and acquiring bondholders is positive. Hubris 
hypothesis predicts that acquiring firms overpay for the target firms and no potential 
synergy will be achieved through mergers. The testable hypothesis is that hubris 
effect exists if the excess return for acquiring firm stocks is negative, the excess 
return for the target firm stocks is positive, and the value-weighted combination of 
excess stock return is negative. The bond return based on the hubris hypothesis 
predicts that the acquiring firm bondholders lose from the non-synergistic merger, 
but the impact of merger on target bondholders is ambiguous. The testable 
hypothesis is: if the hubris hypothesis holds, there should be a negative acquiring 
firm bond return. 
 
This study examines shareholder and bondholder wealth with respect to 310 
acquisitions in the UK market between 1994 and 2006. It tests the 41-day and 3-day 
market-adjusted return (MAR) and abnormal return (AR) of target and acquiring firm 
shareholders and bondholders. The abnormal return is calculated by a short-term 
event study with daily data. These excess returns ae used to test the co-insurance 
hypothesis, the wealth transfer hypothesis, the synergy hypothesis and the hubris 
hypothesis. The combined security returns are studied by combining the excess 
returns of stock/bond and target/acquirer as value-weighted average of the excess 
security returns to further test the hypotheses. The univariate analysis and 
multivariate analysis test the influences of deal characteristics on the excess returns 
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of stocks and bonds. The deal characteristics include method of payment, hostility, 
industry relatedness, relative size and market trend.  
 
Contributions of this study are as follows. First, it is the first empirical research 
to test UK bondholders’ wealth in acquisitions. Second, this research does a thorough 
review on existing theories which explain the shareolder and bondholder wealth in 
M&A, and designs out five testable hypotheses to explain the potential results. 
Compared with the research on shareholder wealth in t e field of M&A, bondholder 
wealth study is much less developed, and researchers ar  still in the process of 
developing rationales to explain the expected impact. Though they have brought 
forward some theories to explain the bond question, they have given different or 
even contradictory interpretations. For example, Lewellen (1971), Kim and 
McConnell (1977) and Billett et al. (2004) give different explanations for co-
insurance effect; in general, researchers befuddle the co-insurance effect, wealth 
transfer effect, incentive effect, and redistribution effect. This research contributes to 
describe theories and testable hypotheses through a standard and exhaustive way. 
Third, As MacKinlay (1997) argues, the power of event study increases substantially 
from reducing the sampling interval, this research utilizes daily bond price data 
which is much powerful than the recent studies which use monthly bond price data. 
This research is the second study that finds significant non-convertible bond returns 
for both target firms and acquiring firms (the other r search is Billett et al. (2004)). 
Fourth, this research finds a significantly negative Total security return, indicating 
acquisitions are value destroying, which has never be n found by previous research. 
Fifth, this is the first research to test the effect of stock market trend on bondholder 
returns, and it finds significant results.  
 
The reminder of this thesis is organised as follows. Section 2.2 investigates the 
literature. Section 2.3 comes up with hypotheses. Sction 2.4 reviews the evidences 
on prediction. Section 3.1 describes data and methodology. Section 3.2 discusses the 




2.2 Literature Review 
Acquisition usually refers to a company takes over another (usually smaller) and 
becomes the new owner; the target company ceases to xist post-transaction and 
stock of the acquiring company continues to be traded in the market (Lott and 
Loosvelt, 2005). Merger usually denotes two companies of the equal size combine to 
create a new company; both companies’ stocks are tender d or given up post-
transaction, and new company stock is issued in its place. Takeover usually refers to 
hostile transactions. In this thesis, acquisition, merger and takeover follow the 
definition of acquisition above and are interchangeabl  with each other.  
 
2.2.1 Motivations for M&A 
Motivations for M&A are divided into four categories—macroeconomic motive, 
microeconomic motive, wealth transfer and managerialism.  
 
The macroeconomic motive includes deregulation, industrial wave, 
technological change and globalisation (Sudarsanam, 2003). Deregulation introduces 
competition and inspires the merger wave. Industrial wave denotes the emergence of 
new industries, the retrenchment of old industries, and the rise and fall within 
industries’ longevity which causes M&A and divestitures. Technological change 
enables corporations to adjust themselves to react to the changes and to absorb the 
achievements of technology in industry, transportation and communication. 
Globalisation incorporates the regional economy (i.e., European Union, North 
American Free Trade Agreement) and global economy (World Trade Organization) 
and opens new territory for corporate business. Globalisation makes M&A an 
effective weapon for firms to exploit chances in the overseas market and to confront 
challenges in the domestic market. The macroeconomic motive can lead to co-
insurance effect and synergy effect which are discus ed in the hypothesis section. 
 
The microeconomic motive consists of economy of scale, economy of scope and 
economy of learning (Sudarsanam, 2003). The first factor is economy of scale. 
Takeover enables a firm to achieve a competitive advantage by spreading fixed costs 
over a larger number of products, and to improve competitive sales positions in the 
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course of enlarged monopoly power. The second motive is economy of scope. M&A 
makes the total costs of producing and selling several products by the multi-product 
firm less than the sum of the costs of producing and selling the same products by 
individual firms specializing in each of those products. The third motive is economy 
of learning. A firm can cut the costs of producing the same volume of output in 
successive production periods through the process of learning. Through a merger, 
one firm may learn from the experiences of success and failure of another firm. The 
microeconomic motive can also lead to co-insurance effect and synergy effect.  
 
Wealth transfer describes M&A motivate by two situations. Wealth can be 
transferred to shareholders from other stakeholders: shareholders (both bidder and 
target) benefit from reneging on compensations for target managers and pensions for 
target employees. Wealth can also be transferred from target firm shareholders to 
acquiring firm shareholders if the target firm is under-valued by the financial market. 
This under-valuation may come from the weak management of the target firm which 
causes a discount in its current market price, or come from the market imperfection 
of information so that the investing public temporarily undervalues this firm. When 
the investing public becomes aware of this under-estimate and re-appraise the target 
firm asset, the share price of acquiring firm will ncrease at the takeover 
announcement (Lewellen, 1971). In this situation, the target firm share price could 
increase as well.  
 
Managerialism can be classified as the ag ncy problem, free cash flow theory and 
hubris hypothesis.  
 
In an agency relationship the principal(s) engage the agent to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making power to the 
agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If both parties are utility maximizers, there is 
good reason to believe that the agent’s interests depart from the principals’. In a 
corporation, shareholders as principal appoint manager s agent to run the firm for 
the benefit of them. The separation of ownership and control creates the agency 
problem: since the management’s interest deviates from that of the shareholders and 
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its action cannot be monitored efficiently, it has the incentive to behave adversely to 
shareholders’ interests. A possible solution to the ag ncy problem is for shareholders 
to design a comprehensive contract to direct the management’s actions. However, the 
transaction costs make the comprehensive contract hard to carry out due to the costs 
of preparing for all eventualities, costs of negotiating, and costs of writing down the 
plans that can be enforced by a third party (Hart, 1995). Takeover is an efficient tool 
to diminish the agency costs. The under-performing firms run by incumbent 
management are likely to be the target of a takeover and the managers face the 
hazard of being replaced. In order to protect themselve  from the threat of acquisition 
and get support from shareholders in case of a hostile takeover, managers must 
operate the firm efficiently and maximize shareholder values. Takeovers motivated 
by the intention to remove incompetent target management can result in synergy 
effect and wealth transfer from target firm shareholders to acquiring firm 
shareholders (because target firm is undervalued).  
 
Free cash flow is defined as “cash flow in excess of that required to fund all of a 
firm's projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant 
cost of capital” (Jensen, 1988: 28). The agency problem causes conflicts between the 
managers and the shareholders upon the payout of free cash flow. When the firm is 
efficient, free cash flow should be paid to shareholders in order to maximize 
shareholders value. On the one hand, the payment of cash flow will directly shrink 
the managers’ powers. On the other hand, after cashis paid out, managers have to 
fund new projects on the capital market. This will put mangers’ behaviour under the 
surveillance of legislation, which is not what they want. For that reason, instead of 
paying out free cash flow to shareholders, managers d sire to expand the firm size by 
investing internally in order to control more resources and increase compensation, 
even if the firm size is adverse to shareholders’ wealth maximization. M&A is one 
alternative to investing internally. Firstly, the fr e cash flow of the acquiring firm can 
be paid to target shareholders rather than wasted by acquiring firm’s managers. 
Secondly, even if an acquisition does not create profit for the acquiring firm, it 
involves less waste of resources than the internal investment. Consequently, target 
shareholders gain and bidder shareholders lose less; thus, a takeover might increase 
 18 
 
the aggregate social welfare (the aggregate value of target firm and acquiring firm) 
than if the takeover had not happened. Thus wealth is transferred from acquiring firm 
shareholders to target firm shareholders. Thirdly, in the industries with low growth 
rate and large cash flow, M&A creates value by facilit t ng exit and mitigating the 
excess of capacity. Accordingly, M&A plays the role f synergy. 
 
Roll (1986) argues in his hubris hypothesis that bidding firms are incorrectly 
motivated by the non-existent takeover gains. Roll presumes the strong-form market 
efficiency that management talent is in its best use, industrial reorganization brings 
no gains in an aggregate output, and asset prices reflect all information about 
individual firms. Thereafter, the positive takeover premium brings no benefit to the 
purchasers but a winner’s curse. The empirical evidence shows that if the bid is 
unanticipated and conveys no information about the bidder except that it is seeking a 
combination with a particular target, the stock price of the bidding firm will decline 
with the announcement of the bid and with the consequence of winning a bid, and 
will increase on abandoning of the bid or losing a bid.  
 
2.2.2 Shareholder-Bondholder Conflicts 
This part talks about two theories, the equal compensation principle and agency 
theory, and the corporate finance. 
 
Equal compensation principle and agency theory diagnose the conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders. It argues that it is difficult for management to 
simultaneously serve both shareholder and bondholder. The corporate finance 
models investigates four financial decisions which benefit shareholders at the 
expense of bondholders—dividend payout, claim dilution, asset substitution and 
under-investment.  
 
2.2.2.1 Equal Compensation Principle and Agency Theory 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) utilize the equal compensation model to prove that 
when an agent's allocation of time or attention betwe n two different activities 
cannot be monitored by the principal, then either t marginal rate of return to the 
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agent from time or attention spent in each of the two activities must be equal, or the 
activity with the lower marginal rate of return receives no time or attention.  
 
This principle is applicable to corporate governance whereas the management is 
the agent, and shareholders and bondholders are the two principles. The management 
is assigned two tasks: to maximise shareholders’ value nd to protect bondholders’ 
value. In existence of the agency problem, the management’s ultimate goal is to 
maximise his own utility. It is unlikely for the man gement to serve both 
shareholders and bondholders equally. The management asures the benefits and 
costs of different investment decisions and prioritises either principal’s interest to 
maximise his own utility function. This principle identifies two agency relationships. 
First, the management’s interest stands with sharehold rs, therefore bondholders 
become the principal and management-shareholders become the agent. Because 
equity value is positively correlated with the variability of firm’s earnings, the agent 
is likely to undertake risky projects—the projects with high failure probabilities in 
which the payoff is high if it succeeds. As a result, shareholders seize the gains and 
bondholders bear the risks, and wealth is redistributed from bondholders to 
shareholders. Second, the management’s interest stands with bondholders, thereafter 
shareholders become the principle and management-bondholders become the agent. 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2008) comment that as management prefers to build less 
risky, diversified firms with lower leverage so as to reduce uncertainty of his human 
capital investment and to lessen the probability of bankruptcy and employment risk, 
he is likely to pass up profitable but risky investment opportunities at the expense of 
shareholders. Thus, management is naturally allied with bondholders. Under this 
circumstance, wealth transfers from shareholders to bondholders.  
 
According to the equal compensation principle and the agency theory, any 
corporate decisions are made by the management to serve one principal at the 
expense of the other principal in order to maximise th  management’s own utility. 
Takeover as a kind of corporate decisions could change the existing contracting 
relationship between shareholders and bondholders by altering the firm’s underlying 
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collateral and the riskiness of firm’s cash flows (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2008), 
thus results in the co-insurance effect (or opposite effect) and wealth transfer effect. 
 
2.2.2.2 Corporate Finance 
Developed on the equal compensation principle and agency theory, this section 
further discusses how management-shareholders could expropriate wealth from 
bondholders. Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2005) argue that financial decisions of 
dividend payout, claim dilution, asset substitution and under-investment are made by 
the manager benefiting shareholders at the expense of bondholders.  
 
Dividend payout: this analysis is based on Black and Scholes’ theory (1973) that 
corporate equity is a European call option (e which can be exercised only at the 
maturity date) on the assets of the firm, i.e., assuming the value of call option as 
criteria of share price. A firm’s unexpected increas  of dividend payment adds value 
to shareholders but lowers assets and planned investments; therefore bondholders 
lose with the decrease of firm assets. If a merger involves the payment of reserved 
cash, it has the same effect of unexpected dividend payout that the acquiring firm 
bondholders lose control over its cash flows (assets). As a result, wealth transfers 
from acquirer bondholders to target shareholders. 
 
 Claim Dilution: on assumption that the future firm is not safer, if the firm does 
not issue new debt, the existing bondholders have exclusive claim on the firm’s 
assets and revenues; if firm issues new debt with the same or more advanced claim, 
the value of the put option is higher than that without issuing new debt, but the claim 
of existing bondholders is diluted in case the firm value is below the promised 
payment, so there is a decline in existing bond value. Consequently, shareholders 
have the incentive to finance takeovers with issuing new debt with the same or more 
advanced claim than existing debt; hence wealth transfers from bondholders to 
shareholders. 
 
Asset Substitution: when firm substitutes existing asset with a riskier one, 
bondholders face higher risk, accordingly bond price falls, and at the same time put 
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option value increases. When two firms have different riskiness, a merger between 
them equals to substitute the safer firm’s assets with a riskier one, and the wealth 
transfers from the safer firm’s bondholders to its shareholders, and to the riskier 
firm’s bondholders. 
 
Under-investment: Myers (1977) comes up with this problem. If a firm gives up a 
chance to invest in a project with potential positive net present value, bondholders 
may suffer from such opportunity loss. If the return of investment is not enough for 
payment to bondholders, shareholders are likely to pass up the investment 
opportunity; however, bondholders would prefer the investment as soon as the net 
present value of investment is positive. The interpretation is that for their own sake, 
shareholders quit certain investment opportunities, so bondholders lose the potential 
opportunities of earning. If the acquiring firm gives up a chance for organic growth 
but involves in a takeover, wealth transfers from its bondholders to shareholders.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
Based on the theories in M&A motivations and shareholder-bondholder conflicts, 
this research designs out five testable hypotheses to investigate the excess returns of 
acquiring firm shareholders and bondholders, and targe  firm shareholders and 
bondholders. These five hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.  
 
2.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Co-insurance Effect 
Testable hypothesis: the co-insurance effect exists if the value-weighted 
combination of excess returns of bonds is positive. 
 
Lewellen (1971) argues that if earnings of two firms are less than perfectly 
correlated, their merger will create values for thejoint firm. He considers takeovers 
as a portfolio of income streams between the bidding a d target corporations. He 
argues that the benefit of this portfolio on merger comes from the operational 
advantages which could not be realized by individual investors’ portfolio of two 
firms’ shares on the stock market. He believes this factor will contribute to the new 
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firm’s income stream, and the unused debt capacity of he target firm could increase 
the borrowing power of the combined firm. 
 
Kim and McConnell (1977) quote this notion as co-insurance effect. They argue 
that the portfolio diversification of two or more firms whose earnings streams are 
imperfectly correlated would reduce the merged firm’s default risk and increase debt 
capacity; hence the merged firm’s bondholders benefit. If the combined firm 
increases its financial leverage after merger and if bondholders do not lose, co-
insurance exists.  
 
Billett et al. (2004) further this theory and argue that when merging firms have 
imperfectly correlated cash flows, the one with risky debt benefits and the other loses. 
Furthermore, they argue that based on Galai and Masulis (1976), when the merger is 
a non-synergistic one, the increase in bondholder walth via co-insurance comes 
exactly from stockholders’ losses. Regarding Shastri’s (1990) hypotheses of risk 
effect, leverage risk and maturity risk, and his prediction that targets are riskier than 
acquirers (which is contradict to Lewellen’s prediction), they conclude that the fact 
that target bondholders gain while acquirer bondholers lose is evidence of co-
insurance.  
 
The above arguments can be supported by the theories of M&A motivations. The 
macroeconomic motives of deregulation, industrial wve, technological change and 
globalisation enable firms to engage in conglomerate mergers and cross-border 
mergers, to absorb new technologies, and to hedge risk against economic cycles. The 
microeconomic motives of economy of scale, scope and learning enable firms to 
achieve competitive advantage, to enlarge market share and to reduce costs. All of 
these behaviours could reduce the riskiness of the combined firms and make their 
cash flows less volatile, thus bondholders as a whole benefit.   
 
Lewellen (1971), Kim and McConnell (1977) and Billett t al. (2004) agree that 
if two firms’ income streams are imperfectly correlat d, the corporate merger should 
have impact on the combined firm’s debt capacity and bondholders’ wealth. 
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However, they deviate from each other on the testable hypothesis of co-insurance 
effect. These conflicting explanations of the co-insurance effect might be confusing 
for empirical tests. Lewellen (1971) considers that under the co-insurance effect, 
takeovers provide a protection for bondholders which is not available under loan they 
would make to the prospective merger partners as independent identities, thus 
bondholders as a whole benefit. Kim and McConnell (1977) emphasize the co-
insurance effect exist if the merged firm’s bondholder do not lose, and the combined 
firm levers up. The later constriction is more like an incentive effect under which the 
managers have the incentive to raise leverage. Billett et al. (2004)’s opinion on co-
insurance involves shareholder wealth, and focus more on wealth transfer. Actually, 
co-insurance effect could have compound effects on hareholders’ wealth. By taking 
share price as a positive function of the variability of firm’s cash flows, the co-
insurance effect decreases the combined firm’s default risk, thus reduces 
shareholders’ wealth. In contrary, the takeover enables the firms to negotiate the 
method of payment, and they could use this mechanism to consume the debt capacity 
raised by the co-insurance (tax shield), which should increase shareholders’ wealth.  
 
By bringing together the theories of M&A motivations and the opinions of the 
three papers, this research designs a more logical testable hypothesis: the co-
insurance effect exists if the value-weighted combined excess returns of acquiring 
firm bonds and target firm bonds are positive. 
  
2.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Wealth Transfer 
Testable Hypothesis: for the acquirer shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target 
shareholders and target bondholders, if one or more parties observe negative excess 
return at the same time that one or more parties oberve positive excess return, 
wealth transfer is present.  
 
Wealth transfer is a complex phenomenon in takeovers and it attributes to many 
factors. First, it is directly caused by shareholders’ incentive to get hold of wealth at 
the expense of others. Target shareholders and acquirer shareholders can benefit 
from reneging on target firms’ contracts with stakeholders such as managers, 
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employees, customers and suppliers. Second, shareholders can also transfer wealth to 
them by taking over an under-valued firm due to the imperfection of financial market; 
although target firm shares may increase at the announcement because investors 
realised its true value, at least part of target share olders’ wealth has already been 
transferred to acquirer shareholders by that time. Third, when a target firm is under-
valued owing to existence of agency problem, the merger could also transfer its 
shareholders wealth to the acquiring firm shareholders. Fourth, under the free cash 
flow theory, when managers pay out free cash flow t acquire another firm (suppose 
the synergy does not exist) other than distributing dividends to its shareholders, 
wealth is transferred from acquirer shareholders to target shareholders.   
 
Second, wealth can transfer from bondholders to shareholders due to the 
corporate finance models of dividend payout, claim dilution, asset substitution and 
under-investment. If an M&A deal involves cash payment, it has the same effect of 
dividend payout that the acquiring firm bondholders lo e control on its cash flows 
(assets) thus wealth transfers to target firm sharehold rs. Furthermore, if the cash 
payment is financed with issuance of new debt, bondh lders (for both acquiring 
firms and target firms) suffer a loss due to the claim dilution. When the two firms 
have difference riskiness, the merger equals to substit te the safer firm’s assets with 
a riskier one, and the wealth transfers from safer firm’s bondholders to its 
shareholders, and to the riskier firm’s bondholders. In case of under-investment, 
suppose the acquiring firm gives up a chance for organic growth but involves in a 
takeover, the wealth transfers from acquiring firm bondholders to shareholders.  
 
Third, as discussed in equal compensation principle, because equity value is 
positively correlated with the variability of firm’s earnings, managers may have the 
incentive to transfer wealth from bondholders to share olders by undertaking 
investment projects which increase the firm’s riskiness (specifically, to increase the 
financial leverage), and merger is such kind of corporate investment. Settle et al. 




Fourth, the diversification effect of a merger could reduce the default risk of the 
combine firm, which in turn increases bondholder’s value but decreases 
shareholders’ value. As a result, wealth transfers from shareholders to bondholders. 
Eger (1983) and Maquieira et al. (1998) refer this as “redistribution” effect. 
 
Fifth, if the merger increases debt capacity (it is the break-even point at which the 
marginal benefit of debt equals to the marginal cost of debt) for the combined firm 
due to co-insurance, the new firm will have the incentive to make use of this benefit 
(say, tax shield) by raising leverage, hence wealth transfers from bondholders to 
shareholders.  
 
Sixth, Shastri (1990) comes up with the maturity effect, leverage effect and risk 
effect which predicts the wealth transfer between bondholders. If there are bonds 
with different maturity length, wealth transfer applies: the value of bonds with a 
shorter maturity goes up and the value of bonds with a longer maturity goes down. 
Shastri advances the notion of maturity effect. Assume there are two bonds 
belonging to the acquirer and target firm, respectiv ly. Bond A has a shorter maturity, 
and bond B has a longer maturity. To bond B, the merger is equivalent to the firm 
issuing a new debt with shorter maturity. Suppose the merger authorizes the two 
bonds with equal priority. If at the time of bond A’s redemption, the firm value is 
higher than the bond’s par value, bond A is paid in full. Therefore bond A is to some 
extent senior to bond B, which affects positively on bond A and negatively on bond B. 
In the case that the firm goes bankrupt, the equal priority clause comes into play. 
Bond A has to share the liquidated firm with bond B, and the maturity difference is 
meaningless, having a negative effect on bond A and positive effect on bond B. In 
each situation, the values of the two bonds are negatively related, which is the 
evidence of wealth transfer. Shastri argues that by considering the above two 
situations, bond A’s value is jointly influenced by the probability of bankruptcy at 
maturity date and the bankruptcy sharing rule. For “reasonable” firm value and bond 
A’s par value, the probability of bankruptcy is small, i.e., negative component of the 
maturity effect (with probabilityp ) is smaller than the positive component (with 
probability 1- p ), hence the overall maturity effect on bond A is positive. For bond B, 
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Shastri deems that since the “new” issue of bond A is followed by a change of firm 
value, and the change is generally greater than the par value of bond A, the maturity 
effect on bond B is ambiguous. I do not agree with this point of view because of its 
contradiction. If the change of firm value is greater han the par value of bond A,
there would be two results—when the change is negative, he new firm goes 
bankrupt, hence bond A loses and bond B gains; when the change is positive, bond A 
is paid in full, so bond A gains and bond B loses. Shastri’s argument that the 
probability of bankruptcy is small suggests that the second result dominates, so it 
should expect the overall maturity effect on bond B to be negative instead of 
ambiguous.  
 
As the acquiring firm and acquired firm have different leverage ratios, a merger 
will make the combined firm’s leverage ratio greater than one firm and less than the 
other. Therefore, the bondholders of the lower-leverag d firm suffer a wealth transfer 
to the bondholders of the higher-leveraged firm (Shastri, 1990).  
 
If the two firms’ risks (weighted average bond credit rating) are different, there is 
a wealth transfer from bondholders of a higher rating f rm to bondholders of a lower 
rating firm. 
 
Above discussions cannot exhaust all the possibilities of wealth transfer in 
takeovers because some outsiders whose wealth cannot be monitored by this study. 
By considering all the above situations and the validity of data, this research designs 
a testable hypothesis: for the acquirer shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target 
shareholders and target bondholders, if one or more parties observe negative return at 
the same time that one or more parties observe positive return, wealth transfer is 
present.  
   
2.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Synergy Effect  
Testable Hypothesis: synergy effect exists when the valu -weighted sum of excess 
return for the acquirer shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target shareholders and 
target bondholders is positive. 
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Synergy implies “possible or actual good effects of the joining together of two 
companies in terms of higher efficiency or productivity” 3 . It is usually a core 
negotiating point between the acquirer and target managers and shareholders, which 
has a big influence on deal value. A potential synergy can increase revenue and 
decrease cost for the combined firm.  
 
In the macroeconomic level, mergers motivated by deregulation, industrial wave, 
technological change and globalisation could bring to ether two firms’ relative 
advantages, and achieve a sustainable growth. Co-insura ce effect between 
bondholders is a special example of synergy. In the microeconomic level, takeovers 
stimulated by economy of scale, scope and learning help the combined firm to reduce 
cost, share distribution channels, increase market share, promote R&D and enhance 
attractiveness to customers. Penas and Unal (2004) suggest both shareholders and 
bondholders gain from synergistic mergers because firm value can increase by 
achieving economies of scale and scope. In the free cash flow model, synergy works 
by facilitating exit and mitigating the excess of capacity of firms in the industries 
with low growth rate and large cash flow through mergers.  
 
This research devises a testable hypothesis for the syn rgy effect to sum up all 
the above factors: a synergy exists if the value-weight d sum of excess return for the 
acquirer shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target shareholders and target 
bondholders is positive. 
 
2.3.4 Hypothesis 4: Hubris Hypothesis 
Testable Hypothesis: if the excess return for the acquiring firm stock is negative, 
the excess return for the target firm stock is positive, and the value-weighted 
combination of excess stock return is negative, hubris effect exists.  
 
Roll (1986) posits the hubris hypothesis as the explanation of the motivations for 
takeovers. According to the hubris hypothesis, managements of bidding firms simply 
pay too much for their targets. This hypothesis rega ds all markets as strong-form 
                                                
3 Oxford Advanced Learner’s English-Chinese Dictionary (Extended fourth edition), Hong Kong: The 
Commercial Press and Oxford University Press, 2002, p 2003. 
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efficient. In financial markets, all investors are investment specialists, they have 
costless access to currently available information about the future, and they observe 
the market prices closely and adjust their holdings promptly (the market efficiency 
means that the market prices in average reflect ration l behaviour; there is no 
evidence to indicate that every individual behaves rationally). In product markets, 
there is perfect competition and prices of goods well r flect supply-demand 
equilibrium. In labour markets, managers are competent and operate firms efficiently. 
Accordingly, corporations’ efficiencies are maximized and their market share values 
substantially represent their intrinsic values. Under such circumstances, there is no 
potential synergy or other sources of gains, but bidding firm management believes 
such gains exist. Thus the takeover premium overstat s the increase in economic 
value of the combination, and at least part of the arget share gains at the 
announcement period present a simple wealth transfer from bidding firm 
shareholders.  
 
The hubris hypothesis predicts that at the announcement period, 1) the value of 
target firm should increase, 2) the value of acquiring firms should decrease, and 3) 
the combined firm value should fall slightly. Previous research shows large increase 
for target shares in announcement period and mixed results for the acquiring firm 
value and thus combined firm value. Roll (1986) interprets the complex acquiring 
firm return results by three reasons: 1) the bid can convey contaminating information 
(for instance, information about bidder’s cash flows hich are not predicted by the 
market) other than the takeover itself, 2) the anticipation of the bid results in an 
announcement effect smaller in absolute value than e true economic effect, 3) the 
overwhelming size of acquirer on target buries the eff ct of bid in the noise of 
acquirer’s return volatility.  
 
In this research, the testable hypothesis for hubris effect is: the excess returns for 
acquiring firm stock is negative, the excess return for the target firm stocks is 




2.3.5 Hypothesis 5: Bond Return Based on Hubris Hypothesis 
Testable Hypothesis: if the hubris hypothesis holds, there should be a negative 
acquiring firm bond return. 
 
Roll’s hubris hypothesis only considers the excess stock return. It can be 
developed into a new hypothesis to explain the excess bond return: when hubris 
hypothesis holds, the acquiring firm bondholders lose from the anticipation of bond 
market on the bad financial and operational performance of the new firm (there will 
be no synergy); the target firm bondholders benefit from the decrease of leverage 
ratio as a result of share price increase, but lose from the anticipation of combined 
firms’ bad operation; thereafter the impact of merger on target bondholders is 
ambiguous. Hence, the testable hypothesis is: if the hubris hypothesis holds, there 
should be a negative acquiring firm bond return. 
 
 Table 2-1 summarises the five testable hypotheses with respect to excess security 
returns. SA  stands for acquiring firm share return, BA  stands for acquiring firm bond 
return, ST  stands for target firm share return, andBT  stands for target firm bond 
return. The co-insurance effect exists if the value-weighted combination of excess 
returns of bonds is positive: BA + BT >0. Wealth transfer exists if for the acquirer 
shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target sharehold rs and target bondholders, one 
or more parties observe negative excess return at the same time that one or more 
parties observe positive excess return. Synergy exists if the value-weighted sum of 
excess return for the acquirer shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target shareholders 
and target bondholders is positive: SA + BA + ST + BT >0. Hubris hypothesis exists if 
the excess return for acquiring firm stock is negative, the excess return for the target 
firm stock is positive, and the value-weighted combination of excess stock return is 
negative: SA <0, ST >0 and SA + ST <0. Bond return based on hubris hypothesis 
exists if the hubris hypothesis holds, and the acquiring firm bond return is negative: 
SA <0, ST >0, SA + ST <0, and BA <0.       
 30 
 
Table 2-1 Hypotheses 
Co-insurance: the co-insurance effect exists if the value-weighted combination of excess returns of bonds is 
positive. Wealth transfer: for the acquirer shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target shareholders and t rget 
bondholders, if one or more parties observe negative excess return at the same time that one or more parties 
observe positive excess return. Synergy: if the value-weighted sum of excess return for the acquirer 
shareholders, acquirer bondholders, target sharehold rs and target bondholders is positive. Hubris hypothesis: if 
the excess return for acquiring firm stock is negative, the excess return for the target firm stock is po itive, and 
the value-weighted combination of excess stock return is negative. Bond return based on hubris hypothesis: if 
the hubris hypothesis holds, there should be a negativ  cquiring firm bond return. 
Hypotheses SA  BA  ST  BT  SA + ST  BA + BT SA + BA + ST + BT  
1.   Co-insurance          +   
2.   Wealth Transfer 
One or more loses while  
one or more gains 
  
3.   Synergy        + 
4.   Hubris Hypothesis -  +   -     
5.   Bond Return Based on Hubris - - +  -   
SA —acquiring firm share return;         BA —acquiring firm bond return; 




2.4. Evidence on Predictions 
2.4.1 Shareholder Returns 
Previous studies on short-term target shareholder wealth find persistent evidences 
of significant positive returns at the announcement period, despite capital market 
variation, deal characteristics and firm characteris ics. Studies on short-term acquirer 
shareholder wealth find diversified results. The research of Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
on 7 papers of tender offer reports 2-day weighted-average abnormal returns of 
3.81% for successful bidders and -1.11% for unsuccessful bidders; 3 papers of 
mergers report 2-day weighted-average abnormal returns of -0.05% for successful 
bidder and 0.15% for unsuccessful bidders; 5 papers of mergers on announcement 
month show weighted-average abnormal returns of 1.37% for successful bidders and 
2.45% for unsuccessful bidders; besides, 3 papers of total abnormal returns from 
offer announcement through outcome report -1.77% for successful bidders and -
4.28% for unsuccessful bidders. According to the survey of Bruner (2004) on 54 
papers published between 1978 and 2003 of acquirer shareholder returns, 26% (14) 
reports value destruction, 31% (17) show value conservation, and 43% (23) show 
value creation.  
 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) study the 3-day abnormal returns for 281 
acquisitions (with available data) from 1990 through 1999. They find that an average 
target return of 20.2% offset the bidder return of -0.37% with a 3.56% value-
weighted return for the combined stock return. Burch (2001) studies 4-day abnormal 
returns of 2067 mergers announced between 1988 and 1995. He finds 25.6% return 
for targets with lockup option, 16.3% for targets without lockup option, -2% return 
for bidder with lockup option and -0.4% for bidder without lockup option. Andrade 
et al. (2001) study 3-day abnormal returns of 3688 mergers that were announced 
between 1973 and 1998 and report target returns between 15.9% and 16.0% (sub-
sample of 4 decades), acquirer returns between -0.3% and -1.0%, and combined 
returns between 1.5% and 2.6%. Fuller et al. (2002) study the 5-day abnormal returns 
of 3135 takeovers between 1990 and 2000. They find -1.07% return for acquirers if 
the targets are public firms. Officer (2003) explores the 7-day abnormal returns of 
2511 acquisition bids from 1988 to 2000. He discovers 22.16% return for targets and 
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-1.16% return for acquirers. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) test 5-day abnormal 
returns of 187 bids between 1993 and 2000, reporting 12.96% return for target firms 
and 1.18% return for acquiring firms. Danbolt (2004) examines 389 domestic and 96 
cross-border acquisitions between 1986 and 1991. He reports the 4-day abnormal 
returns of targets are 24.37% for domestic deals and 30.71% for cross-border deals 
(market model). Gregory and McCorriston (2005) investigate the 5-day abnormal 
returns of 333 acquisitions between 1985 and 1994, and find -0.022% for acquiring 
firms overall. Moellera et al. (2005) test 28182 acquisitions betwe n 1980 and 2001, 
and report 3-day abnormal returns between 0.64% and 1.20% for each of the decades 
for acquiring firms. They discover a negative aggreat  dollar return of $-429897 
million for all the acquiring firms. They also discover the aggregate combined values 
of target and acquiring firms are positive for deals between 1980 and 1997, and 
negative for deals between 1998 and 2001 ($-134 billion). They argue the large loss 
of acquiring firm shareholders from 1998 through 2001 is the result of a small 
number of acquisition announcements with extremely large losses, which attributes 
to the agency problem that “high valuations increase managerial discretion, making it 
possible for managers to make poor acquisitions when t y have run out of good 
ones”, and investors are aware of this at the annoucement time. Fan and Goyal 
(2006) look at 2162 completed mergers from 1962 to 1996, and they report 0.019% 
value-weighted 3-day return for the combination of targets and acquirers. Campa and 
Hernando (2006) study the 3-day abnormal returns of 172 mergers took place 
between 1998 and 2002, and discover 3.24% return for target firms and -0.87% 
return for acquiring firms. Wang and Xie (2008) examine the 11-day abnormal 
returns of 396 completed mergers and acquisitions between 1990 and 2004. They 
report 21.52% return for the targets, -2.91% for the acquiring firms, and 0.97% for 
the value-weighted portfolio of targets and acquirers.  
 
Overall, these empirical results demonstrate significant positive returns for target 
shareholders and slight negative returns for acquirer shareholders, which support the 
wealth transfer hypothesis. The positive combined values from Mulherin and Boone 
(2000), Andrade et al. (2001), Fan and Goyal (2006) and Wang and Xie (2008) 
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support the synergy hypothesis. The negative aggregate combined value from 
Moellera et al. (2005) support the hubris hypothesis.  
 
2.4.2 Bondholder Returns 
Kim and McConnell (1977) do the first research on the influence of M&A on 
bondholder wealth. They investigate 37 US conglomerate merger deals announced 
between 1960 and 1973 involving 21 acquiring firms with 24 bonds and 18 target 
firms with 20 bonds. They attain the bond price data from the Standard & Poor’s 
Bond Guide. They use a long-term event study with monthly bond data to compute 
the abnormal bond returns by a paired-comparison technique and the two-index 
market model. They use the merger date as the event date, which is unlikely to 
capture the market reaction as accurate as the announcement date. In the paired-
comparison test, the normal bond return is measured by a non-merging firm which 
matches each of the bonds of the merging firms based on bond rating, term to 
maturity, coupon interest rate and industries. The abnormal return of bond is 
calculated as the price difference between the non-merging firm bond and the 
merging firm bond. The event window is a 48 month window. In the two-index 
market model, they employ a market model with both a stock index and a bond index 
to measure the normal bond return. The abnormal return of bond is calculated as the 
price difference between the individual bond price and the market indexes. The event 
window is a 36 month window. They report the combined abnormal returns of both 
target and acquirers. For the paired-comparison model, the announcement month 
abnormal return is -0.507% and the 48 months cumulative bnormal return is 1.002%; 
for the two-index market model, the announcement month abnormal return is -0.45% 
and the 36 month cumulative abnormal return is -1.53%. None of the returns are 
statistically significant. Thus they find no abnormal returns to the bondholders of 
mergers. Furthermore, they find firms tend to make gr ater use of leverage after 
merger than the combination of individual firms did before the merger. In the 
absence of co-insurance effect, the increase of financial leverage should transfer 
wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Since bondh lders do not suffer windfall 
losses due to the increase of leverage ratio, this is the indirect evidence that co-
insurance effect did take place.  
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Settle et al. (1984) base their research on Kim andMcConnell (1977) and 
Asquith and Kim (1982), and intend to examine the bondholder wealth and the 
incentive effect (leverage changes).  They look at 53 mergers announced between 
1961 and 1977, involving 58 firms with 90 bonds (they do not specify how many 
acquiring firms and how many target firms). They collect the bond price from the 
Moody’s Bond Record and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. They use a 
long-term event study with monthly bond data to calculate the excess bond returns of 
all the firms. They employ a term-adjusted technique (remove components related to 
the term structure of interest rates) to compute the excess bond returns. Normal 
return for each corporate bond is based on the return of a hypothetical government 
bond which has the same duration with the corporate bond; excess return is the 
difference between the actual return of a corporate bond and the hypothetical return 
of a government bond. The event window is a 21 month window. They find 4.27% 
cumulative abnormal bond returns (significant) for the 21 month window. They 
attribute the difference of results from Asquith and Kim (1982) to sample and 
methodology. Settle et al. then examine the relationship between bondholder gains 
and both the pre-merger debt ratios and post-merger changes in debt ratios, and find 
the evidence for the incentive effect is negligible. Inclusion, their research supports 
the co-insurance effect.  
 
Walker (1994) examines the announcement month abnormal eturns of 65 
takeovers involving 92 firms with 260 bonds between 1980 and 1988. He reports 
return of the 33 target firms as 0.83%, return of the 35 acquiring firms with cash 
offers as -0.73%, return of the 12 acquiring firms with stock offers as 1.39%, and 
return of the total 92 firms as 0.31%. None of these returns are statistically 
significant. He also discovers that bond returns are inversely related to issuer default 
risk (statistically significant), which supports the wealth transfer hypothesis.  
 
2.4.3 Shareholder and Bondholder Returns 
Some empirical studies have been done on the impact of M&A on both 
shareholder and bondholder wealth, and they mainly focus on the US market. 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2008) summarise the results of even papers on US 
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bondholder wealth effects of merger and acquisitions. They conclude that the results 
for acquiring firms are ambiguous, but bondholders do not gain; the results on target 
firms are unanimous, and bondholders earn normal returns. Due to the extent that 
target firms are usually smaller and lower rated, the normal return from target 
bondholders does not support the co-insurance hypotesis and wealth transfer 
hypothesis which expect higher abnormal return for them. Rathinasamy et al. (1991) 
argue that mergers have no noticeable impact on bondholder wealth because wealth 
transfer from stockholders to bondholders are neutralised by incentive effects that 
managers increase the leverage ratios after merger. Asquith and Kim (1982) and 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) ascribe the mild bondhol er returns to bond covenants 
which effectively protect bondholder wealth. 
 
Early research obtains bond data from diversified databases, and their sample 
sizes are relatively smaller. Owing to the sample siz limit, they either test the target 
and acquirer bonds together or only test the acquirer bonds. Their methods of 
calculating abnormal returns are more complex than later research. 
 
Asquith and Kim (1982) follow Kim and McConnell (1977) to study the 
influences of conglomerate mergers on bondholder wealth. There are three 
developments from their study: first, this is the first study of both bondholder and 
shareholder wealth on M&A (the examination of both security returns is necessary in 
order to distinguish wealth transfer effect from synergy effect); second, they use 
announcement date as the event date (the variable time lag of merger date creates 
noise for the test); third, they utilize both long-term and short-term event studies 
(daily study is more accurate than monthly study). They study 28 acquiring firms 
with 38 non-convertible bonds and 22 target firms with 24 non-convertible bonds 
which involved in mergers between 1960 and 1978. They collect monthly bond price 
from the Bank and Quotation Record, daily bond price from the Wall Street Journal, 
and matching monthly and daily bond prices from the Standard and Poor’s Bond 
Guide. They use a variety of models for the event studies. They choose the paired-
comparison technique to test the monthly abnormal return of bond with a 25 month 
event window. They use the raw return as the daily abnormal return of bond with a 
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21 day event window. For the daily study, since many bonds do not trade more than 
once during these 21 days, the number of firms is reduced to 11 for acquiring firms 
and 6 for target firms. They use the Capital Asset Pricing Model to check the 
monthly abnormal return of stock whereas the estimate of the expected rate of return 
on the market portfolio is the equal weighted averag  return of all stocks on New 
York Stock Exchange. The event window for acquiring firms is a 25 month window, 
and the event window for target firms is a 13 month window. As stock returns which 
are summed over several event time periods may overlap in calendar time periods, 
Asquith and Kim modify the CAPM model by forming a portfolio in each calendar 
time period that covers several relative time periods. For this method, the event 
window for acquiring firms is a 15 month window, and the event window for target 
firms is a 3 month window. They test the daily abnormal return of stock by a market 
model and the event window is a 20 day window. The expected rate of return on each 
stock is estimated by grouping annually all securities on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the American Stock and Options Exchange i to 10 equal-size 
portfolios according to their market risk. The abnormal return of a stock is calculated 
as the difference between the actual stock return and the return to its counterpart 
portfolio. They report 1.13% abnormal bond return (insignificant) for the acquiring 
firms, 1.51% abnormal bond return (insignificant) for the target firms, and 1.29% 
abnormal bond return (insignificant) for all firms of the 25 months event window. 
They also report 0.203% abnormal bond return (insignificant) for the acquiring firms, 
1.391% abnormal bond return (insignificant) for the target firms, and 0.622% 
abnormal bond return (insignificant) for all firms of the 2-day event window (-1,0). 
They do not report the long-term cumulative abnormal stock returns for either 
acquirers or targets and their statistics; they do not report the combined stock returns 
either. The announcement month abnormal stock return is 1.54% for the acquiring 
firms (insignificant) and 18.29% for the target firms (significant). The two-day 
announcement period abnormal stock returns are 1.0% for acquiring firms 
(insignificant) and 11.0% for target firms. In conclusion, target stockholders gain, 
acquiring stockholders, acquiring bondholders, and target bondholders neither gain 
nor lose. The four securityholders of the merging firms gain as a whole. It concludes 
that mergers have no noticeable impact on bondholder returns, and there is no 
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noticeable wealth transfer between shareholders and bo holders. This confirms the 
synergy effect. They attribute the results to an effici nt market which has resolved 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondh lders.   
 
 Eger (1983) suggests that a non-synergistic merger transfers wealth from 
stockholders to bondholders as a result of decreased cash flow variance of the 
combined firm (he calls this “redistribution” theory). The wealth transfer theory is 
specific to mergers through pure stock exchange because there is no systematic bias 
in the change in financial leverage which dilutes the wealth transfer. A merger 
involving new issues of debt or cash payment could offset the effect of wealth 
transfer4. He assigns the failures of Kim and McConnell (1977) and Asquith and Kim 
(1982) to detect significant bondholder wealth effect to the inclusion of non-
exchange mergers in their samples. Eger (1983) analyses the effects of pure 
exchange M&A announcements between 1958 and 1980. 38 deals with 41 bonds 
satisfy his selection criteria, involving 33 acquiring firms and 6 target firms whilst in 
each deal either the acquirer or the target firm has publicly traded non-convertible 
bonds. He obtains bond prices as well as control portfoli  bond prices from the Wall 
Street Journal. Eger takes a short-term event study with daily stock and bond data to 
measure the excess returns. He uses a paired-comparison technique to calculate the 
51-day excess bond return. The expected return for each bond is estimated as the 
return on a portfolio of 10 bonds which have similar r ting and maturity date to the 
sample bond. The excess bond return is the differenc  of the actual return of bond 
and the return of its corresponding portfolio. Then  utilizes a mean-adjusted model 
to test the 51-day excess stock return. The expected re urn for each stock is the mean 
return for the stock during the estimation window. For the thin trading problem, he 
tested two assumptions, the jump returns assumption (i  assumes there is no change 
in the price of a bond in the absence of a trade) and the continuous returns 
assumption (it assumes the value changes associated wi h a price change have 
occurred uniformly over the days between two trades), and finds the former one 
                                                
4 Eger (1983, page 548): A merger involves new issue of debt can be viewed as two concurrent transactions: a 
merger through pure stock exchange and the exchange of some outstanding stock for debt. An exchange of stock 
for debt reduces outstanding debt values. A merger involves cash payment can be viewed as a merger throug  
pure stock exchange followed by a repurchase of some outstanding shares. When a repurchase of shares ws 
announced, there is slight decrease in the value of d bt. 
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preferable. Eger reports the cumulative abnormal returns and statistic tests in a 
chaotic pattern, which is difficult to interpret and cannot be compared with other 
event studies. The 30-day pre-announcement cumulative bnormal bond returns are 
0.886136% (significant) on jump assumption and 0.948605% (significant) on 
continuous assumption for the acquirer bonds. He dos not report target bonds 
cumulative abnormal returns in the consistent way as the acquirer bonds on the same 
event window, and he does not report the statistic test either. His footnote states that 
the 51-day cumulative abnormal bond returns for targets are 3% for both 
assumptions. The 30-day cumulative abnormal stock returns are -0.3061% for the 
acquirers (insignificant) (N=37) and 9.985% for targets (significant). Consequently, 
the results support the co-insurance hypothesis and sy ergy hypothesis.  
 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) test the effects of M&A announcements on the 
prices of common stock, convertible preferred stock, non-convertible preferred stock, 
convertible bond, and non-convertible bond between 1962 and 1980. Their primary 
purpose of research is to detect the impact of merger on the market value of merging 
firms’ various securities. 132 deals satisfy their selection criteria, involving 94 
acquiring firms and 81 target firms where in each deal either the acquirer or target 
firm has publicly and actively traded senior securities. There are 42 deals that both 
the acquiring and target firms have senior securities. The target firms have 25 
convertible preferred stock, 40 convertible bonds, 21 nonconvertible preferred stock, 
and 27 nonconvertible bonds; the acquiring firms have 70 convertible preferred stock, 
33 convertible bonds, 32 nonconvertible preferred stock, and 67 nonconvertible 
bonds. This sample is large enough to enable them to tes  target and acquirer bonds 
separately. They acquire convertible and non-convertibl  stock prices from the 
Standard and Poor’s, and convertible and non-convertible bond prices from the Wall 
Street Journal. They utilize a short-term event study with daily security returns to 
compute the abnormal returns of securities for the acquiring firms and target firms 
respectively. For each firm, the securities are divided into five groups—common 
stock, convertible preferred stock, non-convertible preferred stock, convertible bond, 
and non-convertible bond. They employ both a mean-adjusted return technique and a 
market-adjusted return technique to test the abnormal security returns. The mean-
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adjusted return technique compares the returns in the event window with returns in 
the estimation window. The market-adjusted return compares the return in the event 
window with the return of an appropriate market index. Due to these two methods 
get the same results, Dennis and McConnell only describe the market-adjusted return 
procedure in their paper. The market indexes for comm n stock, convertible 
preferred stock and convertible bond are the value-weighted indexes of the New 
York Stock Exchange and the American Stock and Options Exchange; the market 
indexes for non-convertible preferred stock and non-c vertible bond are the Dow-
Jones Industrial Bond Index. The event window for cmmon stock is a 40 day event 
window, and the event window for the other four securities is a 28 day window. They 
find out for the target corporations, common shareholders, convertible and non-
convertible preferred stockholders, and convertible bondholders gain significantly, 
while non-convertible bondholders neither gain nor lose; for the bidding firms, 
convertible preferred stockholders gain significantly and common stockholders gain, 
while preferred stockholders, convertible and non-cvertible bondholders neither 
gain nor lose. Dennis and McConnell notice their result of acquiring firm common 
stock return is different from a number of previous studies. They explain that 
acquirer shareholders approve mergers because some class of securityholders will 
gain, which motivates shareholders to pursue the merger. Therefore no single class of 
securityholders always gain, but the acquirer securityholders as a whole gain. They 
discover that on average, the total value of the combined firm increases statistically 
significantly. Moreover, the cross-sectional test shows that the returns to common 
stock and the returns to senior securities are positively correlated, hence there is no 
wealth transfer. In summary, their results support the synergy hypothesis. 
 
Travlos (1987) looks into the role of method of payment in M&A announcements 
on the prices of stock and bond of acquiring firms from 1972 through 1981. Of the 
167 deals, there are 30 firms with a total of 58 non-c nvertible bonds. He obtains 
non-convertible bond price from the Moody’s Bond Record. Travlos applies a short-
term event study with daily stock and bond data to gauge the abnormal returns of 
stocks and bonds for the acquiring firms, respectivly. For either test, he divides the 
firms into three groups according to the means of payment—common stock, cash, 
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and the combination of common stock and cash (he does n t report results for the 
combination group). He employs a market model to test he abnormal returns of 
stocks for each group. The normal return is defined as the return for the CRSP 
equally weighted market index. The abnormal return is the price difference between 
the return of each common stock and the market index. The event window is a 21 
day window. Then he uses a mean-adjusted model to tes  the abnormal returns of 
non-convertible bonds for each group. The event window is an 11-day window. The 
2-day cumulative abnormal stock return of acquirers is -1.47% (significant) for stock 
exchange offers and 0.24% (insignificant) for cash offers. For bondholder wealth, the 
-1 day abnormal bond return of acquirer is -0.90% (significant) and announcement 
day abnormal bond returns is -0.18% (insignificant) for stock exchange offers; bond 
returns for cash offers are positive and insignificant. Both shareholders and 
bondholders lose by stock exchange offers as against cash offers. Inclusion, there is 
no evident wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders.  
 
Maquieira et al. (1998) base their research on Eger (1983) to examine the pure 
stock-for-stock mergers. They refer that pure stock exchange mergers provide an 
ideal opportunity to test for wealth transfer (the “redistribution” effect) from 
shareholders to bondholders because there are no cash outflows or asset changes. By 
analysing the wealth effects of conglomerate and non-conglomerate mergers, they 
aim to give indirect evidence on the economic benefits of focus-increasing versus 
focus-decreasing mergers. They study 260 mergers announced between 1963 and 
1995, involving 78 nonconvertible preferred stock, 83 convertible preferred stock, 
535 nonconvertible bond, and 67 convertible bond. The sample size of bonds is 
larger than all the previous studies. They do not specify where to collect the preferred 
stock and bond data. They use a modified long-term monthly event study. They 
compute the valuation prediction errors (abnormal returns) of securities as the 
percentage difference from predicted market value of securities (normal returns 
without a merger) from two months before announcement date through two months 
after the effective date (in their sample, it takes 11 to 31 months to finish a merger). 
Predicted market values are computed based on overall market movements in the 
same classes of securities over the measurement period (month t-2 to month t+2). For 
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the conglomerate mergers, they find -4.79% valuation prediction errors for acquirer 
common stock (significant)5, 41.65% for target common stock (significant), 3.55% 
for acquirer nonconvertible preferred stock (significant),  20.31% for target 
nonconvertible preferred stock (significance level N/A because there is only 1 
observation), 2.04% for acquirer convertible preferred stock (insignificant), 3.10% 
for target convertible preferred stock (insignificant), 0.33% for acquirer 
nonconvertible bond (insignificant), 1.22% for target nonconvertible bond 
(insignificant), 22.15% for acquirer convertible bond (significant), and 17.44% for 
target convertible bond (significant). For the non-conglomerate mergers, they report 
6.14% valuation prediction errors for acquirer common stock (significant), 38.08% 
for target common stock (significant), 5.47% for acquirer nonconvertible preferred 
stock (significant),  7.30% for target nonconvertible preferred stock (significant), 
24.30% for acquirer convertible preferred stock (signif cant), 56.33% for target 
convertible preferred stock (significance N/A), 1.90% for acquirer nonconvertible 
bond (significant), 0.50% for target nonconvertible ond (insignificant), 12.45% for 
acquirer convertible bond (insignificant), and 23.94% for target convertible bond 
(significant). They attribute the high average convertible securityholder returns to a 
relatively small fraction of in-the-money convertibles that experience very large 
wealth increases as a result of merger, and the even higher gains for convertible 
bonds than preferred stocks is driven by outlier bonds that have more favourable 
conversion terms. They also report a combined firm-security gain of 3.91% for 
conglomerate mergers (insignificant) and of 6.91% for non-conglomerate mergers 
(significant). In conclusion, conglomerate mergers support the wealth transfer 
hypothesis (lose of acquirer common stockholders and gain of other securityholders) 
and co-insurance hypothesis; the non-conglomerate mergers support co-insurance 
hypothesis and synergy hypothesis.  
 
The later research from Penas and Unal (2004) and Billett et al. (2004) employ 
Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database (LBFID) for the bond data. Billett et al. 
(2004) argue that previous studies fail to find signif cant wealth effects for target 
bonds may attribute to their bond database: first, due to the difficulty of obtaining 
                                                
5 Maquieira et al. (1998) only report significance levels up to 5%. In order to compare with other studies, I 
interpret their significance levels up to 10% for cnvention.  
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bond price data, existing studies have very small samples of bonds, which is unlikely 
to have sufficient statistical power to reject the null hypothesis of zero excess returns; 
second, existing studies use the matrix prices which may dilute the wealth effects of 
bonds in a merger. Hong and Warga (2000) summarises str ngths for LBFID. First, 
this database provides a significant amount of bond-specific diagnostic and 
descriptive information including bond ratings, yields, and coupons. Second, Lehman 
Brothers directly collects bid quotes from its dealers on a majority of the bonds it 
trades or bonds that are of interest to its investor clientele, thus trader quotes other 
than matrix price dominate the database. However, LBFID also have weaknesses. 
First, Elton et al. (2001) and Penas and Unal (2004) argue that the data errors 
problem in LBFID requires examination of data with unusually high or low returns. 
Second, Billett et al. (2004) state that roughly 1/3 of the month-end bond prices in 
LBFID are matrix prices, thus time should be spent to sort them out. Third, Maxwell 
and Rao (2003) mention that LBFID contains only monthly data which could bias the 
study against finding any significant effects. Both Penas and Unal (2004) and Billett 
et al. (2004) calculate the excess bond returns by the market-adjusted model: excess 
return as the difference between a bond’s monthly raw return (change in price plus 
interest accrued) and the monthly return on an index with similar rating and 
remaining maturity.   
 
Penas and Unal (2004) study the monthly abnormal security returns of 66 bank 
mergers with 282 bonds between 1991 and 1997 (15 deals have bond data for both 
target and acquirer). They report 0.704% return for the target firm bondholders 
(significant) and 0.074% return for the acquiring firm bondholders (insignificant) at 
the announcement month.  They find positive return fo  target firm shareholders and 
negative return for acquiring firm shareholders at the announcement month (they do 
not report the return value and statistics). They further find that both bondholders and 
shareholders realise positive returns at the announcement month, and the relation 
between bond and equity returns is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, 
their research supports the co-insurance hypothesis, wealth transfer hypothesis (from 
acquiring firm shareholders to target firm shareholders) and the synergy hypothesis.  
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Billett et al. (2004) examine 940 M&A deals announced between 1979 and 1997. 
Their study has great improvement on the sample siz. The acquiring firms have 
3083 bonds in total and the target firms have 818 bonds in total. There are 141 deals 
that both the acquiring and target firms have bonds with valid announcement period 
returns. For the two-month excess returns, they discover 22.15% return for target 
stock, 0.15% for acquirer stock (insignificant), 1.09% for target bond and -0.17% for 
acquirer bond. The negative excess return of acquirer bonds denies the co-insurance 
hypothesis, and supports the wealth transfer hypothesis. By splitting the sample 
according to whether target firm bonds are investmen  grade or below investment 
grade, they find strong evidence of wealth transfer between bondholders (from low 
risk bondholders to high risk bondholders). They further test the wealth transfer 
effects by the risk effect, leverage effect and maturity effect, and find correct signs 
but none of them are statistically significant. At last, they test the combined excess 
security returns and report positive excess returns for the combined bonds value of 
acquiring firm and target firms, which is the evidenc  of synergy hypothesis. 
 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) publish the first working paper on bondholder 
wealth effects of M&A on European countries. They examine the monthly abnormal 
security returns of 225 M&A deals announced from 1995 through 2004. They collect 
Eurobond prices from the Reuters Fixed Income Database, which is a mix of matrix 
price and transaction price. The database and sample size problems of bond research 
outside of US are well known. Although Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) broaden 
their sample to include both public and private companies and both domestic and 
cross-border announcements of all European countries, th ir search returns only 24 
target firms with bonds (they do not report security eturns for target firms), which 
cannot compete with the sample sizes of Maxwell and Stephens (2003), Maxwell and 
Rao (2003) and Billett et al. (2004) who focus on US public firms with LBFID 
database. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) follow Penas a d Unal (2004) and Billett 
et al. (2004) to calculate the monthly abnormal bond returns by the market-adjusted 
model except that they use bond duration instead of remaining maturity for the index 
portfolio benchmark, and they add currency (euro vs. sterling) into the benchmark as 
well. For the two-month excess returns, they discover 0.73% for acquirer stock 
 44 
 
(insignificant), and 0.56% for acquirer bond with equal-weighed matching portfolio 
(significant). Due to the lack of target firm returns, their results cannot be interpreted 
with hypotheses. 
 
Table 2-2 summarises the empirical results of prior studies with respect to 
hypotheses in this research. Asquith and Kim (1982) find positive target firm stock 
return hence positive total security return, which is supportive of the synergy effect. 
Eger (1983) finds positive acquiring firm bond return, positive target firm stock 
return, positive total bond return and hence positive otal security return, which is 
supportive of the co-insurance hypothesis and synerg  ffect. Dennis and McConnell 
(1986) report positive acquiring firm stock return, positive target firm stock return, 
and hence positive total security return, which is supportive of the synergy effect. 
Travlos’ (1987) study does not fit with any of the ypotheses. Maquieira et al. (1998) 
report that for conglomerate mergers, there are negative acquiring firm stock return, 
positive acquiring firm bond return, positive target firm stock return and positive 
target firm bond return, hence positive total bond return, which is supportive of the 
co-insurance hypothesis and wealth transfer hypothesis; for non-conglomerate 
mergers, all the returns are positive, which is supportive of the co-insurance 
hypothesis and the synergy hypothesis. Penas and Unal (2004) discover negative 
acquiring firm stock return, positive target firm stock return, positive target firm 
bond return, and hence positive total bond return and total security return, which is 
supportive of the co-insurance hypothesis, wealth transfer hypothesis and synergy 
hypothesis. Billett et al. (2004) reports negative acquiring firm bond return, positive 
target firm stock return, positive target firm bond return, and hence positive total 
security return, which is supportive of the wealth transfer hypothesis and synergy 





Table 2-2 Empirical Results 
This table reviews the empirical results of previous researches about the impact of M&A on 
shareholders and bondholders wealth in regarding to the five hypotheses: co-insurance effect, 
wealth transfer, synergy effect, hubris hypothesis and bond return based hubris hypothesis. 
Authors SA  BA  ST  BT  SS TA +  BA + BT  SA + BA + ST + BT  Conclusion 
Asquith and Kim(1982) ~ ~ + ~     + synergy 
Eger(1983) ~ + + ~   + + 
co-insurance 
synergy 
Dennis and McConnell(1986) + ~ + ~   ~ + synergy 
Travlos(1987)           
·  stock exchange - -      - 
          ·  cash payment    ~ ~      - 
Maquieira et al. (1998)         
          ·  conglomerate - + + + ~ + ~ 
co-insurance 
wealth transfer 
          ·  non-conglomerate + + + + + + + 
co-insurance 
synergy 




Billett et al. (2004) ~ - + + +  ~ + 
wealth transfer  
synergy 
Renneboog and Szilagyi 
 (2007) 
~ +      - 
SA —acquiring firm share price;         BA —acquiring firm bond price; 
ST —target firm share price;                   BT —target firm bond price 




Chapter 3 Methodology and Results on Short-Run Returns 
3.1. Methodology 
This chapter includes four research questions: the overall security returns, the 
combined security returns, the univariate analysis and the multivariate analysis. The 
overall security returns and the combined security re urns rely on the five hypotheses 
in Section 2.3. The univariate analysis and the multivariate analysis rely on 
hypotheses stated in Section 3.2.3. 
 
In the overall security returns section, the market-adjusted return (MAR) and 
abnormal return (AR) of stocks and bonds are examined i  a forty-one day event 
window (-20, +20) and a three day event window (-1,+ ).  The abnormal return is 
based on an event study with a two-hundred day estimation window (-230, -31). The 
market index of stock is FTSE all share and the market index of bond is FT fixed 
interest. These excess returns are used to test the co-insurance hypothesis, the wealth 
transfer hypothesis, the synergy hypothesis, the hubris hypothesis, and the bond 
return based on hubris hypothesis. The combined security returns are studied by 
combining the excess returns of stock/bond and targe /acquirer as value-weighted 
average of the excess security returns to further test these hypotheses. The univariate 
section tests the influences of deal characteristics on the excess returns of stocks and 
bonds. The deal characteristics include method of payment, hostility, industry 
relatedness, relative size and market trend. Hypotheses of the influences of these deal 
characteristics are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3. The multiple analysis section 
tests the influences of the above deal characteristics on excess security returns by a 
multiple regression (OLS).  
 
3.1.1 Data 
The initial task of an event study is to define theev nt and to identify the event 
window. In this research the event is the announcement of M&A and the measurable 
financial variables are stock and bond prices. This research focuses on the daily 
return of stocks and bonds, labelling the announcement day of M&A as the event 
date day 0, the previous day of the announcement as day -1 and the next day of the 
announcement as day 1. The estimation window is a 200 day window (-230,-31) and 
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the event windows are a three day window (-1, +1) and  41 day window (-20, +20). 
Given that event windows are shorter than 1 calendar ye r, this study is a short-term 
event study. 
 
M&A announcements information are obtained from Thoms n One Banker 
(TOB). The screen criteria for inclusion of a firm are set as following: 
 Database: All Mergers & Acquisitions 
 Acquirer Nation: United Kingdom 
 Target Nation: United Kingdom 
 Acquirer Public Status: Public 
 Target Public Status: Public 
 Deal Value (Pounds Sterling in Millions): 10 or more 
 Deal Announced: between 1st Jan 1994 and 31st Dec 2006 
 Deal Status: Completed 
 Percent of Shares Held by Acquirer at Announcement: l ss than 50% 
 Percent of Shares Owned by Acquirer after Transaction: 50% or more 
 
These criteria ensure that all firms are British domestic firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. The start time is set to 1994 because the UK’s aggregate 
acquisitions value increased significantly from 1994 (Sudarsanam, 2003), though 
there was a decline between 2001 and 2003. Characteristi ally, the acquirer owns 
less than 50% of target shares before the announcement and owns more than 50% 
after the deal, makes the transaction a typical M&A.  
 
TOB identifies 392 deal announcements which satisfy he selection criteria. By 
eliminating 12 self-tender deals, 3 reverse-takeover deals, 67 deals where either the 
target firm or acquiring firm has no stock data, finally 310 deal announcements meet 
the research criteria. The number of deals increases steadily between the year 1994 
and 1999, from 16 deals to 60, and decreases between th  years 2000 and 2006, from 
39 to 6, although there is an increase in 2005. The distribution of the mean value of 
deals ascends between the year 1994 and 2000, from 186.111 to 1994.148 million 
pounds, and descends afterwards to 247.232 million pounds in the year 2006. The 







Table 3-1 Deal Numbers and Values 
This table describes the statistics of M&A deal numbers and values. The sample comes from 
M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 and both the target firms and acquiring firms are 
UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
Year No. Min Med Max Mean Std. Dev 
1994 16 15.200 54.715 796.000  186.111  247.047  
1995 23 10.280 121.040  8987.000  802.780  1962.235  
1996 30 10.400 59.998 2527.000  370.183  659.505  
1997 35 11.000 44.300 1296.280  140.661  234.677  
1998 38 10.120 52.825 6757.457  486.867  1266.725  
1999 60 11.676 76.453 23785.050  682.618  3082.747  
2000 39 12.230 135.589  46479.133  1994.148  7501.499  
2001 19 10.708 62.057 10358.221  664.351  2353.630  
2002 11 12.433 192.240  6482.976  864.610  1889.018  
2003 10 14.971 74.937 2982.336  397.973  913.600  
2004  5 40.307 248.242  540.125  243.575  210.278  
2005 18 15.828 81.710 2941.804  385.783  708.444  
2006  6 11.531 167.473  560.819  247.232  250.354  
Total 310 10.120  76.109 46479.133  678.899  3168.080  
Data Source: Thomson One Banker (Deal Values are in million of sterling pounds). 
 
To count the target firms and the acquiring firms separately, the 310 deal 
announcements involve 310 target firms and 266 acquiring firms. For target firms 
only, each firm appears just once; for acquiring firms only, 230 firms engage in just 
one deal, 30 firms engage in two deals, 4 firms engage in three deals and 2 firms 
engage in four deals.  
 
To combine the target firm and the acquiring firm lists, 553 different firms are 
involved in the deals; 496 firms appear only once (account for 89.70% of 553), 49 
firms appear twice (8.86%), 6 firms appear three times (1.08%) and 2 firms appear 
four times (0.36%), and among them 23 firms come out as both the acquirer and the 
target. For firms involved in more than one deal, 10 firms (1.81% of 553 firms) have 
successive deals within 250 trading days. The weak overlapping effect of the event 
windows of individual securities enables the assumption of the absence of clustering.  
 
The daily stock price and the daily stock index for the market (FTSE all shares), 
and the daily bond price and the daily bond index for the market (FT fixed interest) 





An event study is an empirical study examines the influence of a specific event 
on the behaviour of a particular financial variable. The usefulness of event studies 
arises from the fact that the magnitude of abnormal performance of the financial 
variables provides a measure of the unanticipated impact on the wealth of the firm’s 
securityholders (Kothari and Warner, 2004). It assumes an efficient financial market 
so that the effect of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
In accounting and finance research, events can be M&A, share split, share 
repurchase, asset sale, announcement of earnings, issues of new securities, and so on; 
in the field of law and economics, events can be a change in regulation (MacKinlay, 
1997). Stock prices or bond prices are the most frequently selected variables.  
 
This research analyses the excess returns of stocks and bonds by the market 
adjusted return model and the market model. 
 
The daily security price can be measured by various benchmarks such as the 
opening price, the closing price, the daily high price, the daily low price, and so on. 
This research uses Datastream total return index (RI) as the closing price of stocks 
and corporate bonds6. By definingPiτ  as the closing price for security i and for 









Normal return is defined as the return that would be expected without the event; 
the abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security over the event period 
minus the normal return of this security over that period (Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1997). For firm i  and event dateτ the abnormal return is expressed as: 
                                                
6 Datastream: for stocks, RI shows a theoretical growth in value of a security holding over a specified period, 
assuming that dividends or coupons are re-invested to purchase additional units of a security at the closing price 
applicable on the ex-dividend date. For bonds, RI is the return on investment, including interest payments, as well 
as appreciation or depreciation in the price of the bond.   
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ARiτ = Riτ - )|( XRE i ττ  
whereARiτ , Riτ  and )|( XRE i ττ are abnormal return, actual return and normal return 
respectively; Xτ is the conditioning information for the normal return model. 
 
Market adjusted return model (or the index model) assumes that security i on 
trading day τ  earns the market rate of return Rmτ , so the abnormal return ARiτ is the 
difference betweenRiτ  andRmτ : ARiτ = Riτ - Rmτ . Market adjusted return model is an 
approximation to the market model assumingα i =0 andβ i =1 for all firms.  
 
Market model relates the return of any given security to the return of the market 
portfolio, and its linear specification follows from the assumed joint normality of 
asset returns. It assumes that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal and 
independently and identically distributed through time (Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1997). The model is specified as: 
Riτ =α i + β i Rmτ +ε τi  
Where          Riτ = periodτ returns on security i 
   Rmτ = periodτ returns on market portfolio 




                    α i , β i ,σε
2
i
= parameters of the market model 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used to estimate parameters of the 
market model. Regressions are based on the data from estimation window. For the i th 
















































































      L1 is the length of estimation window starts on 1T0 + and ends on T1  
 
The abnormal return is the disturbance term of the market model calculated on an 
out-of-sample basis for the i th firm at periodτ : 




β i Rmτ  
 
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated through time and across 
securities (it is equivalent aggregate firstly eithr by time or by securities) so as to 
draw overall inferences for the event of interest (MacKinlay, 1997). By aggregating 
an individual security’s abnormal return through time to get the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR): 








where 1T1 +=τ to T2=τ represents the event window ( TT 2211 ≤≤< ττ ), and the 
variance of CARi is: 
),( 21
2
i ττσ = σττ ε212 i)1( +−  
By aggregating on time and on security, the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) is: 




∑ ),( 21 ττCARi  
The null hypothesis is that the cumulative average bnormal return will be jointly 
normally determined with a zero conditional mean and conditional variance, 
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The significance of the cumulative average abnormal return is tested by a one-


















)1,0(~ N  
whereas the distribution result of Z is asymptotic with respect to the estimation 
window length L1  and the number of securities N (MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
Because the market model takes explicit account of both the risk associated with 
the market and the mean returns, it is the most widely used method (Weston and 
Weaver, 2001) and “no better alternative has yet been found despite the weak 
relationship between beta and actual returns” (Armitage, 1995: 25). 
 
3.1.3 Discussion on Thin Trading  
It is quite common that securities are traded in an irregular frequency but their 
prices are recorded with a factitiously regular frequ ncy. The factual trading 
frequency can be either higher or lower than the recording frequency.  
 
In the first situation that the securities’ trading frequency is higher than the 
recording frequency, there rises the question that which kind of sampling intervals is 
optimal in the event study. Suppose in a perfect sta e hat the database allows 
research on various sampling intervals—hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, and 
so on, researchers have to decide whether the more frequent sampling or the less 
frequent sampling is better. MacKinlay (1997) tests the abnormal return of 1 percent 
for 1 to 200 securities by comparing the tests of daily, weekly and monthly data, and 
concludes that “there is a substantial payoff in terms of increased power from 
reducing the sampling interval”. Hence in an event study, data with the shortest 
interval (or with the highest frequency) is the most favourable.  
 
By employing data with a high recording frequency, researches unsurprisingly 
fall into the second situation that the trading frequ ncy is lower than the recording 
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frequency, which is called an infrequent trading, or n n-synchronous trading, or thin 
trading. The effect of the thin trading on the variances and covariances of individual 
securities leads to biased and inconsistent estimation of the coefficient of systematic 
risk, β ,  for the market model (MacKinlay, 1997): for frequently traded securities, 
the β  is biased upward; for infrequently traded securities, the β  is biased downward 
(Dimson, 1979). A biased β  estimate may result in biased abnormal return and 
misspecified test statistics in the event studies (Strong, 1992).  
 
Quite a few attempts have been made to justify the bias in Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimates ofβ . Two dominant methods are introduced by Scholes and 
Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979), respectively. 
 





















− =estimator of the slope coefficient in a simple regression by regressing the 
contemporary return on the i th security against the previous return on the market 
index; 
 β 0i =estimator of the slope coefficient in a simple regression by regressing the 
contemporary return on the i th security against the current return on the market index; 
 β 1i
+ =estimator of the slope coefficient in a simple regression by regressing the 





=the estimated first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the market index. 
 
Scholes and Williams apply their consistent estimate of β  to the daily returns 
from securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock 
Exchange (ASE) between January 1963 and December 1975. They allocate each 
security into 1 of the 5 portfolios according the level of the security’s trading volume, 
and compare these estimated betas with those corresp nding betas derived from the 
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OLS. They find out that the portfolio of securities with the lowest level of trading 
volume generates a larger β than the corresponding OLS estimateβ ; the portfolio 
of securities with the highest level of trading volume generates a smaller β  than the 
corresponding OLS estimateβ .  
 
Dimson’s aggregated coefficients method (1979) describes the estimate of β  for 












where  β τ
∧
i
=estimators of the slope coefficients in a multiple regression by regressing 
the contemporary return on the i th security against the previous, current and 
subsequent returns on the market index with time period τ = n− , 1n+− ,...,-
1,0,1,…, 1n− ,n . 
 
Dimson apply his aggregated coefficients method to the monthly returns from a 
one-in-three random sample of all stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
between January 1955 and December 1974. He allots each stock into 1 of the 10 
portfolios according to the average age of its month-end price (trading frequency), 
and then compare these estimated betas with those corresponding betas derived from 
the OLS. Dimson draws the same conclusion as Scholes and Williams that the 
aggregated coefficients estimate of β  is larger than the OLS estimate of β  when the 
trading frequency is low, and vice versa.  
 
Brown and Warner (1985) examine 50 randomly selected securities with daily 





obtained through the OLS market model, the Scholes-Williams procedure and the 
Dimson aggregated coefficient method, respectively. They conclude that in the 
occurrence of thin trading, procedures other than te OLS for estimating the market 




Later researches affirm the same outcome. Dyckman et l. (1984) consider that 
neither the Scholes-Williams nor the Dimson method of estimating β  improves the 
specification or power of the tests (the Brown and Warner 1985 paper is in fact 
published earlier than the Dyckman, et al. 1984 paper). Jain (1986) finds out that the 
Scholes-Williams corrections for thin trading do not improve the distributions of 
β over the OLS method. Campbell and Wasley (1993) discover that the Scholes-
Williams adjustment does not yield significant improvement in either Type I error or 
the power of the test beyond the OLS estimation. Bartholdy and Riding (1994) claim 
that neither the Scholes-Williams nor the Dimson bias-correcting procedures provide 
incremental benefits over OLS estimation; moreover, “from the perspective of bias, 
efficiency and consistency, none of the most commonly used correction procedures 
is superior to OLS estimation”. Consistency of these mpirical results may attribute 
to the factor that although the OLS market model estimation might be biased for sub-
estimation-periods or for individual securities, in a  event study, the bias may 
average out to zero for the whole sample (Strong, 1992).  
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1 Overall Returns 
3.2.1.1 Stock Returns  
In this section the overall excess returns of stocks are examined. Based on the 41 
day event window (-20, +20) and the 3 day event window (-1, +1), the results of 
MAR and AR are reported for target firms and acquiring firms.  
 
Table 3-2 shows the average excess stock returns and cumulative average excess 
stock returns for 310 target firms assembling on each day of the event window (-20, 
+20). MAR is for market adjusted return, CMAR is for cumulative market adjusted 
return, AR is for abnormal return and CAR is for cumulative abnormal return. From 
event day -8 to +1, the daily average aggregate MARs and ARs of the target firms 
are positive and statistically significant. On day 0, the MAR is 10.213% and the AR 
is 10.303%. The cumulative average returns for the 41 day event window (-20, +20) 




Table 3-2 Target Firm Average Stock Returns in Event Window 
The average MAR and AR for 310 target firms are repo ted assembling on each day of the event 
window (-20, +20). The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 and 
both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is for market adjusted return, CMAR is for cumulative market adjusted return, AR is for 
abnormal return and CAR is for cumulative abnormal return. The one-sample t-statistic examines 
whether MAR and AR are statistically different from zero. ***, ** and * denotes the significance 
level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Day MAR%     t          CMAR%    AR%           t             CAR% 
-20 0.379 1.819*  0.379 0.374 1.784*  0.374 
-19 0.106 0.683  0.486 0.109 0.707  0.483 
-18 -0.123 -0.807  0.363 -0.064 -0.429  0.419 
-17 0.205 1.055  0.568 0.264 1.400  0.683 
-16 0.146 1.182  0.715 0.218 1.938**  0.901 
-15 -0.005 -0.024  0.710 0.025 0.131  0.926 
-14 0.300 1.487  1.010 0.442 2.203**  1.368 
-13 0.500 2.653***  1.511 0.554 3.051***  1.922 
-12 0.126 0.622  1.637 0.225 1.101  2.147 
-11 0.179 1.188  1.816 0.276 1.868* 2.424 
-10 0.191 1.191  2.007 0.240 1.537  2.664 
-9 0.087 0.508  2.094 0.176 1.060  2.839 
-8 0.386 1.779*  2.480 0.398 1.857*  3.237 
-7 0.581 2.899***  3.061 0.559 2.784***  3.796 
-6 0.640 2.950***  3.700 0.641 3.012***  4.437 
-5 0.599 2.815***  4.299 0.622 2.927***  5.059 
-4 0.847 3.152***  5.146 0.919 3.495***  5.978 
-3 0.543 2.403**  5.689 0.613 2.731***  6.592 
-2 0.734 2.681***  6.423 0.759 2.811***  7.351 
-1 2.085 6.177***  8.508 2.087 6.203***  9.438 
0 10.213 12.681***  18.721 10.303 12.747***  19.741 
1 0.638 2.572***  19.359 0.673 2.728***  20.414 
2 0.127 0.901  19.486 0.141 1.047  20.555 
3 -0.048 -0.509  19.438 0.001 0.015  20.557 
4 0.116 0.984  19.554 0.186 1.680*  20.743 
5 0.071 0.722  19.624 0.168 1.892*  20.911 
6 0.005 0.046  19.630 0.077 0.716  20.987 
7 0.047 0.471  19.677 0.054 0.569  21.042 
8 -0.189 -0.755  19.488 -0.141 -0.571  20.901 
9 0.157 1.939**  19.645 0.138 1.954**  21.039 
10 0.230 1.570  19.875 0.181 1.293  21.221 
11 0.039 0.374  19.914 0.141 1.489  21.361 
12 -0.167 -1.800*  19.747 -0.089 -1.097  21.272 
13 -0.024 -0.263  19.724 0.069 0.868  21.341 
14 0.162 1.654*  19.886 0.190 2.201**  21.531 
15 0.087 0.840  19.973 0.117 1.293  21.648 
16 0.182 2.088**  20.155 0.226 2.785***  21.875 
17 0.219 1.772*  20.374 0.303 2.559***  22.177 
18 0.115 0.744  20.489 0.111 0.745  22.288 
19 0.190 2.134**  20.679 0.179 2.286**  22.467 




Table 3-3 shows the average excess stock returns and cumulative average excess 
stock returns for 310 acquiring firms assembling on each day of the event window (-
20, +20). The MARs are negative and statistically significant on day 0 and day +1; 
the ARs are negative and statistically significant from day -2 through day +2. On 
event day 0, MAR is -0.892% and AR is -0.904%. The cumulative average returns 





Table 3-3 Acquirer Firm Average Stock Returns in Event Window 
The average MAR and AR for 310 acquiring firms are reported assembling on each day of the 
event window (-20, +20). The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 
2006 and both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock 
price data. MAR is for market adjusted return, CMAR is for cumulative market adjusted return, 
AR is for abnormal return and CAR is for cumulative abnormal return. The one-sample t-statistic 
examines whether MAR and AR are statistically different from zero. ***, ** and * denotes the 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Day MAR%      t          CMAR%   AR%          t             CAR% 
-20 0.086 0.674 0.086 0.007 0.061  0.007 
-19 -0.110 -0.903 -0.025 -0.150 -1.293  -0.143 
-18 -0.064 -0.506 -0.088 -0.058 -0.467  -0.200 
-17 -0.164 -1.685* -0.252 -0.168 -1.770*  -0.368 
-16 0.053 0.513 -0.199 0.003 0.036  -0.365 
-15 -0.173 -1.897* -0.372 -0.247 -2.751***  -0.612 
-14 -0.010 -0.079 -0.382 0.029 0.252  -0.584 
-13 0.223 1.564 -0.158 0.133 0.936  -0.451 
-12 -0.113 -0.858 -0.272 -0.142 -1.133  -0.593 
-11 -0.020 -0.149 -0.292 -0.057 -0.427  -0.650 
-10 0.186 1.386 -0.106 0.186 1.438  -0.464 
-9 -0.026 -0.243 -0.132 -0.041 -0.395  -0.505 
-8 0.004 0.031 -0.128 -0.035 -0.313  -0.539 
-7 -0.150 -1.131 -0.279 -0.191 -1.498  -0.730 
-6 0.280 2.353** 0.002 0.229 2.006**  -0.502 
-5 0.072 0.637 0.073 0.052 0.479  -0.450 
-4 0.209 1.907* 0.283 0.190 1.792*  -0.260 
-3 0.021 0.182 0.303 -0.018 -0.164  -0.278 
-2 -0.172 -1.739* 0.132 -0.187 -1.957**  -0.465 
-1 -0.167 -1.446 -0.035 -0.209 -1.894*  -0.674 
0 -0.892 -2.881*** -0.927 -0.904 -2.936***  -1.578 
1 -0.439 -2.795*** -1.366 -0.516 -3.419***  -2.094 
2 -0.220 -1.572 -1.586 -0.247 -1.753*  -2.341 
3 -0.063 -0.558 -1.649 -0.101 -0.962  -2.442 
4 0.297 2.425** -1.353 0.266 2.264**  -2.176 
5 -0.044 -0.311 -1.397 -0.042 -0.304  -2.219 
6 0.086 0.921 -1.310 0.087 0.990  -2.132 
7 0.010 0.090 -1.300 -0.049 -0.471  -2.181 
8 0.058 0.532 -1.242 0.042 0.397  -2.138 
9 0.380 3.695*** -0.862 0.284 2.916***  -1.855 
10 -0.108 -0.773 -0.969 -0.197 -1.421  -2.052 
11 -0.166 -1.551 -1.136 -0.166 -1.597  -2.218 
12 0.060 0.346 -1.075 0.051 0.294  -2.167 
13 0.013 0.095 -1.063 0.018 0.142  -2.149 
14 -0.051 -0.308 -1.113 -0.043 -0.267  -2.192 
15 0.045 0.402 -1.069 -0.023 -0.215  -2.214 
16 0.004 0.042 -1.065 0.002 0.024  -2.212 
17 0.066 0.550 -0.999 0.077 0.680  -2.135 
18 0.000 0.002 -0.999 -0.037 -0.349  -2.172 
19 0.223 1.988** -0.776 0.168 1.563  -2.004 




Chart 3-1 illustrates the cumulative MARs and ARs of the target and acquiring 
stocks from event day -20 to event day +20. It shows positive cumulative returns 
around 20% for target firms and negative cumulative returns around -1% for 
acquiring firms.  
 
Chart 3-1 Cumulative Excess Stock Returns 
This figure illustrates the cumulative MARs and ARs of the target and acquiring stocks from 
event day -20 to event day 20. 









































Table 3-4 utilizes the t-test (two-tailed) and Z-test to examine the null hypotheses 
that in the event window, the cumulative average MARs and ARs are zero. For target 
firms, all the returns are positive and statistically significant at 1% level. MAR (-20, 
+20) is 20.631%, AR (-20, +20) is 22.507%, MAR (-1, + ) is 12.936% and AR (-1, 
+1) is 13.063%. For acquiring firms, all the returns are negative and their absolute 
values are much smaller than target returns. Except MAR (-20, +20), all the other 
three returns are statistically significant. MAR (-20, +20) is -0.728%, AR (-20, +20) 
is -1.938%, MAR (-1, +1) is -1.498% and AR (-1, +1) is -1.629%. These results are 
consistent with previous studies on the shareholder wealth that target shareholders 
invariably gain from M&A and acquiring shareholders lo e slightly, which does not 
support the synergy hypothesis but supports the wealth transfer from acquiring 
shareholders to target shareholders. 
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Table 3-4 Overall Stock Returns 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. The one-sample t-statistic (two-tailed) and Z-
statistic examines whether MAR and AR are statistically different from zero. ***, ** and * denotes the 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 











N of  
Positive 
Returns 
MAR(-20,+20) 20.631  16.075***   272  -0.728  -0.864   146  
AR(-20,+20) 22.507  16.793***  024.529***  266  -1.938  -2.030**  -2.677***  147  
MAR(-1,+1) 12.936  14.850***   264  -1.498  -3.839***   123  





3.2.1.2 Bond Returns 
In this section the overall excess returns of bonds are examined. Among the 310 
M&A deals, 37 bonds of 11 target firms and 131 bonds of 49 acquiring firms have 
valid data. Each firm is treated as a separate observation. If one firm has more than 
one bond, the excess bond returns of the firm is calculated as the value-weighted 
average (according to amount of issue) of the bonds to facilitate the high correlation 
between returns of bonds issued by the same firm. This approach avoids the inflated 
t-statistics and diminishes the effect of heavily weighted firms with multiple issues in 
the sample (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003). Kahle et al. (2008) argue that the 
economic significance of abnormal bond returns should be lower given the lower 
market risk premium that bonds earn relative to shares. Thus I predict the wealth 
effects on bondholders are less than on shareholders. 
 
Table 3-5 shows the average excess bond returns and cumulative average excess 
bond returns for 11 target firms assembling on each day of the event window (-20, 
+20). Due to the small sample size, the one-sample t test is replaced by a non-
parametric alternative. A parametric test assumes that the data are samples from a 
population with a specified distribution; the non-parametric tests do not make 
specific assumptions about population distributions a d are therefore referred to as 
distribution-free tests (Kinnear and Gray, 2004). If the data set is small and there are 
some highly deviant outliers which can inflate the values of the denominators of the 
parametric tests, the parametric tests are likely to give misleading results, but non-
parametric tests are able to overcome this problem. Basically, there is at least one 
nonparametric equivalent for each parametric general type of test. Here the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (Siegel, 1956) is used to examine the null hypothesis if the aver g  
excess returns assembling on each day is zero. It cnsiders information about both 
the sign of the differences and the magnitude of the differences between pairs. On the 
event day 0, the daily average aggregate MAR and AR are positive and statistically 
insignificant. MAR is 3.441% and AR is 3.532%. The cumulative average returns for 
the 41 day event window (-20, +20) are 7.682% for CMAR and 7.404% for CAR. 
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Table 3-5 Target Firm Average Bond Returns in Event Window 
The average MAR and AR for 11 target firms are repoted assembling on each day of the event 
window (-20, +20). The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 and 
both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is for market adjusted return, CMAR is for cumulative market adjusted return, AR is for 
abnormal return and CAR is for cumulative abnormal return. If one firm has more than one bond, 
the excess bond returns of the firm are calculated s the value-weighted average of the bonds. 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is applied to test if MAR and AR are statistically different from 
zero. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Day MAR%   W          CMAR%  AR%         W            CAR% 
-20  0.198  -2.134**  0.198  0.135  -1.067  0.135  
-19  0.153  -1.245  0.351  0.098  -0.622  0.233  
-18  0.092  -0.051  0.443  0.037  -0.445  0.270  
-17  -0.040  -0.663  0.403  -0.057  -0.356  0.213  
-16  0.003  -0.267  0.406  0.065  -0.800  0.278  
-15  -0.196  -1.778*  0.210  -0.050  -0.356  0.228  
-14  -0.185  -1.682*  0.026  -0.148  -1.600  0.080  
-13  -0.063  -0.866  -0.037  0.026  -0.178  0.106  
-12  -0.047  0.000  -0.084  -0.031  -0.445  0.075  
-11  0.256  -0.978  0.172  0.173  0.000  0.248  
-10  0.110  -0.968  0.282  -0.018  -0.711  0.230  
-9  -0.238  -0.356  0.044  -0.265  -0.978  -0.035  
-8  -0.090  -1.511  -0.046  -0.131  -2.134**  -0.166  
-7  0.105  -0.889  0.059  0.039  -0.445  -0.126  
-6  -0.065  -0.445  -0.007  -0.065  -0.445  -0.191  
-5  -0.341  -0.267  -0.348  -0.287  -1.245  -0.478  
-4  0.134  -0.978  -0.214  0.143  -0.356  -0.335  
-3  0.108  -0.178  -0.107  0.203  -0.622  -0.131  
-2  -0.528  -0.153  -0.635  -0.495  -1.245  -0.627  
-1  1.023  -0.889  0.389  1.117  -1.245  0.491  
0  3.441  -1.511  3.830  3.532  -1.600  4.022  
1  0.618  -0.889  4.448  0.629  -0.889  4.651  
2  0.110  -0.089  4.557  0.108  -0.711  4.760  
3  -0.017  -0.178  4.541  -0.060  -0.533  4.700  
4  0.152  -1.600  4.693  0.046  -0.267  4.746  
5  0.096  -1.245  4.788  -0.012  -0.178  4.733  
6  0.012  -0.445  4.800  -0.045  -0.356  4.688  
7  0.310  -0.051  5.110  0.301  -0.978  4.990  
8  -0.402  -1.600  4.708  -0.417  -2.312**  4.572  
9  0.475  -0.178  5.183  0.368  0.000  4.941  
10  1.448  -0.178  6.632  1.410  -0.178  6.351  
11  -0.113  -1.778*  6.518  -0.032  -1.067  6.319  
12  -0.083  -0.356  6.436  0.040  -0.445  6.360  
13  0.054  -0.051  6.490  0.063  -0.267  6.422  
14  0.958  -2.934***  7.448  0.907  -2.401**  7.329  
15  -0.119  -1.156  7.329  -0.106  -0.978  7.223  
16  -0.008  -0.089  7.321  -0.008  -0.089  7.215  
17  0.013  -0.533  7.334  0.004  -0.622  7.219  
18  0.088  -0.711  7.422  0.058  -0.622  7.277  
19  0.061  -1.067  7.483  0.014  -0.178  7.291  





Table 3-6 shows the average excess bond returns and the cumulative average 
excess bond returns for 49 acquiring firms assembling on each day of the event 
window (-20, +20). The one-sample t-statistic examines whether MAR and AR are 
statistically different from zero. On the event day 0, the MAR and AR are negative 
and statistically insignificant. MAR is -0.092% and AR is -0.148%. The cumulative 
average returns for the 41 day event window (-20, +) are -0.768% for CMAR and -




Table 3-6 Acquiring Firm Average Bond Returns in Event Window 
The average MAR and AR for 49 acquiring firms are reported assembling on each day of the 
event window (-20, +20). The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 
2006 and both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock 
price data. MAR is for market adjusted return, CMAR is for cumulative market adjusted return, 
AR is for abnormal return and CAR is for cumulative abnormal return. If one firm has more than 
one bond, the excess bond returns of the firm are clculated as the value-weighted average of the 
bonds. The one-sample t-statistic examines whether MAR and AR are statistically different from 
zero. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Day MAR%   W        CMAR%   AR%        W            CAR% 
-20 -0.056  -2.466***  -0.056  -0.027  -1.597  -0.027  
-19 0.009  -0.201  -0.047  -0.004  -0.274  -0.031  
-18 0.021  -0.025  -0.026  0.028  -0.254  -0.003  
-17 0.001  -0.475  -0.025  -0.011  -1.010  -0.014  
-16 -0.110  -0.431  -0.135  -0.081  -0.035  -0.096  
-15 -0.080  -0.444  -0.215  -0.070  -0.532  -0.166  
-14 0.014  -0.544  -0.201  0.024  -0.522  -0.142  
-13 0.055  -0.562  -0.146  0.043  -0.214  -0.099  
-12 -0.105  -1.354  -0.251  -0.076  -1.427  -0.175  
-11 0.038  -0.612  -0.213  0.031  -0.602  -0.145  
-10 -0.023  -0.646  -0.235  -0.014  -0.244  -0.159  
-9 -0.046  -0.671  -0.282  -0.043  -0.403  -0.201  
-8 0.001  -0.522  -0.281  -0.013  -0.045  -0.215  
-7 -0.100  -1.069  -0.380  -0.118  -1.776*  -0.333  
-6 -0.009  -0.761  -0.389  -0.055  -0.303  -0.387  
-5 0.006  -1.097  -0.384  -0.047  -0.413  -0.434  
-4 -0.000  -0.592  -0.384  -0.035  -0.204  -0.469  
-3 0.137  -0.463  -0.246  0.170  -0.831  -0.299  
-2 0.022  -0.944  -0.225  0.020  -0.612  -0.279  
-1 -0.060  -0.010  -0.285  -0.070  -0.492  -0.349  
0 -0.092  -1.000  -0.376  -0.148  -0.035  -0.497  
1 -0.055  -0.283  -0.431  -0.076  -1.517  -0.573  
2 -0.037  -0.065  -0.468  -0.016  -0.592  -0.589  
3 -0.122  -1.378  -0.590  -0.073  -0.124  -0.662  
4 -0.035  -0.124  -0.625  -0.022  -0.154  -0.684  
5 -0.017  -0.174  -0.642  -0.050  -0.443  -0.734  
6 0.046  -1.149  -0.596  0.013  -0.204  -0.721  
7 0.054  -0.055  -0.541  0.062  -0.124  -0.659  
8 -0.045  -0.373  -0.586  -0.050  -0.224  -0.709  
9 -0.039  -0.113  -0.625  -0.046  -0.532  -0.755  
10 -0.071  -0.246  -0.696  -0.090  -0.005  -0.845  
11 -0.103  -0.960  -0.798  -0.069  -0.811  -0.914  
12 0.058  -0.913  -0.741  0.080  -1.159  -0.834  
13 0.149  -2.297**  -0.592  0.117  -1.477  -0.717  
14 -0.075  -0.980  -0.667  -0.064  -0.751  -0.782  
15 0.018  -0.492  -0.649  -0.009  -0.612  -0.790  
16 -0.037  -0.562  -0.686  -0.036  -1.189  -0.826  
17 0.036  -0.642  -0.650  0.006  -0.671  -0.820  
18 -0.149  -1.417  -0.798  -0.139  -1.288  -0.959  
19 0.007  -0.482  -0.791  0.004  -0.264  -0.955  





Chart 3-2 illustrates the cumulative MARs and ARs of the target and acquiring 
bonds from event day -20 to event day +20. It shows po itive cumulative returns 
around 7% for target firms and negative cumulative returns around -0.8% for 
acquiring firms. The trend is similar to stocks.  
   
 Chart 3-2 Cumulative Excess Bond Returns 
This figure illustrates the cumulative MARs and ARs of the target and acquiring bonds from 
event day -20 to event day 20. 
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Table 3-7 utilizes the Z-test and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to examine the 
null hypotheses that in the event window, the cumulative average MARs and ARs 
are zero. For target firms, all the returns are positive. Both Z-tests for AR (-20, +20) 
and AR (-1, +1) are significant at 1% level. The Wilcoxon tests for MAR (-1, +1) 
and AR (-1, +1) are significant at 5% level. For acquiring firms, all the returns are 
negative. The Wilcoxon test for AR (-20, +20) is significant at 5% level. These 
results indicate that target firm bondholders gain while acquiring firm bondholders 
lose, and these wealth effects are smaller than shareholder wealth effect as predicted 
by Kahle et al. (2008). These results are consistent with Billett (2004). The 
significant wealth gain for target bondholders and significant (the AR (-20, +20)) 
loss for acquirer bondholders supports the wealth transfer from acquiring 
bondholders to target bondholders.  
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Table 3-7 Overall Bond Return 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
The sample is made up of 11 target firms with 37 bonds and 49 acquiring firms with 131 bonds. MAR is 
market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. If one firm has more than one bond, the excess bond 
returns of the firm are calculated as the value-weight d average of the bonds. The Z-test and Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test examines whether MAR and AR are st tistically different from zero. ***, ** and * denotes 
the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 















N of  
Positive 
Returns 
MAR(-20,+20) 7.682   -1.156 6  -0.768   -0.721 22  
AR(-20,+20) 7.404  6.048***  -1.067  6  -0.961 -0.747 -1.965**  16  
MAR(-1,+1) 5.082   -2.045** 9  -0.206    -0.313 23  




3.2.2 Combined Security Returns 
This section examines the combined excess security returns based on the method 
of Billett et al. (2004). The combined stock/bond and target/acquirer total excess 
returns are calculated as value-weighted average of the excess security return in the 
combination. When one firm has more than one bond, the excess bond returns of the 
firm are calculated as the value-weighted average of the bonds. The weights of 
stocks are based on the market value of firms 40 trading days before the 
announcements; the weights of bonds are based on the fiscal-year-end book value of 
long-term debt of firms before the announcements. The formulation assumes that the 
excess returns of a firm’s short-term debt and debt-like instruments are zero, and all 
of a firm’s long-term debt has the same excess return as the firm’s bonds been 
tracked.  
 
Table 3-8 reports the results for: (1) Stock: the value-weighted aggregate excess 
stock returns of both target firms and acquiring firms; (2) Bond: the value-weighted 
aggregate excess bond returns of both target firms and acquiring firms; (3)Target: the 
value-weighted aggregate excess stock and bond returns of target firms; (4)Acquirer: 
the value-weighted aggregate excess stock and bond returns of acquiring firms; (5) 5
Deals: the value-weighted aggregate stock and bond return of 5 deals that both the 
target firms and acquirer firms have valid bond data; (6)Total: the value-weighted 
aggregate return of target and acquirer total excess stock and bond returns for the 
entire sample. Wilcoxon signed rank test examines whether MAR and AR are 
statistically different from zero. 
 
The combined Stock returns in Table 3-8 are negative and statistically significant. 
The explanation is that the large gains of target shareholders are offset by the small 
losses of acquirer shareholders due to the larger siz  of acquirer firms compared with 
target firms when the excess returns are calculated s value-weighted. The negative 
acquiring firm stock return (Table 3-4), the negative acquiring firm bond return 
(Table 3-7), the positive target firm stock return (Table 3-4), and the negative 
combined stock return (Table 3-8) are consistent with the hubris hypothesis and the 
bond return based on hubris hypothesis. It implies that the target firm is operated 
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efficiently and the merger brings no operational synergy. The acquiring firm believes 
the existence of gains and overpays for the transaction. Thus the target shareholders 
gain at the announcement period, presenting a simple wealth transfer from acquiring 
firm shareholders.  
 
The combined Bond returns are positive and the MAR (-1, +1) is statiically 
significant. This result is consistent with the co-insurance hypothesis. It implies that 
the merger brings together two firms whose earning streams are imperfectly 
correlated, therefore reduces the default risk and increase debt capacity, and the 
merged firms’ bondholders as a whole benefit.  However, the co-insurance effect 
predicts shareholders’ losses from the reduced default risk of the firm. The negative 
combined Stock returns are consistent with this wealth transfer from shareholders to 
bondholders.  
 
The combined Target returns are positive and statistically significant where the 
combined Acquirer returns are negative and statistically significant. These results are 
consistent with the results of target shareholder returns, acquiring shareholder returns, 
target bondholder returns and acquirer bondholder returns. These results are 
consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis thatarget firm gains at the expense of 
acquiring firms.  
 
The 5 deals returns are negative and statistically insignificant. Though lack 
statistical power due to the small sample size, these returns do not support the 
synergy hypothesis and they show that M&As are value destroying for these 5 deals 
/10 firms. For the entire sample of 310 deals/620 firms, the combined Total returns 
are negative and statistically significant. They do not support the synergy hypothesis 
either, and they further imply that M&As are valued destroying at the announcement 
period by combining stock/bond and target/acquirer as a whole.  
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Table 3-8 Combined Excess Security Returns 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 
million pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid 
daily stock price data. MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. When one firm 
has more than one bond, the excess bond returns of the firm are calculated as the value-weighted 
average of the bonds. The weights of stocks are basd on the market value of firms 40 trading 
days before the announcements; the weights of bonds are based on the fiscal-year-end book value 
of long-term debt of firms before the announcements. It assumes that the excess returns of a 
firm’s short-term debt and debt-like instruments are zero; moreover, it considers all of firm’s 
long-term debt has the same excess return as the firm’s bonds been tracked. Stock is the value-
weighted aggregate excess stock returns of both target firms and acquiring firms; Bond is the 
value-weighted aggregate excess bond returns of both target firms and acquiring firms; Target is 
the value-weighted aggregate excess stock and bond returns of target firms; Acquirer is the 
value-weighted aggregate excess stock and bond returns of acquiring firms; 5 Deals is the value-
weighted aggregate stock and bond return of 5 deals th t both the target firms and acquirer firms 
have valid bond data; Total is the value-weighted aggregate return of target and cquirer total 
excess stock and bond returns. Wilcoxon signed ranktest examines whether AR and AR are 
statistically different from zero. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 








Stock -0.00103 -4.949***  -0.00141 -4.946***  
Bond 0.00448 -1.736*  0.00331 -0.619  
Target 0.01401 -11.562***  0.01415 -11.658***  
Acquirer  -0.00445 -3.177***  -0.00521 -3.698***  
5 Deals      -0.14135     -1.045           -0.13735     -0.821 









3.2.3 Univariate Analysis  
This section tests the influences of deal characteristics on the excess returns of 
stockholders and bondholders by univariate analysis. The deal characteristics include 
method of payment, hostility, relatedness, relative size and market trend. Economic 
rationales of these deal characteristics are present d, followed by results of tests.  
 
As each of these deal characteristics divides the sample into two sub-groups, the 
independent sample t-test and its non-parametric alternative the Mann-Whitney test 
are used. When the individual factor results in twosub-samples of data, a t-test is 
applicable for comparing the significance of difference between the two sample 
means. It assumes that data are gained from normally distributed populations and 
data are measured at least at the interval level (Fi d, 2005). It is of importance to 
decide whether these two samples are independent or related. If the dependent 
variable is assigned to either one of the two samples, the test is known as the 
Independent Samples t-Test, or a Between Subjects Experiment, or an Independent 
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Means t-Test. If the same dependent variable takes part in both of the two samples, 
the test is known as the Paired Samples t-Test, or a Within Subjects Experiment, or a 
Dependent Means t-Test. In addition to the general assumptions of the t-test, the 
independent samples t-test assumes that variances in these two samples are roughly 
equal (homogeneity of variance) and the dependent variables are independent from 
each other. It rests on the hypothesis that the two sample means are equal. The non-
parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples t-Test is the Mann-Whitney Test 
which assumes the breach of normal distributions of the populations.  
 
3.2.3.1 Method of Payment 
The influences of method payment on security returns are explained by the 




From the economic implication of the choices, method of payment can be 
categorised as fixed payments, contingent payments a d side payments (Bruner, 
2004). Fixed payments include cash and senior debt securities. The aim of this 
payment is to reduce the uncertainty about the value being conveyed. However, this 
payment can also have negative signalling effects that the target lack confidence for 
the long-term integration of the transaction (so target shareholders would not keep 
acquiring firm’s equity), and positive signalling that the acquirer is confident for the 
long-term performance of the combined firm (so acquiring firm shareholders will 
keep the equity to themselves). This signalling effect predicts that cash payment is 
associated with lower target stock returns and higher acquirer stock returns.  
 
Contingent payments include mezzanine or junk bonds, preferred stock and
common stock. The value of these securities is less c rtain than the fixed payments 
because the share price of the acquirer constantly changes with the progress of the 
acquisitions (it often falls in the announcement period). Contingent payments have 
an incentive effect on the target firm that if the arget firm performs well in the future, 
its shareholders will receive extra payoff. This payment also hedges risk for both 
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sides of the transaction by attached derivatives (e.g. caps, collars, floors, earnouts, 
warrants, convertible bonds, contingent value rights, puts, guarantees). The incentive 
effect predicts higher returns for target shareholders by equity payment (optimistic 
targets are more likely to accept equity offers). This payment may signal adverse 
information that the acquirer does not have the cash or senior debt capacity to 
finance the acquisition. Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a behavioural 
finance model of mergers and acquisitions based on st ck market misevaluations of 
the combining firms: acquirers are likely to offer stock when they believe their stocks 
are over-valued and cash when under-valued. Managers have private information 
about the intrinsic value of their stock. If they know the firm is over-valued, they 
have the incentive to enhance their wealth by selling stocks, i.e., they use the firm’s 
stock to acquire a target firm which is under-valued. Finally, the market realises the 
stock is over-valued and the market value of the acquiring firm falls. If target 
shareholders receive the equity offer, these negative returns on acquirer stock may 
result in low returns to target stocks (Danbolt, 2004). This theory explains why 
acquiring firms experience negative stock returns at the announcement period and in 
the post-merger period. It also predicts higher excess stock returns associated with 
the cash payment for both acquiring firms and target firms. According to this 
hypothesis, the higher an acquiring firm’s market to book ratio is, the more likely it 
is going to issue stock than cash or mixed offers. This phenomenon has been 
identified by the empirical studies of Travlos (1987), Martin (1996), Chang and Mais 
(2000), and Heron and Lie (2002). Andrade et al. (2001) point out that this signal 
may also deteriorate bondholder wealth because of market’s bad expectation on 
firm’s future cash flows. 
 
Side payments are the payments to parties other than target sharehold rs. These 
parties are those who may have some influence in the design and consummation of 
the transaction, or in the post-merger integration which include target firm 
management, work union, municipalities, national government, bank lenders, etc. 
The cost of side payments is usually ignored by the acquirer for its smaller value 





Cash and stock payments differ significantly in their tax exposures for both the 
acquirer shareholders and target shareholders. In a pure cash payment deal, the target 
shareholders are obliged to pay tax on capital gains immediately, but the acquirer can 
raise the depreciation basis of acquired assets to their market value (Travlos, 1987). 
In a pure stock payment deal, the tax payments of targe  shareholders are postponed 
until the shares of the new firm are sold, but the depreciation basis of acquired assets 
remains unchanged. Gaughan (2002) proposes security may be more attractive to 
some of the target stockholders because under certain circumstances the transaction 
may be tax free. Hayn (1989) compares the returns to acquirers and targets in taxable 
and non-taxable deals and finds higher returns for taxable deals. Since taxable deals 
are often for cash, non-taxable deals are often for equity, the higher target share 
returns attached with cash payment could be the compensation for target 
shareholders’ immediate loss on tax liability and the reward from acquirer for the 
larger tax shield they gain.  
 
Control Hypothesis 
Bruner (2004) argues that the method of payment is also influenced by the 
control consideration. A cash offer will not change th  composition of acquirer’s 
equity ownership but a stock transaction could impose a large change. As control is 
precious to acquirer, and the acquirer must trade off this effect with the cost and 
benefit of other factors. It predicts a higher retun for acquirers in cash payment. 
 
Riskiness Hypothesis 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) argue that a cash offer is usually associated with 
debt financing since most acquiring firms have limited cash flows. Moreover, 
shareholders may seek to reverse bondholder gains from co-insurance effect by 
issuing debt. The debt issue tends to increase firm’s leverage ratio and default risk, 
but reduce collateral available to bondholders, which has the same effect of dividend 
payout and claim dilution talked in the hypotheses ction (Hypothesis 2: Wealth 
Transfer). In contrary, an equity offer does not change firm’s assets and financial 
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distress costs are reduced. Therefore, this hypothesis predicts a higher bondholder 
wealth if the method of payment is equity. 
 
Evidence on Prediction 
For shareholder wealth, Bruner (2004) summarises 12 tudies of announcement 
returns segmented by the method of payment, and conclude: target shareholders earn 
generally large positive announcement returns, and the returns for cash payment are 
materially higher than returns for stock payment; acquirer shareholders basically 
break even at announcement, and the returns for cash p yment are zero to positive, 
and the returns for stock payment are significantly egative. Travlos (1987), Andrade 
et al. (2001),  Officer (2004), and Bhagat et al. (2005) and also find pure cash 
payment results in higher returns than pure stock payment or mixture payment for 
both target and acquirer shareholders. Fuller et al. (2002), Moellera et al. (2004), 
Mitchell et al. (2004), Moellera et al. (2005), Fan d Goyal (2006), Wang and Xie 
(2008) find acquiring firm shareholders gain more in cash offers. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) discover target shareholders gain higher return for cash payment 
and acquirer shareholders gain higher return for equity payment. Billett et al. (2004), 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) do not find method of payment has statistically 
significant impact on share returns.  
 
For bondholder wealth, Billett et al. (2004) and Renn boog and Szilagyi (2007) 
do not find statistically significant effect of payment on bondholder wealth.   
 
Results 
In this research, method of payment is categorised as if it is “pure cash” or 
“otherwise”. Payment information is taken from TOB.  
 
Table 3-9 demonstrates the impact of method of payment on shareholders’ excess 
returns. For target firms, all the excess returns show higher value for pure cash 
payment than otherwise. The independent sample t-tests are significant for MAR (-
20, +20) and AR (-20, +20); the Mann-Whitney tests are significant for all the excess 
returns. For acquiring firms, MAR (-20, +20) and AR (-20, +20) show lower value 
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for pure cash payment than otherwise, but neither is statistically significant. MAR (-1, 
+1) and AR (-1, +1) illustrate higher value for pure cash payment than otherwise, and 
both are significant for the t-test, and AR (-1, +1) is significant for Mann-Whitney 
test. These results indicate that method of payment has significant impact on stock 
returns, and pure cash payment is associated with higher returns. These results are 
consistent with the signalling hypothesis about fixed payments that when acquiring 
firms are confident for the long-term performance of the combined firm, they pay by 
cash; the signalling hypothesis about contingent payments that acquiring firms offer 
stock when they believe their stocks are over-valued, h nce the stock market reacts 
negatively on both target stocks and acquirer stock; the tax hypothesis that acquirers 
gain from the tax shield on cash payment, and targes ain from the compensation on 
immediate loss on tax liability and reward from acquirers for the tax shield they gain; 
control hypothesis that cash payment keeps the control power of acquirers. These 




Table 3-9 Stock Returns on Payment Method  
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. For payment method, the excess returns of targe  
firms and acquiring firms are divided into two independent samples according to whether the payment is i  
“pure cash” or “otherwise”. The Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means 
between the two samples; the Mann-Whitney Test (Z- est) is the non-parametric counterpart of the 
Independent Samples t-test. The null hypothesis is that the two sample means are equal. ***, ** and * 
denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
Target Stocks 
 N(1)=101 N(2)=209 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:pure cash 25.436  2.627***  -3.339***  -2.254  -1.261  -1.511  
 2:otherwise 18.309    0.009    
AR(-20,+20) 1:pure cash 25.977  1.807*  -2.332**  -3.029  -0.794  -1.115  
 2:otherwise 20.830    -1.410   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:pure cash 14.676  1.390  -1.646*  -0.298  2.383** -1.611 
 2:otherwise 12.095    -2.077    
AR(-1,+1) 1:pure cash 14.858  1.439  -1.764*  -0.322  2.631*** -2.045**  





Table 3-10 illustrates the impact of method of payment on bondholders’ excess 
returns. These results do not show that method of payment has significant impact on 
bond returns, which are consistent with the results of Billett et al. (2004) and 




Table 3-10 Bond Returns on Payment Method  
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
The sample is made up of 11 target firms with 37 bonds and 49 acquiring firms with 131 bonds. MAR is 
market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. If one firm has more than one bond, the excess bond 
returns of the firm are calculated as the value-weight d average of the bonds. For payment method, the 
excess returns of target firms and acquiring firms are divided into two independent samples according to 
whether the payment is in “pure cash” or “otherwise”. The Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines 
the equality of means between the two samples; the Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) is the non-parametric 
counterpart of the Independent Samples t-test. The null hypothesis is that the two sample means are equal. 
***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
Target Bonds 
 N(1)=2 N(2)= 9 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:pure cash -0.471  -0.688  -0.943  -1.395  -0.834  -1.554  
 2:otherwise 9.494    -0.435    
AR(-20,+20) 1:pure cash 1.858  -0.446  0.000  -1.506  -0.646  -0.315  
 2:otherwise 8.637    -0.672   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:pure cash 0.538  -0.826  -0.707  -0.045  0.722 -0.021 
 2:otherwise 6.092    -0.292    
AR(-1,+1) 1:pure cash 0.749  -0.791  -0.943  -0.109  0.813 -0.294 





Hostile takeovers are the acquisitions of a publicly held company over the 
opposition of its management. Practically, a takeover is defined hostile if it is 
initially rejected by the target management (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1994). Morck et al. 
(1988) investigate the ownership characteristics of the 1980 Fortune 500 firms that 
were acquired in the subsequent five years and conclude that “the mangers’ incentive 
to sell” is a factor in deciding if the takeover is hostile. Friendly takeovers are 
acquisitions through negotiation without any defences.  
 
Hypotheses 
According to Sudarsanam (2003), a friendly takeover has several advantages to 
the acquiring firms. First, it is less risky: because the acquirer has better access than a 
hostile takeover to information about the target in due diligence, the future status of 
the target firm is certain. Second, it is less expensive: because it involves less 
defence from the target, the duration of takeover is short and the expense is low. 
Third, the co-operation from target firm’s management is conducive to a more 
successful post-merger integration. These three reasons predict higher excess returns 
for acquirer shareholders by friendly takeovers than ostile ones. However, acquirers 
still benefit in hostile takeovers from a greater clarity of purpose, clearer 
identification of sources of value creation, and better pre-bid planning. Moreover, the 
hostile deals are subject to much greater public scrutiny, which reduces the 
overpayment problem and forces acquirers work more efficiently on the post-
acquisition integration. This factor predicts a higher return for acquirer shareholders 
by hostile takeovers.  
 
Ruback (1988) argues that there are three reasons for target managers to resist a 
takeover: they believe the firm has hidden values; they believe the resistance will 
increase bidding premium; or they want to retain their positions. Target shareholders 
only concern the market value of the firm. The market value of any firm is the sum 
of two components: the value of the firm conditional on keeping the same 
management, and the expected change in value of the firm from a corporate control 
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change. The latter component equals the probability of a takeover multiplies the 
change in value from a takeover.  
market value 
of the firm 
= 
value of the 








value from a 
control change 
A takeover defence may lower the probability of being acquired, increase the offer 
price, and also affect the value of the firm even if it is not acquired. Thus, the 
defence could have complex effects on target firm shareholders7.  
 
According to above hypotheses, bondholders are expected to have qualitatively 
the same wealth effect on hostility as the shareholders. 
 
Evidence on Prediction 
For shareholder wealth, Schwert (2000) argues that empirical tests show that 
most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly 
deals in economic terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part of 
the bargaining process. Burch (2001) and Officer (2003) do not find hostility have 
statistically significant effect on either target or acquirer stockholders. Danbolt (2004) 
find hostility does not have significant effect on targets shareholders, whereas 
Moellera et al. (2004), Gregory and McCorriston (2005) and Moellera et al. (2005) 
report hostility does not have significant impact on acquirers shareholders. Bhagat et 
al. (2005) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) discover higher returns for acquirers if 
the deal is friendly. Billett et al. (2004) find higher target share returns in hostile 
takeovers. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report target stockholders experience 
higher return if the deal is hostile but acquirer stockholders experience higher return 
if the deal is friendly.  
 
For bondholder wealth, Billett et al. (2004) and Renn boog and Szilagyi (2007) 
do not find significant influence of hostility on target and acquirer bondholders.  
 
                                                
7 Ruback (1988) page 50: if a defence allows incumbent management to completely block all takeovers, the 
probability of a control change will reduce to zero and the expected takeover premium is eliminated, the market 
value of the firm could decrease because managers enjoy the leisure that the isolation from being fired provides, 
and the market value could increase because managers stop wasting time and corporate resources worrying about 




In this research, hostility is categorised as if it is “friendly” or “hostile”. Hostility 
information is taken from TOB.  
 
Table 3-11 demonstrates the impact of hostility on shareholders’ excess returns. 
For target firms, none of the tests are significant. For acquiring firms, MAR (-1, +1) 
and AR (-1, +1) show higher value for friendly deals than hostile deals, and the 
Mann-Whitney tests are significant. These results imply that acquiring firms face less 




Table 3-11 Stock Returns on Hostility 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. For hostility, the excess returns of target firms 
and acquiring firms are divided into two independent samples according to whether the deal is “friendly” 
(neutral deals are considered as friendly) or “hostile”. The Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines 
the equality of means between the two samples; the Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) is the non-parametric 
counterpart of the Independent Samples t-test. The null hypothesis is that the two sample means are equal. 
***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
Target Stocks 
 N(1)=293 N(2)=17 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:friendly 20.782  0.486  -0.452  -0.432  1.459  -1.521  
 2:hostile 18.038    -5.820    
AR(-20,+20) 1:friendly 22.705  0.614  -0.310 -1.601  1.467  -0.920  
 2:hostile 19.089    -7.740   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:friendly 12.830  -0.505  -0.413  -1.424  0.786 -1.902* 
 2:hostile 14.764    -2.771    
AR(-1,+1) 1:friendly 12.977  -0.412  -0.274  -1.550  0.848 -2.064**  





Table 3-12 demonstrates the impact of hostility on bdholders’ excess returns. 
None of the tests are significant, thus hostility has no influence on target and acquirer 
bondholder wealth. This finding is consistent with Billett et al. (2004) and 




Table 3-12 Bond Returns on Hostility 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
The sample is made up of 11 target firms with 37 bonds and 49 acquiring firms with 131 bonds. MAR is 
market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. If one firm has more than one bond, the excess bond 
returns of the firm are calculated as the value-weight d average of the bonds. For hostility, the excess r turns 
of target firms and acquiring firms are divided into two independent samples according to whether the deal is 
“friendly” (neutral deals are considered as friendly) or “hostile”. The Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) 
examines the equality of means between the two samples; the Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) is the non-
parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples t-t t. The null hypothesis is that the two sample means 
are equal. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
Target Bonds 
 N(1)=9 N(2)=2 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:friendly 9.134  0.546 0.000  -0.627  0.864  -0.657  
 2:hostile 1.149    -2.355    
AR(-20,+20) 1:friendly 8.738  0.484  0.000 -0.737  1.238  -0.949  
 2:hostile 1.401   -3.482   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:friendly 5.828  0.600  -0.236  -0.091  0.885 -0.548 
 2:hostile 1.724    -1.507    
AR(-1,+1) 1:friendly 6.064  0.610  0.000  -0.180  0.861 -0.073  





3.2.3.3 Industry Relatedness 
Hypotheses 
Whether an acquisition is horizontal, vertical or cnglomerate, it may affect the 
level of operating synergies of the combined firm, and possibly also on the 
shareholder abnormal returns (Danbolt, 2004). It isusually considered that since a 
related merger (horizontal or vertical) happens in the same industry, the combined 
firm is more likely to achieve operational synergies on economy of scale and scope. 
In contrast, an unrelated merger (conglomerate) is usually associated with the agency 
problem that acquiring firm managers use the free cash flow to build their empire. 
From this prediction, target and acquirer shareholders should earn more in related 
mergers than unrelated mergers. However, unrelated m rgers enable acquirers to 
diversify their risk against the industrial wave (the emergence of new industries, the 
retrenchment of old industries, and the rise and fall within industries’ longevity) and 
economic circle; moreover, merging firms benefit from economy of learning even 
though they belong to difference industries. In addition, since unrelated mergers are 
associated with the co-insurance effect, shareholders are likely to increase leverage 
to expropriate wealth from bondholders (the incentive effect). From these predictions, 
target and acquirer shareholders should receive higher returns in unrelated mergers. 
 
From bondholders’ point of view, when two firms’ earnings streams are 
imperfectly correlated, the merger would reduce the combined firm’s default risk and 
increase debt capacity; hence the co-insurance effect is likely to be stronger in 
diversifying or unrelated mergers. As a result, theunrelated mergers increase 
bondholder’s value but decreases shareholders’ value. Nevertheless, the opposite 
situation could still happen because shareholders have the incentive to increase 
leverage to expropriate bondholders’ wealth gained from the co-insurance.  
 
Evidence on Prediction 
For shareholder wealth, Fuller et al. (2002) and Grego y and McCorriston (2005) 
report industry relatedness does not have significat impact for acquirer shareholders; 
Officer (2003) reports relatedness does not have significant impact for both target 
and acquirer shareholders. Moellera et al. (2004) and Moellera et al. (2005) discover 
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higher acquirer stock returns for related deals. Danbolt (2004) finds higher target 
stock returns for related (vertical) deals. Bhagat et al. (2005) reported higher stock 
return for both target and acquirer stockholders for related acquisitions. Fan and 
Goyal (2006) find mixed effects of relatedness.  
 
For bondholder wealth, Walker (1994) report target bondholder returns are 
negatively associated with related mergers, and acquirer bondholder returns are 
insignificant on relatedness. This result is consistent with the co-insurance hypothesis. 
Maquieira et al. (1998) discover the combined non-cvertible bondholder wealth of 
targets and acquirers are positively correlated with related (non-conglomerate) 
mergers. They explain that non-conglomerate mergers create more value (for the 
firm) than conglomerate mergers. Billett et al. (2004) and Renneboog and Szilagyi 
(2007) do not find significant evidence of the impact of relatedness (diversifying deal) 
on shareholder and bondholder wealth. 
 
Results 
In this research, industry relatedness is classified as “related” or “unrelated”. The 
relatedness depends on firms’ first two digits of primary SIC code. The SIC code 
information is taken from TOB. 
 
Table 3-13 shows the impact of industry relatedness on shareholders’ excess 
returns. For target firms, none of the tests are significant. For acquiring firms, the t-
test is significant for MAR (-1, +1) and the Mann-Whitney test is significant for both 
MAR (-1, +1) and AR (-1, +1). These two excess returns show higher value for 
unrelated deals than related deals. This could be explained by the hypotheses of 




Table 3-13 Stock Returns on Relatedness 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. For relatedness, the excess returns of target fi ms 
and acquiring firms are divided into two independent samples according to whether the deal is “related” or 
“unrelated”. Relatedness is measured by the first 2 digits of the Primary SIC code. The Independent Samples 
t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the two samples; the Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) 
is the non-parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples t-test. The null hypothesis is that the two
sample means are equal. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
Target Stocks 
 N(1)=155 N(2)=155 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:related 19.937 -0.540  -0.552  -0.098  0.748  -0.809  
 2:unrelated 21.325    -1.358    
AR(-20,+20) 1:related 22.422  -0.063  -0.307 -1.601  0.352  -0.886  
 2:unrelated 22.591    -2.275   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:related 12.776  -0.183  -0.762  -2.157  -1.696* -2.046** 
 2:unrelated 13.096    -0.838    
AR(-1,+1) 1:related 12.893  -0.195  -0.884  -2.257  -1.625 -1.829*  





Table 3-14 depicts the impact of industry relatedness on bondholders’ excess 
returns. For target firms, none of the tests are significant. For acquiring firms, the 
Mann-Whitney test is significant for MAR (-20, +20), and the bondholder return is 
higher in related deals. According to the prediction f co-insurance effect, 
bondholders should experience higher returns in unrelated deals; the lower returns 
here may due to the wealth transfer from bondholder to shareholders due to the 




Table 3-14 Bond Returns on Relatedness 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
The sample is made up of 11 target firms with 37 bonds and 49 acquiring firms with 131 bonds. MAR is 
market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. If one firm has more than one bond, the excess bond 
returns of the firm are calculated as the value-weight d average of the bonds. For relatedness, the exc ss 
returns of target firms and acquiring firms are divided into two independent samples according to whether 
the deal is “related” or “unrelated”. Relatedness is measured by the first 2 digits of the Primary SIC code. 
The Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the two samples; the 
Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) is the non-parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples t-test. The null 




 N(1)=4 N(2)=7 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:related 14.523 0.708  -0.189  -0.490  0.610  -0.671  
 2:unrelated 3.774    -1.172    
AR(-20,+20) 1:related 15.021  0.760  -0.189 -0.515  0.878  -1.892*  
 2:unrelated 3.052    -1.608   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:related 6.771  0.481  0.000 -0.038  1.063 -0.203 
 2:unrelated 4.117    -0.450    
AR(-1,+1) 1:related 6.986 0.468  -0.189  -0.110  1.163 -0.346 





3.2.3.4 Relative Size 
Hypotheses 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) argue that acquirers have limited capacity to 
absorb the target, so the takeover of a large target creates more uncertainties for the 
realisation of synergy thus is harder to implement successfully. Moreover, larger 
acquisitions are more driven by managerial hubris aimed at building large and 
diversified firm (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2007), and are inefficient on removal of 
target firm’s incumbent management (Bhagat et al. 2005). As a result, shareholder as 
well as bondholder returns should be negatively related with the target size.  
 
Conversely, large targets create greater scope for co-insurance effect and 
contribute more assets to the combined firm, adding ebt capacity, so bondholder 
returns should be positively related with the target size (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 
2007).  
 
Evidence on Prediction 
For stockholder wealth, Danbolt (2004) reports log of market value of target does 
not have significant impact on target shareholder returns, Fuller et al. (2002) find log 
of relative size and log of target size do not have significant influence on acquirer 
shareholders, and Burch (2001) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find relative 
size does not have significant effect on both targets and acquirers. Billett et al. (2004) 
find relative size negatively related with target firm stock returns. Officer (2004) 
reports log of relative size (target / acquirer) negatively related to acquirer stock 
returns, and Officer (2003) finds log of target firm market value is negatively related 
to both target and acquirer stock returns. Bhagat et l. (2005) find the log of relative 
size (target over acquirer) is negatively related with target shareholder returns and 
positively related with acquirer shareholder returns. They argue that if the gains from 
takeovers are derived solely from target improvements such as removal of bad 
management, then a smaller (larger) relative size of the target (acquirer) would not 
increase the gains. They also find the log of target size is negatively related with both 
target and acquirer shareholder returns. Campa and Hernando (2006) discover 
relative size is positively related with target shareholder returns, but insignificant for 
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acquirer shareholder returns. Moellera et al. (2005) find target firm market value is 
positively related with acquirer returns.  Moellera et al. (2004) also report relative 
size is positively related to acquirer (for all sample) stock returns. Fan and Goyal 
(2006) find relative size (target / acquirer) positively related with the combined firm 
values.  
 
Billett et al. (2004) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) discover the relativ  size 
is negatively related with acquirer bond returns.  
 
Results 
Table 3-15 depicts the impact of relative size on share olders’ excess returns. 
Relative size is measured as the ratio of target siz  over acquirer size, where the size 
dependents on market value of firms 40 trading days before the announcement date. 
“T<A” stands for the target size is smaller than theacquirer size and “T>A” stands 
for the target size is larger than the acquirer size. Market value information is 
obtained from Datastream.  
 
For target firms, all the excess returns show higher values for T<A. The t-tests 
are significant at 1% level for MAR (-20, +20) and AR (-20, +20). The Mann-
Whitney tests are significant for all the returns. For acquiring firms, none of the tests 
are significant. These results indicate that the acquisition of a small target is more 
likely to realise synergy, to remove incumbent management, and less likely to be 




Table 3-15 Stock Returns on Relative Size 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. The relative size dependents on market value of 
firms 40 trading days before the announcement date. “T<A” stands for the target size is smaller than the
acquirer size and “T>A” stands for the target size is larger than the acquirer size. The Independent Samples 
t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the two samples; the Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) 
is the non-parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples t-test. The null hypothesis is that the two
sample means are equal. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
Target Stocks 
 N(1)=284 N(2)=26 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:T<A 21.718 2.830***  -2.608***  -0.510  0.681  -0.869  
 2:T>A 8.761    -3.106    
AR(-20,+20) 1:T<A 23.643  2.835***  -2.567*** -1.766  0.593  -0.105  
 2:T>A 10.092    -3.810   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:T<A 13.325  1.478  -1.749*  -1.438  0.5 1 -0.382 
 2:T>A 8.689    -2.144    
AR(-1,+1) 1:T<A 13.430  1.398  -1.630*  -1.593  0.31 -0.283  






Table 3-16 depicts the impact of relative size on bodh lders’ excess returns. 




Table 3-16 Bond Returns on Relative Size 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
The sample is made up of 11 target firms with 37 bonds and 49 acquiring firms with 131 bonds. MAR is 
market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. If one firm has more than one bond, the excess bond 
returns of the firm are calculated as the value-weight d average of the bonds. The relative size dependents on 
market value of firms 40 trading days before the annou cement date. “T<A” stands for the target size is 
smaller than the acquirer size and “T>A” stands for the target size is larger than the acquirer size. The
Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the two samples; the Mann-
Whitney Test (Z-test) is the non-parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples t-test. The null 




 N(1)=10 N(2)=1 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:T<A 8.459 0.432  -0.632  -0.720  0.419  -1.112  
 2:T>A -0.081    -1.886    
AR(-20,+20) 1:T<A 8.167  0.410  -0.316 -0.984  -0.184  -0.101  
 2:T>A -0.219    -0.410   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:T<A 5.578  0.595  -0.949  -0.216  -0.279 -0.253 
 2:T>A 0.119    0.015    
AR(-1,+1) 1:T<A 5.797  0.599  -0.632  -0.302  -0.227 -0.202  





3.2.3.5 Market Trend 
Hypotheses 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that merger waves can be 
rationally driven by periods of over- and undervaluation of the stock market. In the 
model, managers of acquirer have private information about the stand-alone value of 
their firm and the potential value of a merger; managers of target have private 
information about the stand-alone value of their firm. Both firms’ market value may 
not reflect their intrinsic values. The misvaluation has two components—a firm-
specific component and a market-wide component. The rational target knows 
whether it is overvalued or undervalued, but it cannot decide whether this 
misvaluation is a market effect or a firm effect. For a given offer value, the target 
managers decide whether to accept the offer based on their private information of the 





Value ×  (1+Synergy) 
Target managers attempt to filter out the market-wide misvaluation effect because 
the target’s true value and the offer value both positively related to the market-wide 
misvaluation. The target correctly adjusts the offer value for potential market-wide 
overvaluation, but being a Bayesian updater, it assign  some weight on high synergy 
as well (for a given offer, the target must decide th  probability that the acquirer is 
overvalued versus the probability that the firm has a large synergy, and it usually 
puts some weight on synergy, thus the discount factor of market misvaluation is 
diminished). So when the market-wide overvaluation is high, the estimated error 
associated with synergy is high, too. Thus, the more the market is overvalued, the 
larger is the target’s expectation of its firm-specific misvaluation (for given total 
misvaluation of target, if the market effect is underestimated, the firm effect is 
therefore enlarged). Accordingly, the target filters out of the bid offer too little of the 
market-wide effect in case the market is overvalued, an  the offer value seems to be 
favourable to both target and acquirer shareholders. This hypothesis predicts higher 
value of excess shareholder returns when the market is overvalued.  
 
Since mergers in overvalued market is likely to be associated with the agency 
problem that acquirer managers use the firm’s source to build their empire, where 
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mergers in undervalued market is more associated with industry restructuring and the 
discipline of bad target management, and create more synergy, it is expected that 
mergers in undervalued market produce higher excess returns for acquiring firm 
bondholders.  
 
Evidence on Prediction 
There are not many empirical studies test the relationship between market trend 
and stockholder returns in regard to M&A. Bhagat et al. (2005) find that US target 
firms attain higher stock returns for mergers announced after March 2000. To my 




A bull market is likely to be an overvalued market and a bear market is likely to 
be an undervalued market. This research measures the market trend according to the 
market index of FTSE All Shares. Chart 3-3 illustrates the market trend of this index. 
Sample firms are split into groups of a bull market b ween 1994 and September 
2000, and after March 2003, and a bear market between S ptember 2000 and March 
2003. The index information is from Datastream. 
 
Chart 3-3 FTSE All Shares  
FTSE ALL SHARE
FROM  1/ 1/94 TO 31/12/06 MONTHLY













PRICE REL. TO FTSE ALL SHARE
HIGH 3262 1/9/00, LOW 1469 1/7/94, LAST 3110




Table 3-17 describes the impact of market trend on shareholders’ excess returns. 
For target firms, MAR (-1, +1) shows higher values for the bull market and is 
significant for the Mann-Whitney test. For acquiring firms, all the excess returns 
show higher value for bull market, and all the t-tests are significant and the Mann-
Whitney test for AR (-20, +20) is significant. These results are consistent with the 




Table 3-17 Stock Returns on Market Trend 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. The market trend splits the sample into bull 
market period (announcement before 4 September 2000and after 12 March 2003) and bear market period 
(announcement between 4 September 2000 and 12 March 2003) according to the trend of FTSE All Shares. 
The Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the two samples; the 
Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) is the non-parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples t-test. The null 




 N(1)=40 N(2)=270 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:bear market 18.397 -0.670  -0.259  -5.896  -2.380**  -1.597  
 2:bull market  20.962    0.038    
AR(-20,+20) 1:bear market 20.370  -0.613  -0.847 -6.461  -1.831*  -2.034**  
 2:bull market 22.823    -1.267   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:bear market  10.491  -1.081  -1.682*  -3.564  -2.050** -0.973 
 2:bull market 13.298    -1.191    
AR(-1,+1) 1:bear market 10.810  -0.998  -1.575  -3.509  -1.876* -0.922 





Table 3-18 describes the impact of market trend on bondholders’ excess returns. 
For target firms, none of the tests are significant. For acquiring firms, MAR (-1, +1) 
and AR (-1, +1) demonstrate positive and higher values for bear market than the bull 
market. The t-test is significant for MAR (-1, +1) and the Mann-Whitney tests are 
significant for both MAR (-1, +1) and AR (-1, +1). These results are consistent with 




Table 3-18 Bond Returns on Market Trend 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million 
pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. 
The sample is made up of 11 target firms with 37 bonds and 49 acquiring firms with 131 bonds. MAR is 
market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. If one firm has more than one bond, the excess bond 
returns of the firm are calculated as the value-weight d average of the bonds. The market trend splits the 
sample into bull market period (announcement before 4 September 2000 and after 12 March 2003) and bear 
market period (announcement between 4 September 2000 and 12 March 2003) according to the trend of 
FTSE All Shares. The Independent Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the 
two samples; the Mann-Whitney Test (Z-test) is the non-parametric counterpart of the Independent Samples 
t-test. The null hypothesis is that the two sample means are equal. ***, ** and * denotes the significan e 
level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  
Target Bonds 
 N(1)=1 N(2)=10 














MAR(-20,+20) 1:bear market -2.076 -0.547  -1.265  -1.200  -0.372  -0.103  
 2:bull market  8.658    -0.671    
AR(-20,+20) 1:bear market -1.716  -0.493  -0.949 -1.270  -0.145  -0.181  
 2:bull market 8.316    -0.892   
MAR(-1,+1) 1:bear market  1.686 -0.403  0.000  0.358  1.686* -2.324** 
 2:bull market 5.422    -0.333    
AR(-1,+1) 1:bear market 1.681  -0.411  -0.316  0.219  1.488 -2.040** 





3.2.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This section studies the relation between excess security returns and the deal 
characteristics variables discussed in the univariate analysis section. The excess stock 
and bond returns are each categorized into MAR (-20, + ), AR (-20, +20), MAR (-1, 
+1) and AR (-1, +1). The independent variables include method of payment, hostility, 
industry relatedness, relative size, and market trend. Method of payment is the 
dummy variable set to 1 if the payment is pure cash and 0 as otherwise. Hostility is 
the dummy variable set to 1 if the deal is friendly and 0 as hostile. Industry 
relatedness is measured by the first 2 digits of the primary SIC code of target and 
acquiring firms. If the target and acquiring firms’ first 2 digits are the same, the deal 
is labelled as related and otherwise as unrelated. The dummy variable is set to 1 for 
unrelated deals and 0 for related deals. Relative size measures the log ratio of target 
firm size over acquiring firm size: )
acquirerMV
etMVargt
lg( , and the sizes are market value 
of firms 40 trading days before the deal announcements. Market trend assesses where 
the deals are announced in the period of bull market or bear market. According to the 
trend of FTSE All Shares index, the dummy variable is set to 1 for bull market 
periods which are before 4 September 2000 and after 12 March 2003, and 0 for bear 
market period which is between 4 September 2000 and 12 March 2003. The formula 
of the multivariate analysis (OLS) is expressed as: 
Excess Return= α + β 1 Payment + β 2 Hostility + β 3 Relatedness + β 4 Size 
+ β 5 MarketTrend +ε  
 
Table 3-19 illustrates the correlations between these independent variables. Low 
correlations between variables support the robustnes  of regression. The highest 
correlation in absolute value is between method of payment and relative size with a 
value of -0.383.  The negative correlation between method of payment (pure cash) 
and relative size (log ratio of target over acquirer) means that the larger the target 
size, the more likely the deal is paid by stock, which shows that acquirers’ cash 
reserve (as well as debt capacity) is limited. The lowest correlation in absolute value 
is between relative size and market trend with a value of -0.018.
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Table 3-19 Correlations between Independent Variables 
This table demonstrates the correlations between independent variables. The sample comes from M&A deals 
announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values ovr 10 million pounds. Both the target firms and the 
acquiring firms are UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. The sample consists of 310 deals. 
Method of payment, hostility, relatedness and market t end are dummy variables equal to 1 if the deal is pure 
cash payment, friendly, unrelated and announced before 4 September 2000 and after 12 March 2003. 
Industry relatedness is measured by the first two digits of firms’ primary SIC code. Relative size is the log 
ratio of target firm size over acquiring firm size. Firm size is market value of firms 40 trading days before 
the announcement day. 
 Payment Hostility Relatedness Size Market Trend    
Payment  0.137  0.062  -0.383  0.020  
Hostility  0.137   0.071  -0.051  0.050  
Relatedness 0.062  0.071   -0.106  -0.115  
Size -0.383  -0.051  -0.106   -0.018  





Table 3-20 reports the results of multiple regressions (OLS) on stock and bond 
excess returns. These excess returns include MAR (-20, +20), AR (-20, +20), MAR 
(-1, +1) and AR (-1, +1). For the reports of target stock return, acquirer stock return 
and acquirer bond return, the adjusted R-squares are low, which means the models do 
not explain a large percentage of the multiple regressions in excess returns. However, 
these values of adjusted R-squares are similar to the empirical results of Maxwell and 
Stephens (2003) and Billett et al. (2004). 
 
For target stock, all these four excess returns show significance for the model 
(see the F-statistic). The coefficient for relative size is significant at 1% level for all 
the four excess returns. The negative sign of this coeffi ient shows that the smaller 
the target firm is, the higher the stock returns for target firm, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis and results in the univariate analysis. The coefficients of the other 
independent variables are insignificant. For acquirer stock, MAR (-20, +20), MAR (-
1, +1) and AR (-1, +1) show significance at 5% for the model (see F-statistics). The 
coefficients of hostility and market trend are significant at 5% level for MAR (-20, 
+20); the coefficients of market trend is significant t 5% level for MAR (-20, +20) 
and at 10% level for AR (-20, +20); the coefficients of payment method are 
significant for MAR (-1, +1) and AR (-1, +1) at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The 
implications are that excess acquirer stock returns a e higher if the deal is friendly, 
announced in bull market, and paid by pure cash, which are consistent with the 
hypotheses in univariate analysis.  
 
For target bond, none of the model is significant. The coefficient of payment 
method is significant at 10% level and negative for all the four excess returns, 
implying that bond returns are higher with equity payment, which is consistent with 
the riskiness hypothesis in univariate analysis. The coefficients of size are significant 
at 10% level and negative for MAR (-20, +20) and AR (-20, +20), which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that large targets create greater scope for co-insurance 
effect. The adjusted R-squares for MAR (-1, +1) and AR (-1, +1) are negative, which 
implies that the model uses more information than it reveals (the observation size is 
small but regressor size is big). For acquirer bond, MAR (-1, +1) and AR (-1, +1) 
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show significance for the model. The coefficient of size is significant for MAR (-20, 
+20) at 5% level. The implication is the same as for target bond returns. The 
coefficient of market trend is significant at 5% level for MAR (-1, +1) and AR (-1, 
+1). It implies that acquirer bond returns are higher in bear market, which is 




Table 3-20 Multiple Regressions on Stock and Bond Returns 
The sample comes from M&A deals announced between 1994 and 2006 with deal values over 10 million pounds. Both the target firms and the acquiring firms are
UK public firms with valid daily stock price data. MAR is market adjusted return and AR is abnormal return. The stock sample consists of 310 target firms and 310 
acquiring firms. The bond sample is made up of 11 target firms with 37 bonds and 49 acquiring firms with 131 bonds. When one firm has more than one bond, the 
excess bond return of the firm is calculated as the value-weighted average of the bonds. The multiple regression tests the deal characteristics which could influence 
the excess returns: method of payment, hostility, industry relatedness, relative size and market trend. Method of payment, hostility, relatedness and market trend are 
dummy variables equal to 1 if the deal is pure cash payment, friendly, unrelated and announced before 4 September 2000 and after 12 March 2003. Industry 
relatedness is measured by the first two digits of firms’ primary SIC code. Relative size is the log ratio of target firm size over acquiring firm size. Firm size is market 
value of firms 40 trading days before the announcement day. t-statistics are computed using White’s correction fr Heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * denotes the 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Stock Target Stock Returns  Acquirer Stock Returns 
MAR(-20, +20) AR(-20, +20) MAR (-1, +1) AR(-1, +1)  MAR(-20, +20) AR(-20, +20) MAR(-1, +1) AR(-1, +1) Estimated 
Coefficient Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t  Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
Constant 0.104  1.545  0.108  1.555  0.095  2.337**  0.095  2.316** -0.110  -2.729***  -0.116  -1.959**  -0.054  -2.795***  -0.052  -2.678***  
Payment 0.025  0.686  -0.006  -0.178  0.003  0.136  0.004  .177  -0.025  -1.307  -0.011  -0.527  0.017  2.053**  0.020  2.505***  
Hostility  0.010  0.191  0.027  0.485  -0.024  -0.703  -0.021  -0.599  0.069  2.392**  0.073  1.369  0.009  0.642  0.009  0.624  
Relatedness -0.002  -0.088  -0.016  -0.618  -0.005  -0.281  -0.005  -0.267  -0.018  -1.096  -0.010  -0.538  0.010  1.329  0.010  1.307  
Size -0.088  -2.578***  -0.109  -3.393***  -0.048  -2.561***  -0.048  -2.586***  0.000  0.025  0.017  0.953  -0.000  -0.047  0.003  0.493  
Mar_Trend  0.030  0.702  0.032  0.694  0.030  1.178  0.028  1.093  0.064  2.092**  0.055 1.724*  0.023  1.559  0.021  1.459 
F-test  5.138***  5.865***  2.950***  2.883**  2.309**  1.656  2.229**  2.300**  
Adj. R^2  0.063  0.073  0.031  0.030  0.021  0.011  0.019  0.021 
N  310  310  310  310  310  310  310  310 
Bond Target Bond Returns  Acquirer Bond Returns 
MAR(-20, +20) AR(-20, +20) MAR (-1, +1) AR(-1, +1)  MAR(-20, +20) AR(-20, +20) MAR(-1, +1) AR(-1, +1) Estimated 
Coefficient Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t  Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
Constant -0.030  -0.250  0.002  0.013  0.010  0.005  -0.003  -0.039  -0.027  -0.933 -0.037  -1.038  -0.008  -0.594  -0.009  -0.685  
Payment -0.370  -2.350*  -0.353  -2.153*  -0.168  -2.292*  -0.169  -2.105*  -0.003  -0.242  -0.004  -0.294  0.002  0.780  0.002  0.768  
Hostility  -0.033  -0.245  -0.066  -0.493  0.001  0.010  0.004  0.049  0.032  1.363  0.041  1.544  0.013  0.964  0.013  0.929  
Relatedness -0.024  -0.171  -0.033  -0.226  0.014  0.211  0.013  0.181  -0.004  -0.314  -0.010  -0.612  -0.005  -1.267  -0.006  -1.367  
Size -0.265  -2.034*  -0.293  -2.211*  -0.099  -1.517  -0.099  -1.416  0.013  2.027**  0.010  1.531  0.000  .150  0.000  -0.075  
Mar_Trend  0.067  0.412  0.043  0.262  0.015  0.187  0.019  0.227  0.007  0.380  0.007  0.263  -0.006  -2.297**  -0.005  -2.134** 
F-test  1.846  1.977  0.755  0.698  0.955  0.787  2.289*  2.162*  
Adj. R^2   0.297  0.328  -0.140  -0.178  -0.005  -0.013  0.118  0.108 





This thesis examines shareholders’ and bondholders’ wealth in respect to 310 
mergers and acquisitions in the UK market between 1994 and 2006. 
 
Based on the theories of M&A motivations and the thories of shareholder-
bondholder conflicts, this research is designed around five testable hypotheses: the 
coinsurance effect, the wealth transfer, the synergy, the hubris hypothesis and the 
bond return based on the hubris hypothesis. The excess security returns are tested in 
four sections: the overall security returns, the combined security returns, the 
univariate analysis and the multivariate analysis.  
 
In the overall security returns section, the market-adjusted return (MAR) and 
abnormal return (AR) of stocks and bonds are examined i  a forty-one day event 
window (-20, +20) and a three day event window (-1,+ ). The overall stock returns 
are 20.631% for MAR (-20, +20), 22.507% for AR (-20, +20), 12.936% for MAR (-1, 
+1) and 13.063% for AR (-1, +1) of target firms, and -0.728% for MAR (-20, +20), -
1.938% for AR (-20, +20), -1.498% for MAR (-1, +1) and -1.629% for AR (-1, +1) 
of acquiring firms. Except for MAR (-20, +20) of the acquiring firm, all the other 
returns are statistically significant. The positive target stock returns and negative 
acquirer stock returns are consistent with many previous studies. The overall bond 
returns are 7.682% for MAR (-20, +20), 7.404% for AR (-20, +20), 5.082% for 
MAR (-1, +1) and 5.278% for AR (-1, +1) of target firms, and -0.768% for MAR (-
20, +20), -0.961% for AR (-20, +20), -0.206% for MAR (-1, +1) and -0.294% for 
AR (-1, +1) of acquiring firms. The target AR (-20, +20) and AR (-1, +1) are 
significant for the Z-test at 1% level, MAR (-1, +1) and AR (-1, +1) are significant 
for the Wilcoxon test at 5% level, and the acquirer AR (-20, +20) is significant for 
the Wilcoxon test at 5% level. The number of studies on bondholder wealth 
regarding M&A is limited, and among them only Billett t al. (2004) and this study 
are able to find significant non-convertible bond retu ns for both target and acquiring 
firms. Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim (1982), Dennis and McConnell 
(1986) and Walker (1994) do not find significant retu ns for bondholders; Settle et al. 




distinguish the wealth effect on target and acquirer; Eger (1983), Maquieira (1998) 
and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) report a significantly positive bond return for 
acquiring firms, and Travlos (1987) report a significantly negative bond return for 
acquiring firms, but no significant evidence for taget firm bonds; Penas and Unal 
(2004) find significantly positive bond return for target firms, but acquiring firm 
bond return is insignificant. The significant positive target stock return, negative 
acquirer stock return, positive target bond return and negative acquirer bond return 
preliminarily support the wealth transfer hypothesis and the hubris hypothesis. 
However, the complete conclusion on the five hypotheses can be drawn only after 
the combined security return tests are done.  
 
The second section examines the combined stock/bond and target/acquirer excess 
returns. These combined returns are calculated as value-weighted average of the 
excess security return in the combination. The combined Stock returns are -0.00103% 
for MAR (-1, +1) and -0.00141% for AR (-1, +1), and statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with the hubris hypothesis that acquisitions are value destroying 
for stockholders as a whole. The combined Bond returns are 0.00448% for MAR (-1, 
+1) and statistically significant, and 0.00331% forAR (-1, +1) and statistically 
insignificant. The positive bondholder return is consistent with the co-insurance 
hypothesis. The combined Target returns are 0.01401% for MAR (-1, +1) and 
0.01415% for AR (-1, +1), and statistically significant; the combined Acquirer 
returns are -0.00445% for MAR (-1, +1) and -0.00521% for AR (-1, +1), and 
statistically significant. These two results are consistent with the wealth transfer 
hypothesis that M&A transfers wealth from acquiring firms to target firms. The 5 
deals returns are -0.14135% for MAR (-1, +1) and -0.13735% for AR (-1, +1), and 
statistically insignificant; the Total returns are -0.00077% for MAR (-1, +1) and -
0.00109% for AR (-1, +1), and statistically significant. These results are inconsistent 
with the synergy hypothesis. Billett et al. (2004) reports a significant positive return 
for combined Stock, an insignificant positive (mean) return for combined Bond, a 
significant positive return for combine Target, an insignificant positive return for 
Acquirer, and a significant positive return for Total. The Total return difference 




Billett et al. (2004) study is insignificantly positive but in this study is significantly 
negative.  
 
The univariate analysis section tests the influences of deal characteristics on the 
excess returns of stockholders and bondholders. The deal characteristics include 
method of payment, hostility, industry relatedness, relative size and market trend. 
The method of payment is measured by whether the payment is in pure cash or 
otherwise. Stock returns show higher value in cash payment than otherwise, which 
support the signalling hypothesis, tax hypothesis and control hypothesis, and are 
consistent with most previous studies. The method of payment does not have 
significant impact on bond returns, and this result is consistent with Billett et al. 
(2004) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007). Hostility s measured by whether the 
deal is friendly (including neutral deals) or hostile. The acquiring firm stocks show 
higher value for friendly deals than hostile deals, which implies the hypothesis that 
acquiring firms face less risk, incur fewer costs, and receive better co-operation in 
friendly takeovers. Hostility does not have significant impact on bond returns, and 
this result is again consistent with Billett et al. (2004) and Renneboog and Szilagyi 
(2007). Industry relatedness measures whether the targ t and acquiring firms belong 
to the same industry. The acquiring firm stock returns show higher value for 
unrelated mergers, which could be explained by the hypotheses of diversifying, 
economy of learning and incentive effect. The acquiring firm bond returns are higher 
for related mergers, which may attribute to the incentive effect that transfers wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders. Relative size measur s the ratio of target size over 
acquirer size. Target firm share returns are higher if target is smaller than the 
acquirer, which indicates the hypotheses that acquisition of small target is more 
likely to realise synergy, to remove incumbent management, and less likely to be 
motivated by managerial hubris of the acquirer. None f the bond returns are affected 
by relative size. Market trend measures if the overall stock market is overvalued or 
undervalued. Not many previous studies have examined the effect of market trend on 
stockholder returns. There has not been any study on bondholder wealth with market 
trend.  This research divides the announcement period int  bull market period and 




Both target and acquirer stock returns show higher value for bull market, which 
supports the merger wave hypothesis of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004). The 
acquirer bond returns are higher in the bear market, which maintains the hypothesis 
that mergers in bear market create more synergy than in bull market.  
 
The multivariate analysis section studies the relation between excess security 
returns and the deal characteristics variables discussed in the univariate tests, and 





Chapter 4 Theories of Leverage Ratios 
4.1 Introduction 
Capital structure is the mix of different securities issued by a firm (Brealey and 
Myers, 2003). The amount of debt that a firm uses to finance its assets is called 
leverage. The firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless 
combinations—when the firm is financed entirely by equity, its entire stream of cash 
flows goes to the shareholders; when the firm is financed partly by equity and partly 
by debt, the relatively safe stream goes to the debtholders and the more risky stream 
goes to the shareholders. The management makes choice of capital structure in order 
to maximise the firm’s overall market value.  
 
Research on corporate finance has made substantial progress on the subject of 
capital structure. The M-M theorem proposition I states that a firm’s value is 
unaffected with its capital structure in a perfect capital market. By taking the tax 
shield of debt into consideration, the modified M-M theorem proposition I argues that 
it is advantageous for a firm to be levered as high as possible. The control hypothesis 
argues that debt helps shareholders reduce agency costs of free cash flow and 
promote managers’ efficiency, thus debt is a potential determinant of capital 
structure; the optimal capital structure is the point at which the marginal costs of debt 
equal to its marginal benefits. Based on the M-M theorem and control hypothesis, the 
trade-off theory considers that companies make financial decisions as a trade-off 
between interest tax shields and the costs of financial distress. Specifically, the static-
trade off theory considers that the leverage ratio is determined by a single period 
trade-off; the adjustment costs make the leverage rtios among firms having the same 
optimal leverage ratio randomly dispersed. The dynamic trade-off theory maintains 
that firms adjust their leverage ratios, and the deviations from their optimal leverage 
ratios are gradually removed over time. The pecking order theory disputes that firms 
do not have optimal capital structures, instead, they prioritise the financing sources 
according to the degree of effort and resistance—first with internal funds, then debt, 
last equity. The market timing theory believes that there is no optimal capital 




their stocks are overvalued (undervalued). As a result, a firm’s observed capital 
structure is the cumulative outcome of historical equity performance.  
 
Based on the dynamic trade-off theory, a bunch of hypotheses link capital 
structure research with the event of takeovers, and forecast significant leverage ratio 
changes with takeovers. The co-insurance hypothesis advises that when two firms’ 
earnings are not perfectly correlated, a merger can increase the debt capacity of the 
combined firm, so the combined firm takes advantage of the debt benefits and levers 
up. The unused debt capacity hypothesis explains that the combined firm levers up to 
consume the unused debt capacity from either the acquirer or target before the 
merger. The financial slack hypothesis uggests that the slack-rich acquiring firm 
actively searches for the slack-poor target firm with valuable investment 
opportunities, therefore the acquiring firm with low leverage ratio before the merger 
increases its leverage ratio with the merger. The commitment device hypothesis 
proposes that low leverage ratio plays a role of commitment device for the acquiring 
firm to deter its bidding rivals; after the merger, since debt loses its strategic value, 
the acquiring firm levers up to take the tax shield advantage. The wealth transfer 
hypothesis supposes that the acquiring firm levers up in takeover to expropriate 
wealth from existing bondholders to offset shareholders’ loss from the increasing 
debt capacity.  
 
This empirical research utilizes takeover as an event to i vestigate its potentially 
significant influences on acquiring firms’ book leverage ratios. It probes each 
acquiring firms’ book leverage ratio deviations in a standard 11-year window [-5, +5]. 
The deviations are computed in three stages. At the first stage, the tobit model runs a 
pooled cross-sectional regression on a number of lagged independent variables for 
firm-year [-5, -1] to estimate the coefficients of independent variables. At the second 
stage, the estimated coefficients are substituted into the tobit model to predict the 
optimal leverage ratios of firms in each of the elev n years. At the third stage, each 
firm’s optimal leverage ratio is subtracted from its actual book leverage ratio to get 
its deviation in each of the eleven years. The trend of the deviations in the 11-year 




announcement year, which fits the hypotheses that links takeovers and firms’ capital 
structures. The trend also illustrates that firms gradually converge their leverage 
ratios towards the optimum in the years after merger, which is consistent with the 
prediction of dynamic trade-off theory. This research then analyses the speed with 
which firms reverse back to their optimal leverage ratios by a standard partial 
adjustment model with OLS regression. It discovers a low but persistent adjustment 
speed, which is consistent with Fama and French (2002) and Flannery and Rangan 
(2006). In order to examine whether this low adjustment speed is caused by 
adjustment costs or by alternative theories that competing with the dynamic trade-off 
theory, variables proxy for pecking order theory, market timing theory and 
managerial inertial are added into the partial adjustment model for further tests. 
These tests reject all the alternative theories and find consistent evidence of dynamic 
trade-off effects. These results are consistent withFlannery and Rangan (2006). Last, 
this research tests the influences of method of payment and source of fund on 
leverage ratios. It reports that cash payment and raise of funds are inclined to 
increase leverage ratios at announcement, and to maintain leverage ratios at a high 
level in the post-merger period. 
 
Contributions of this research are as follows. First, the sample selection process 
is improved from previous papers. The study of M&A’s impact on a firm’s capital 
structure requires isolate one deal’s influence from another in case the firm takes 
more than one deals in the object window. Otherwise, it is difficult to tell which deal 
attributes to the change of capital structure in a certain year. This research excludes 
firms that take more than one takeovers in the 11-year period, and avoids the 
overlapping problem. The studies of Ghosh and Jain (2000), Harford et al. (2007) 
and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) do not restrict serie  acquirers thus their studies 
are noisy. Bruner (1988) restricts his sample to firms that are not involved in 
takeovers in the previous eight years, but he does n t exclude firms that are involved 
in takeovers in the years after the first selected d als.  
 
Second, the regression process is different. To examine the influence of M&A 




structures after M&A should be quite different from those before M&A. As 
MacKinlay (1997) argues, the event priod itself should not be included in the 
estimation period to prevent the event from influencing the normal performance 
model parameter estimates; otherwise, both the normal eturns and the abnormal 
returns would capture the event impact. Previous research such as Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Harford et al. (2007) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) estimate coefficients 
of capital structures by in-sample models, which could cause a problem by mixing 
the “estimation window” and the “event window”. This research uses out-of-sample 
regression for the coefficients estimations and the results are more objective.  
 
Third, the deviation tests split the sample into two gr ups on whether firms’ 
deviations increase between year -1 and year 0. It is evident that M&A increases 
some firms’ leverage ratios but decreases other firms’ leverage ratios, and the trend 
of deviations of those two groups should be quite diff rent. Previous research such as 
Harford et al. (2007) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) do not distinguish those two 
groups, therefore the leverage deviations of firms that lever up and firms that lever 
down cancel out with each other, and the aggregate deviation trend of the sample is 
noisy. Due to the above three reasons, this research shows more significant influence 
of takeovers at the announcement year than previous research (the previous research 
find M&A reverses firms’ leverage ratios back to their optimism, but this research 
finds M&A drags firms’ leverage ratios beyond their optimism to the opposite way 
of deviation), and gives evidence of dynamic trade-off theory that firms reverse back 
to their optimal leverage ratios gradually in the years after takeovers which has not 
been reported by other papers (see Chart 5-1 and Chart 5-2).  
 
Fourth, despite that quite a few papers examine the method of payment on 
capital structures, this research is the first one t  t st on the source of fund on capital 
structures.  
 
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the classic 
capital structure theories. Section 4.3 motivates the argument for examining capital 




data. Section 5.2 explains the methodology and regression results in detail. Section 
5.3 tests dynamic trade-off theory against alternative theories by partial adjustment 
models. Section 5.4 probes the impact of method of payment and source of fund on 
capital structure. Section 5.5 is conclusion.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Modigliani and Miller Theorem 
Modigliani and Miller (M-M) set up the basis of modern thinking on capital 
structure research. The M-M theorem proposition I shows that in a perfect capital 
market without taxes, costs of bankruptcy and asymmetric information, the market 
value of a firm is unaffected by its capital structure. Proposition II , derived from 
proposition I, shows that the cost of equity increases with the debt to equity ratio, 
which keeps the weighted-average cost of a firm’s capital constant (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). Although the traditional M-M theorem is based on unreal assumptions, 
it sheds light on where to look for determinants of optimal capital structure and how 
those factors might affect optimal capital structure.  
 
In a well-functioning capital market where the government levies corporate 
income tax, the financial decision on capital structure does affect the firm’s market 
value. Since the interest that a firm pays for its debt is a tax-deductible expense 
whereas dividend for equity is not, the debt financing provides an interest tax shield 
for the firm (Brealey and Myers, 2003). By taking taxes into consideration, the 
modified M-M theorem proposition I argues that it is advantageous for firms to be 
levered as the interest payment on debt is deductible (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 
and 1963). Therefore the firm’s market value and shareholders’ wealth will continue 
to go up as the leverage increases, and the optimal capital structure for a firm should 
be 100 percent debt-financed (Brealey and Myers, 2003). However, this optimal 
capital structure does not apply in practice. The modified M-M theorem proposition 
II  emphasises that the costs of equity rise with leverage because higher leverage is 





The costs of equity led by risk are also called the costs of financial distress. 
These costs are made up of costs of bankruptcy and costs without bankruptcy. The 
direct costs of bankruptcy come from the legal and dministrative fees, and the 
indirect costs of bankruptcy come from the stakeholders’ (such employees, 
customers, supplier, etc) reluctance to do business with a firm that may not be around 
for long (Brealey and Myers, 2003). The financial distress without bankruptcy is 
such a situation that a firm on the edge of bankruptcy can scrape up enough cash to 
pay the interest on its debt and may be able to delay the bankruptcy for many years. 
Under such circumstance both the shareholders and the bondholders want the firm to 
recover, but in other respects their interests might be in conflict and the conflict is 
costly (Brealey and Myers, 2003). The high odds of de ault create the costs of 
financial distress through the behaviours of undertaking risky projects and under-
investment. For the former one, shareholders are tempted to undertake riskier 
projects—projects with higher failure probabilities and the payoff is higher if 
succeeds—at the expense of bondholders, thus the excess profits accruing to the 
shareholders but risks borne by bondholders. For the later one, if the business risk is 
held constant, any increase in firm value is shared among shareholders and 
bondholders, as a result the shareholders are inclined to give up an opportunity to 
invest in a project with potential positive net present value—the investment 
decreases the probability of default and if default occurs the payoff to the 
bondholders is larger, but the stream of cash flow to shareholders is reduced (Brealey 
and Myers, 2003). Bondholder might suffer from such opportunity losses.  
 
4.2.2 Control Hypothesis 
Jensen (1986) argues that the optimal capital structure “is the point at which firm 
value is maximised, the point where the marginal costs of debt just offset the 
marginal benefits”. Free cash flow generates agency costs because there are conflicts 
of interest between the shareholders and managers ov  payout policies. To avoid 
current cash being invested in low-return projects or being wasted by managers, debt 
creation is an effective substitute for dividends and share repurchase. Debt creation 
forces managers to maintain the interest and principal payments; in case they fail to 




helps to reduce the agency costs by reducing the cash flow available to spend at 
managers’ discretion, thus it benefits shareholders by motivating managers to run 
firms more efficiently. Jensen calls this effect of debt the control hypothesis and 
considers it as a potential determinant of capital s ructure. Jensen and Smith (2001) 
and Smith (1986) examine stock price changes at announcements of transactions 
which change firms’ leverage ratio. Jensen (1986: 325) summarises that “most 
leverage-increasing transactions, including stock repu chases and exchange of debt 
or preferred for common, debt for preferred, and income bonds for preferred, result 
in significantly positive increases in common stock prices”, and “most leverage-
reducing transactions, including the sale of common, and exchange of common for 
debt or preferred, or preferred for debt, and the call of convertible bonds or 
convertible preferred forcing conversion into common, result in significant decreases 
in stock prices”. Jensen (1986) discovers that debt creation does not always have 
positive effects on firms: the control function of debt is more important in firms with 
low growth prospects and large cash flows, but lessimportant in firms with high 
growth opportunities and no free cash flow. 
 
4.2.3 Trade-off Theory 
The original version of the trade-off theory is founded on the modified M-M 
theorem and the control hypothesis, which explains how companies make financial 
decisions as a trade-off between the benefits and costs of borrowing (Brealey and 
Myers, 2003). The benefits of debt include interest tax shields of debt and the 
reduction of free cash flow problems; the costs of debt include potential costs of 
financial distress and agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders (Fama 
and French, 2002). Fama and French (2002) propose the interest tax shields have two 
offsetting effects on the optimal leverage ratio: the deductibility of corporate tax 
interest payments lead high optimal leverage ratios for firms; the higher level of 
personal tax rate on debt comparing with equity tempts firms to have low optimal 
leverage ratios.  
  
The development of the trade-off theory can be broken into two stages. The 




contributed to its development, it is Bradley et al. (1984) who construct a standard 
model on it, arguing the static trade-off theory holds if a firm’s leverage ratio is 
determined by a single period trade-off between the tax advantage of debt and the 
present value of bankruptcy costs. Since there are costs and delays for firms to adjust 
to their optimal leverage ratio, firms cannot immediately offset the random events 
that bump them away from the optimal leverage ratio, the leverage ratio among firms 
having the same optimal leverage ratio should be randomly dispersed (Myers, 1984).  
 
In a later stage, as the high demand on removing some unrealistic assumptions of 
the single-period model (such as the ignorance of the tax code, the expectation, and 
the adjustment costs), a dynamic trade-off model is generated. The dynamic trade-off 
theory holds if a firm has an optimal leverage ratio and the deviations from that 
optimal ratio are gradually removed over time (Frank d Goyal, 2008). Kane et al. 
(1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1984) come up with the first dynamic models to 
measure the trade-off between tax savings and bankruptcy costs. Their models take 
into account of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and uncertainty. Since their assumptions 
exclude transaction costs, firms are able to rebalance capital structures immediately. 
Fischer et al. (1989) proposes a dynamic model by bringing in transaction costs. 
They predict that firms allow their capital structures to swing over time, and firms 
rebalance their capital structures only if the drift is beyond the optimal leverage ratio 
boundary. According to this model, persistently good performance will eventually 
cause firms to raise debt if their leverage fluctuations reach their lower limits. This 
prediction causes a controversy because in the real world, profitable firms seldom go 
out to raise debt. Alternatively, these firms might involve in mergers and acquisitions 
and lever up significantly (Frank and Goyal, 2008).   
 
The static trade-off theory predicts a negative relation between leverage ratio 
and the market-to-book ratio: as high market-to-book ratio is usually associated with 
good investment opportunities (Hovakimian et al., 2001), firms with high market-to-
book ratio are likely to keep the leverage ratio down in order to avoid the high cost of 




trade-off theory anticipates that firms adjust the leverage ratio to offset the influence 
of market-to-book ratio in the long run. 
 
The static trade-off theory expects a positive relationship between leverage ratio 
and asset tangibility. Brealey and Myers’ (2003) argue that companies with tangible 
assets favour debt financing. Rajan and Zingales (1995) explain that tangible assets 
are considered as collateral which diminishes debtholders’ risk of financial distress 
and tangible assets retain more value in case of liquidation, therefore lenders are 
willing to lend more to firms with large proportion of tangible assets. 
 
In general, the static trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between the 
optimal leverage ratio and profitability due to a number of reasons: higher 
profitability implies potentially higher tax shield from debt, lower probability of 
bankruptcy, and potentially higher overinvestment, hence a higher optimal leverage 
ratio (Hovakimian et al., 2004). This relationship well explains the industry 
differences in capital structure, reflecting the differential benefits and costs of debt—
companies with safe, tangible assets and abundant taxable income to shield favour 
debt financing; unprofitable companies with risky, intangible assets should prefer 
equity financing (Brealey and Myers, 2003). In contrary, the dynamic trade-off 
theory predicts a negative relationship between the optimal leverage ratio and 
profitability: when firms passively accumulate earnings and losses, the firms that 
were highly profitable in the past are likely to beunder-levered, and the firms that 
experienced losses are likely to be over-levered (Hovakimian et al., 2004). Under this 
hypothesis, the negative relationship between the actual leverage ratio and 
profitability is explained by the effects of profitability on the deviation of actual 
leverage ratio from the optimal leverage ratio, notby the effects of profitability on 
the optimal leverage ratio.  
 
The research and development expense and selling expense are usually 
considered as the indicators of firms’ uniqueness. The static trade-off theory predicts 
a negative relationship between leverage ratio and them. Titman and Wessels (1988) 




R&D, the more difficult for its competitors to duplicate its innovations and products; 
firms with unique products are likely to advertise more in selling their products. 
Titman (1983), Titman and Wessels (1988), Grinblatt and Titman (2002), 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) expect the negative relationship because firms with 
specialised assets and products (higher R&D and selling expense) have greater 
stakeholder costs, potentially more shareholder-bondh lder conflicts, little earnings, 
and these assets and products cannot be treated as collateral. The R&D expense is 
also deemed as an indicator of non-debt tax shields. Since a higher R&D expense is 
connected with no taxable income, a lower expected orporate tax rate, and a lower 
expected payoff from interest tax shields, leverage ratio is negatively related with 
R&D expense (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Fama and French, 2002). 
 
The static trade-off theory also foresees a positive relationship between leverage 
ratio and firm size. Firms make financial decisions by balancing the interests and 
costs of debt regarding to firm size. Since large firms have better access to capital 
markets and their cash flow is less volatile, they ave low cost of financial distress. 
As a result, they can afford high leverage ratios. 
 
Furthermore, the static trade-off theory explains the influence of industry 
characteristics on the leverage ratio, and Grinblatt and Titman (2002) argue that 
firms in industries producing durable goods tend to be less levered than firms 
producing nondurable good because customers avoid buying durable goods of 
distressed firms.  
 
Welch (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) find the 
evidence of trade-off theory in their empirical studies. Leary and Roberts (2005) 
dispute that “firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range” 
in respond to their equity value changes after the price shocks or equity issuance. 
However, the adjustment costs often postpone the adjustment process. Welch (2004) 
finds firms that wander away from the industry averge debt-equity ratio seek to 
move back, and firms which just acquired other firms are inclined to increase their 




are strongly influenced by firms’ history, firms do move back towards their target 
debt ratio, though with slow pace. However, the trade-off theory fails to explain why 
the most profitable companies commonly borrow the least (Brealey and Myers, 
2003). As an alternative, the pecking order theory functions to explain this capital 
structure puzzle. 
 
4.2.4 Pecking Order Hypothesis 
Myers (1984) proposes the pecking order hypothesis based on Donaldson’s 
(1961) study of the financing practices of a sample of large firms. Pecking order 
theory considers that firms prioritise the sources of financing according to the degree 
of effort and resistance—investment is financed first with internal funds, then by new 
issues of debt, and finally with new issues of equity (Brealey and Myers, 2003). In 
this theory, there is no well-defined optimal capitl structure, instead, “there are two 
kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one at 
the bottom” (Myers, 1984: 581). According to this hypothesis, since the most 
profitable companies have sufficient internal funds and this way of funding is the 
cheapest, they are likely to borrow the least; for those companies which assets are 
mostly intangible and the costs of financial distres are high, the only way to grow 
rapidly and to low down the leverage ratio is to finance with equity (Brealey and 
Myers, 2003). The pecking order behaviour may attribu e to six reasons.  
 
I. The agent theory: Myers (1984) argues that firms ely on internal finance to avoid 
the discipline of capital market.  
 
II. The asymmetric information: Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984) explain 
that the capital structure decision is stimulated by the costs of adverse selection as a 
result of asymmetric information. Managers choose to issue debt when investors 
undervalue the firm, and equity when investors overvalue the firm. Fama and French 
(2002) declare shareholders are aware of this asymmetric information problem and 
they react by discounting the firms’ existing and new risky equities at the time of 
new issue. Managers assume if they do issuing new equity, shareholders’ discounts 




opportunities, managers finance their projects following pecking order to avoid the 
asymmetric information costs. The asymmetric information also explains the market 
timing theory which will be discussed later. 
 
III. The stakeholder theory: Grinblatt and Titman (200 ) recommend that more 
profitable firms may expect expansion and in turn will ant to keep low leverage 
ratio to attract strategic partners and employees; les  profitable firms may anticipate 
shrinking and in turn will want to keep a higher leverage ratio in order to gain 
favourable concessions from suppliers and employees.  
 
IV. The shareholder – bondholder conflicts: Grinblatt and Titman (2002) suggest that 
for the financially distressed firms, the new stock issue is less attractive to 
shareholders (both existing and new shareholders) because as the risk on bond is 
replaced by the risk on share, wealth is transferred from shareholders to bondholders.  
 
V. The taxes: Grinblatt and Titman (2002) argue that e combination of corporate 
tax deductibility of interest payments and the personal taxes on dividends implies 
that the US tax code favours funding new investment with retained earnings and debt 
over issuing new equity.  
 
VI. Transaction costs: Fama and French (2002) advise that transaction costs are the 
costs associated with new issues: the pecking order arises if the costs of issuing new 
risky debt or equity overwhelm other costs and benefits of retained earnings and safe 
debt.  
 
Considering market-to-book ratio as a major proxy for expected investment 
opportunities, Fama and French (2002) predict a positive relationship between the 
investment opportunities and book leverage ratio by a simple pecking order theory, 
and a negative relationship by a complex pecking order theory. They explain that in 
the simple version of pecking order, leverage ratio is determined by the accumulative 
differences between retained earnings and investment, if profitability and investment 




investment opportunities. In the complex version of pecking order, firms balance 
current and future financing costs, so firms with larger investment opportunities are 
likely to maintain low-risk debt capacity in order to finance future investments; 
hence there is negative relation between leverage rtio and investment opportunities. 
 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002) consider the pecking order theory anticipate a 
strong negative relationship between firms’ profitability and leverage ratio: the most 
profitable firms tend to use a substantial amount of their retained earnings to repay 
the debt rather than to repurchase equity, and these firms are likely to experience an 
increase in share price, hence their leverage ratiois l w; the least profitable firms 
that in demand of external funds are likely to raise debt rather than issue equity, and 
these firms are tend to experience an decrease in share price, hence their leverage 
ratio is high. In the long run, if firms follow pecking order, the negative relationship 
between profitability and the leverage ratio will be persistent because firms have no 
incentive to offset the effects of profitability on leverage ratios (Hovakimian et al., 
2004).  
 
The pecking order theory also predicts a positive relationship between leverage 
ratio and firm size, which coincides with the trade-off theory prediction. Fama and 
French (2002) suggest firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets is 
an inverse symbol of volatility. Since small size firms usually have volatile cash 
flows, in order to avoid issuing new risky equities or forgoing investment 
opportunities, they tend to keep lower leverage ratios.  
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) find that profitable firms have relatively lower debt 
ratio. Leary and Roberts (2005) discover evidence of pecking order in their paper 
that firms with sufficient internal funds are less likely to use external capital, but are 
more likely when they have large investment opportunities.  
 
4.2.5 Market Timing Theory 
Market timing theory argues that there is no optimal capital structure and the 




financing decisions (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Managers of firms aim to maximise 
the interests of ongoing shareholders. The managers believe that they can time the 
market by issuing stocks when their stocks are overvalued or by repurchasing stocks 
when their stocks are undervalued; outside investors will under-react to issue or 
repurchase announcements, which leaves some space to exploit the perceived 
mispricing hence the ongoing shareholders benefit. S nce the optimal capital 
structure does not exist, there is no need for managers to reverse their financial 
decisions in later period; the influence of financial decisions on capital structure will 
be permanent.  
 
The market timing theory makes no prediction about the effect of profitability, 
but its prediction on the negative effect of market-to-book ratio coincides with the 
pecking order hypothesis: firms time the market by issuing equity (repurchase equity) 
when the market-to-book ratios are high (low), which results in decreased (increased) 
leverage ratios (Myers, 1984; Hovakimian et al., 2004). Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
argue that the temporary fluctuations in market-to-bo k ratio would have a 
permanent influence on leverage ratio. They find that firms do not have optimal 
capital structure and the capital structure depends strongly on past market valuations.  
 
4.3 M&A and Capital Structure 
This thesis examines capital structure by the event of mergers and acquisitions. 
Based on the trade-off consideration between the tax advantages of debt and the 
expected bankruptcy costs, several hypotheses have forecasted the significant 
leverage ratio changes around M&A. 
 
The co-insurance hypothesis advises that when two firms’ earning streams are 
less than perfectly correlated, a merger between thm can increase the debt capacity 
of the combined entity; then the combined firm takes advantage of the debt benefits 
and levers up. The unused debt capacity hypothesis explain that the combined firms 
levers up because either the acquiring firm or the target firm has unused debt 
capacity before the merger. The financial slack hypothesis uggests that the slack-




investment opportunities and about which investors have limited information, 
therefore the acquiring firm with low leverage ratio before the merger is observed to 
increase its leverage ratio after the merger. The commitment device hypothesis 
proposes that leverage ratio plays a role of commitent device for the growth firm, 
and deters its rival in the merger contest; since debt loses its strategic value after the 
merger, the acquiring firm levers up after merger to take the tax shield advantage. 
The wealth transfer hypothesis upposes that the acquiring firm levers up after 
takeover in order to expropriate wealth from existing bondholders to offset 
shareholders’ loss from the increasing debt capacity.  
 
4.3.1 Co-insurance and Increasing Debt Capacity  
Lewellen (1971) proposes that if earnings of two firms are not perfectly 
correlated, their merger will create values for thejoint firm. Lewellen considers 
takeovers as a portfolio of income streams between th  bidding and target firms. He 
argues that the benefit of this portfolio on merger comes from the operational 
advantages which could not be realized by individual investors’ portfolio of two 
firms’ shares on the stock market. He believes this factor will contribute to the new 
firm’s income stream, and the unused debt capacity of he target firm could increase 
the borrowing ability of the combined firm. Kim and McConnell (1977) quote this 
concept as co-insurance effect. They develop Lewellen’s theory, arguing that the 
portfolio diversification of two or more firms whose earning streams are imperfectly 
correlated would reduce the merged firm’s default risk and increase debt capacity 
(Kim and McConnell, 1977).  
 
Ghosh and Jain (2000) develop the co-insurance hypot esis and come up with 
the increasing debt capacity hypothesis. When two firms merge, the variability of the 
combined firm’s earnings is smaller than the weighted average of the variability of 
the earnings of the two merging firms as long as the correlation between the earnings 
of the two merging firms is less than one. The reduction in the variability of the 
combined firm’s earnings therefore reduces the firm’s expected bankruptcy costs, 
making its debt safer and creating extra capacity for debt. The combined firm makes 




tax deductibility of interest payments on corporate debt generated from the additional 
debt.  
 
4.3.2 Unused Debt Capacity 
Ghosh and Jain (2000) advise that the increase in leverage ratio could come from 
the unused debt capacity of either the acquiring or target firms, or both, from pre-
takeover period. For that reason, either the acquiring or target firms should be 
observed under-levered before the acquisition. Weston and Mansinghka (1971), Lev 
and Mandelker (1972), Melicher and Rush (1973), Kim and McConnell (1977), 
Shrieves and Pashley (1984), Bruner (1988) and Ghosh and Jain (2000) find 
evidence that the acquiring firms build up debt capacity in advance of acquiring. 
 
4.3.3 Financial Slack 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Bruner (1988) come up with the financial slack 
hypothesis based on information asymmetry. Financial slack refers to sum of cash on 
hand and marketable securities, or the sum of cash and unused debt capacity. In 
circumstances of asymmetric information, a firm (the target) with insufficient 
financial slack is unable to raise fund by issuing equity directly to investors because 
investors will discount this equity; thus, this firm may pass up all valuable 
investment opportunities. Another firm (the acquirer) with plenty of slack pursues 
this type of target firm (the target firm is with good investment opportunities and 
limited slack, and about which investors have limited information) and initiates a 
merger which creates value through the additional ivestment opportunities with 
positive net present value. As a result, the acquiring firms with low leverage increase 
their leverage ratios significantly after the merger.  
 
4.3.4 Commitment Device 
Morellec and Zhdanov’s (2008) theoretical research develops a dynamic model 
of takeovers in which the timing and terms of acquisitions, and financing strategies 
of the acquiring firms are jointly determined. In their model, the leverage ratio plays 
a role of commitment device, and determines the outcome of the takeover contest. In 




leverage ratio in order to receive some of the NPV of the target firm’s investment 
opportunity; the other potential acquirer makes up for the loss of the investment 
opportunity by picking a higher debt level with great r tax benefits. Hence, two ex 
ante identical firms rationally go for asymmetric strategies: one firm selects a lower 
leverage ratio and invests, and becomes a growth firm; the other firm selects a higher 
leverage ratio and does not invest, and becomes a value firm. In this equilibrium the 
growth firm ends up with a lower leverage ratio and is more likely to deter the rival 
bidders (the bidding premium is a negative function of the acquirer’s leverage ratio, 
and the acquirer with a lower leverage is likely to pay higher premium and win the 
contest). The model predicts that the leverage of the winning bidder is below the 
industry average. It also predicts that the winner should lever up after the acquisition 
consummation: the low leverage ratio loses its strategic role after the acquisition; 
hence the winner will logically want to lever up to utilize the tax benefits of debt. 
Bruner (1988), Ghosh and Jain (2000) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) find 
empirical evidence that the acquiring firms are under-levered before the takeovers 
and their leverage ratios increase significantly after the takeovers.  
 
4.3.5 Wealth Transfer 
Galai and Masulis (1976), Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim (1982) 
and Bruner (1988) recommend that shareholders have t e opportunity to transfer the 
value of co-insurance (increasing debt capacity) to themselves by increasing the 
leverage after merger. Ghosh and Jain (2000) give explanation that the combined 
firm levers up in order to expropriate wealth from existing bondholders because the 
shareholders need to offset the loss from the increasing debt capacity. Because equity 
is a call option granted by creditors on firm’s asset  and the exercise price of option 
is the face value of outstanding debt, equity’s value is positively correlated with the 
variability of the earnings, as the merger lowers down the variability of the combined 
firm’s earnings, the value of equity declines. Hence, shareholders of the combined 
firm protect themselves from the potential loss by levering up and transferring wealth 
from the bondholders. This explains why the leverag ratio increasing acquisitions 
are usually connected with higher abnormal stock returns and downgrade of bonds of 




the anticipated increases in financial leverage at the announcement period, Ghosh 
and Jain (2000) report that the stock returns at the announcement period are 
positively related to increases in financial leverage following mergers. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the key capital structure theories and a bunch of 
hypotheses which link capital structure research wit the event of takeovers. 
 
The M-M theorem states that a firm’s value is unaffected with its capital structure 
in a perfect capital market. The control hypothesis argues that the optimal capital 
structure is the point at which the marginal costs of debt equal to its marginal 
benefits. The trade-off theory considers that companies make financial decisions as a 
trade-off between interest tax shields and the costs f financial distress. The pecking 
order theory disputes that firms prioritise the financing sources according to the 
degree of effort and resistance. The market timing theory argues that a firm’s 
observed capital structure is the cumulative outcome f historical equity performance.  
 
Based on the dynamic trade-off theory, a bunch of hypotheses forecast 
significant leverage ratio changes with takeovers. The co-insurance hypothesis 
advises that when two firms’ earnings are not perfectly correlated, a merger can 
increase the debt capacity of the combined firm, so the combined firm takes 
advantage of the debt benefits and levers up. The unused debt capacity hypothesis 
explains that the combined firm levers up to consume the unused debt capacity from 
either the acquirer or target before the merger. Thefinancial slack hypothesis 
suggests that the slack-rich acquiring firm actively searches for the slack-poor target 
firm with valuable investment opportunities, therefor  the acquiring firm with low 
leverage ratio before the merger increases its leverage ratio with the merger. The 
commitment device hypothesis proposes that low leverage ratio plays a role of 
commitment device for the acquiring firm to deter its bidding rivals; after the merger, 
since debt loses its strategic value, the acquiring firm levers up to take the tax shield 




in takeover to expropriate wealth from existing bondholders to offset shareholders’ 
loss from the increasing debt capacity.  
 
The next chapter will do empirical tests of the leverag  ratio deviation and the 






Chapter 5 Methodology and Results on Leverage Ratios 
This chapter includes two research questions, the leverage ratio deviation and the 
partial adjustment. The leverage ratio deviation is used to test the dynamic trade-off 
theory. The hypothesis of this test is that firms deviat  away from their optimal 
leverage ratios at the acquisition announcement, but they gradually converge the 
deviations in the post-merger period. The leverage rtio deviations are computed by 
three stages. At the first stage, the actual book leverage ratios are regressed on a 
number of lagged independent variables by a tobit model to get the estimates for the 
coefficients. These independent variables include the market-to-book ratio, asset 
tangibility, profitability, R&D expense, R&D dummy, selling expense and firm size. 
The sample is made up of 659 acquiring firms that each firm has valid financial data 
for an 11 year period: from 5 years before the merger announcement to 5 years after 
the merger announcement. Since merger is considered as an event which could 
impact the leverage ratio, the five years before annou cement is considered as the 
estimation window. The tobit regression is run based on the sample of 3295 firm-
year in the estimation window. At the second stage, th  estimated regression 
equation is used for predicting the value of optimal leverage ratios for given values 
of independent variables by substituting the estimated coefficients into each year of 
the 11 years. At the third stage, the predicted leverage ratios are subtracted from the 
actual leverage ratios to get the leverage ratio deviations. The trend of the deviations 
in the 11 year period supports the dynamic trade-off theory. 
 
The standard partial adjustment model is used to tes th  speed of adjustment a 
firm moves towards the optimal leverage ratio in the post-merger period on the 
dynamic trade-off theory. The hypothesis is that partial adjustment effect (dynamic 
trade-off theory) holds if the coefficient of trade-off variable is between 0 and 1 and 
statistically significant. The result approves the hypothesis. Partial adjustment effect 
(against the complete adjustment effect) could be caused by either the adjustment 
cost or by the influence of alternative capital struc ure theories. In order to 
distinguish these two factors, several modified partial adjustment models are utilized 
to test the influences of competing theories on the adjustment speed. The financial 




order hypothesis, the external finance weighted average variable and its alternative 
variables are added into the model, respectively, to test the market timing hypothesis, 
and two different stock return variables are added into the model, respectively, to test 
the managerial inertial hypothesis and market timing hypothesis. All of these 
modified models reject the effect of alternatively hypothetical variables and support 
the dynamic trade-off hypothesis. Thus it gives indirect evidence that the partial 
adjustment effect could be caused by the adjustment cost.  
 
5.1 Data  
Sample acquiring firms (deals) are selected from Thomson One Banker (TOB). 
The screen criteria for inclusion of a firm (deal) are set as following: 
 Acquirer Nation: United States of America 
 Acquirer Public Status: Public 
 Date Announced: between 1st Jan 1962 and 31st Dec 2001 
 Deal Type: Disclosed Value M&A8 
 Deal Status: Completed 
 Deal Value:  Band 1: $10 million or above 
 Band 2: $100 million or above 
 Band 3: $1000 million or above 
    
All the acquiring firms are US nation public firms (listed globally, majority of 
them are listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASD Q). The reason that this 
research focuses on the US companies other than UK companies is because of data 
availability on Compustat.9 The beginning date of announcement is set to 1st Jan 
1962 which is the earliest record date on the TOB; the end date of announcement is 
set to 31 Dec 2001 because this research tracks each acquiring firm’s leverage ratio 
up to 5 years after the announcement, and the leverage ratio data on Compustat10 is 
                                                
8 Thomson One Banker categorises M&A deals into two macro types: 1)M&A Transaction for Majority / 
Remaining Interest and 2)Specific Transaction Types. The first macro type is sub-categorised as 1.1)Disclosed 
Value M&A and 1.2)Undisclosed Value M&A. The second macro type is sub-categorised as 2.1)Minority Stake 
Purchases, 2.2)Acquisitions of Remaining Interest, 2.3)Privatisations, 2.4)Leveraged Buyouts, 2.5)Tender Offers, 
2.6)Spinoffs, 2.7)Recapitalisations, 2.8)Self-Tenders, 2.9)Exchange Offers and 2.10)Repurchases.  
9 A comparison study has been taken for UK companies w th Datastream, but ended up with the invalidity of the 
financial variables for leverage regression.  
10 At the time of doing this research, only FTP version of data is available on Compustat which is up to 2006. In a 




valid up to 2006. Deal values are classified into 3 bands thus TOB returns 3 groups 
of acquiring firms (deals). These 3 groups of acquiring firms (deals) are merged to 
build up the sample of this research. The rationale of searching acquiring firms with 
3 bands and combining them is discussed later.  
 
The financial data for testing acquiring firms’ book leverage ratios are obtained 
from Compustat North America (from WRDS). The research examines the 
deviations of acquiring firms’ leverage ratios in a11-year period thus it collects 
each firm’s financial data from 5 years before the announcement to 5 year after the 
announcement [-5, +5]. The most recent data with record in Compustat is in year 
2006 (FTP version).  
 
If a firm involves into two or more successive acquisitions in the [-5, +5] window, 
the inclusion of this firm will cause overlapping problem. In the research undertaken 
by Harford et al. (2007), the acquiring firms invole into two or more acquisitions in 
the 6-year period are not excluded, therefore the tests on leverage ratios can be 
seriously damaged by noise: one deal’s influence on the firm’s leverage ratio in the 
announcement year can be offset or enlarged by the successive deal(s); moreover, the 
impact of the successive deal(s) also obstructs the det ction of dynamic trade-off 
trend. There are two solutions for the overlapping problem: one is to shorten the 
research period, however, it loses the power to see th  entire map of leverage ratio 
changes in a long period; the other solution is to eliminate the firms with overlapping 
and it decreases the sample size. This research adopts the second solution: the 
acquiring firms which involve into two or more mergs are removed from the 
sample. The exclusion of companies could cause the survivorship bias that the 
remaining companies are infrequent acquirers. However, since the purpose of this 
research is to test firms’ capital structures by using takeover as an event, not testing 
the impact of takeovers on firms’ growth/survivorship, the exclusion of companies 
does not biases the sample.   
 
The removal of overlapping deals causes a firm size i sue: large acquiring firms 




search criteria set the deal value low (some firms may take mergers with deal value 
over $10m for several times a year); small acquiring f rms do not involve in deals 
with large values so they are excluded from sample if the TOB search criteria set the 
deal value high (some firms never involve into mergers with deal value over $100m). 
Searching acquiring firms with 3 bands of deal values and combining them helps 
solve this problem. 
 
This research categorises the deal values of the search criteria in TOB as Band 
1( ≥ $10m), Band 2( ≥ $100m) and Band 3( ≥ $1000m) and creates three groups of 
acquiring firms. By eliminating the firms which invol e in successive acquisitions 
within the [-5, +5] window in each group, the remaining firms (deals) of the three 
groups are merged together. The firms (deals) appear mo e than once 
between/among these groups are deleted. Then, the financial firms with primary SIC 
code between 6000 and 699911 and the regulated utilities with primary SIC code 
between 4900 and 499912 are excluded because their capital structures may reflect 
special factors. Moreover, firms with total assets l ss than $10m are dropped because 
these are very tiny companies or else formerly larger companies in great financial 
and economic distress, so their capital structures ar  moving around for reasons 
unrelated to standard theory of capital structure13. Last, firms are restricted to include 
those with the market-to-book ratio between the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles to avoid 
the influence of outliers. This leaves a sample of 659 acquiring firms (deals) each 
with 11-year data for all the required variables on Compustat North America. Table 
5-1 reports the sample screening process.  
 
                                                
11 Rajan and Zingales (1995) propose three reasons for the elimination of financial firms: 1). their leverage is 
strongly influenced by explicit (or implicit) investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance. 2.) their debt-
like liabilities are not strictly comparable to the d bt issued by nonfinancial firms; 3.) regulations such as 
minimum capital requirements may directly affect capit l structure. 
12 Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) explain that in the regulated industries the conflicts of interests betwen 
stockholders and debtholders are less extensive, so firms in regulated industries are expected to have higher 
leverage ratios. 
13 Flannery and Rangan (2006) explain that small companies’ adjustment costs may be unusually large or thei




Table 5-1 Sample Screening 
This table describes how the 659 firms are constructed.  
 Original Search Firm No. 
Band 1: Deal Value ≥ $10m 20128 
Band 2: Deal Value ≥ $100m 6543 
Band 3: Deal Value ≥ $1000m 928 
 
Delete firms with successive deals within year [-5,+5]                 Remaining Firm No. 
Band 1: Deal Value ≥ $10m 3994 
Band 2: Deal Value ≥ $100m 1770 
Band 3: Deal Value ≥ $1000m 468 
Combination of Band 1, 2 & 3 6232 
 
Reason for deletion  Remaining Firm No.   
Delete Repeated Deals in the Combined Group 5296 
Delete Firms with SIC Code between 4900-4999 & 6000-6999 3958 
Delete Firms without 11-year Successive Data in Compustat 736 
Delete Firms with data12=0 (for data12 definition, see Table 5-3) 723 
Delete Firms with Total Assets < $10m 687 
Delete Firms with M/B outside of 0.5th and 99.5th Percentile                659 (final sample) 
 
 
Table 5-2 describes the book leverage, market leverage, market value and deal 
value of the 659 sample firms (deals). The data of b ok leverage ratio, market 
leverage ratio, and market value are the fiscal-year-end data of firm in the previous 
year of the M&A announcement (year -1). It shows that the median book leverage 
ratio is 0.166 and the mean book leverage ratio is 0.192; the median market leverage 





Table 5-2 Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
This table describes the book leverage, market leverage, market value and deal value of the 659 sample firms 
(deals). The data of book leverage ratio, market leverage ratio, and market value are the fiscal-year-end data 
of firm in the previous year of the M&A announcement (year -1).   
               Book Leverage          Market Leverage      Market Value ($m)  Deal Value ($m) 
Min  0.000  0.000  5.756  10.000  
Max 1.345  1.131  144439.716  11864.608  
Med 0.166  0.122  468.563  104.352  
Mean 0.192  0.153  2288.519  493.928  
Std. Dev. 0.167  0.151  8125.713  1261.523 
Data Source: Thomson One Banker (Deal Values are in millions of US dollars) and WRDS Compustat North 
America (Market Values are in millions of US dollars).  





A Tobit regression is used to predict acquiring firms’ optimal book leverage 
ratios. These optimal book leverage ratios are then subtracted from the actual 
leverage ratios to obtain the deviations of book leverage ratios.  
 
5.2.1 Definitions of Variables 
It is disputable on what is the appropriate measure of l verage ratio. The ratio of 
total liabilities over total assets and the ratio of total debt over total assets are the two 
widely used definitions. The ratio of total liabilities over total assets is the broader 
definition of leverage ratio, which is a proxy for what is left for shareholders in case 
of liquidation. Because it includes the non-debt liabilities such as trade creditors and 
pension liabilities, it may exaggerate the amount of leverage and does not provide a 
good indication of firms’ default risk (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). To avoid the 
dilution of non-debt liabilities’ influences on the l verage movement, this research 
adopts the total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt)14 over total assets as the 
proxy of book leverage.  
 
There are arguments on whether book leverage ratio or market leverage ratio is a 
better measurement of capital structure. Myers (1977) argues that since book value of 
equity refers to assets already in place while a certain part of market value of equity 
is counted by assets not yet in place (by the present value of future growth 
opportunities, and the amount of debt ‘supported by’ growth opportunities will be 
less than is supported by assets already in place), book leverage ratio is more 
practical than market leverage ratio. In the category of M&A, book leverage ratio is 
considered as a better measurement because it is unaffected by the dramatic stock 
price changes of the acquiring firms around the M&A announcement period.  
 
The data definitions from Compustat North America and variable definitions are 
listed in Table 5-3 and Table 5-4. The model for regression is given in Section 5.2.5. 
Give an example to illustrate the calendar of data. Texas Instrument Inc acquired 
Burr-Brown Corp. in year 2000. Hence, the dependent variable Book Leverage Ratio 
                                                




gets data (data 6, data 9 and data 44) in year 2000; the independent variables gets 
data in year 1999 for the Market-to-book Ratio (data 6, data 10, data 25, data 35, data 
79, data 181 and data 199), the Asset Tangibility (data6 and data 8), the Profitability 
(data 6 and data 13), the R&D Expense (data 12 and data 46), the Selling Expense 





Table 5-3 Data Definitions 
DATA6:  Assets—Total (MM$)  
 This item represents current assets plus net property, lant, and equipment plus other 
noncurrent assets (including intangible assets, deferred charges, and investments and advances). 
DATA8:  Property, Plant & Equipment (Net) (MM$) 
This item represents the cost, of tangible fixed prope ty used in the production of revenue, less 
accumulated depreciation. 
DATA9:  Long-Term Debt—Total (MM$) 
This item represents debt obligations due more than one year from the company’s Balance 
Sheet date or due after the current operating cycle. 
DATA10:  Preferred Stock—Liquidating Value (MM$) 
This item represents the total dollar value of the net number of preferred shares outstanding in 
the event of involuntary liquidation. 
DATA12:  Sales (Net) (MM$) 
This item represents gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for regular sales 
completed during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales 
and allowances for which credit is given to customers. The result is the amount of money 
received from the normal operations of the business (i.e., those expected to generate revenue 
for the life of the company). 
DATA13:  Operating Income before Depreciation (MM$) 
This item represents Sales (Net) minus Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, General, and 
Administrative expenses before deducting Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization. 
DATA25:  Common Shares Outstanding (MM) 
 This item represents the net number of all common shares outstanding in year-end for the 
annual file, and as of the Balance Sheet date for the quarterly file excluding treasury shares. 
DATA35:  Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit (MM$) 
 This item represents the accumulated differences between income expense for financial 
statements and tax forms due to timing differences and investment tax credit. 
DATA36:   Retained Earnings (MM$) 
 This item represents the cumulative earnings of a company minus total dividend distributions 
to shareholders. The stock adjustments made to this item relate to unissued shares. 
DATA44:  Debt—Due in One Year (MM$) 
 This item represents the current portion of long-term debt (included in Current Liabilities). 
DATA46:  Research and Development Expense (MM$) 
This item represents all costs that relate to the development of new products or services. The 
amount reflects the company’s contribution to research nd development. 
DATA79:  Debt—Convertible (MM$) 
This item represents all costs that relate to the development of new products or services. The 
amount reflects the company’s contribution to research nd development. 
DATA181:  Liabilities—Total (MM$) 
This item represents the sum of: 1. Current Liabilities – Total; 2. Deferred Taxes and 
Investment Tax Credit (Balance Sheet); 3. Liabilities – Other; 4. Long-Term Debt – Total; 5. 
Minority Interest 
DATA189: Selling, General & Administrative Expenses (MM$) 
  This item represents all commercial expenses of operation (i.e., expenses not directly related to 
product production) incurred in the regular course of business pertaining to the securing of 
operating income.  
DATA199:  Price—Fiscal Year—Close ($&c) 
These items represent the absolute close transactions during the period for companies on 
national stock exchanges and bid prices for over-th-counter issues. Annual prices are reported 
on a calendar year basis, regardless of the company’s fiscal yearend. 
Source: Compustat North America (WRDS: http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/comp/inda/) 








Table 5-4 Variable Definitions 
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R&D Dummy  = 1 if the firms do not report the R&D expense 




Firm Size (logarithm of net sales) = )12data(log10
15 
Dividend Payments= 127data  
Investments= 109data107data219data129data128data113data −−+++  for firms reporting format codes 1-3 
                     = 310data309data109data107data129data128data113data −−−−++  for firms reporting format codes 7 
Change in Working Capital 
                       = 301data274data236data ++  for firms reporting format code 1 
                       = 301data236data274data −−  for firms reporting format code 2 and 3 
                       = 312data307data305data304data303data302data301data274data −−−−−−−  for firms reporting format code 7 
Internal Cash Flow= 218data217data213data126data125data124data123data106data +++++++  for firms reporting format code 1 to 3 
                                 = 314data217data213data126data125data124data123data106data +++++++  for firms reporting format code 7 
 
                                                

































Financial Deficit Dummy = 1 if Financial Deficit is positive 




5.2.2 Motives of Variables 
5.2.2.1 Market-to-book Ratio 
A number of empirical studies have documented evidence on the negative 
relationship between the leverage ratio and the market-to-book ratio. The static trade-
off theory, the complex pecking order hypothesis and the market timing theory give 
interpretation on this relationship.  
 
As high market performance is usually associated with the presence of good 
growth/investment opportunities (Hovakimian et al., 2001), static trade-off theory 
considers market-to-book ratio as the proxy of firms’ growth/investment 
opportunities, and the firms make financial decision  as a trade-off between the 
interest tax shields of debt and the costs of financial distress. It is generally believed 
that growth opportunities play an important role in determining a firm's financial 
decision, and firms with good growth opportunities are expected to have low debt 
(Goyal et al., 2002). In the existence of greater underinvestment problems, rational 
bondholders are likely to require a higher cost of debt financing, which prevents new 
fund from being raised or leads to an inefficient bankruptcy negotiation during which 
some future growth opportunities are lost forever (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), Houston and James (1996), Hovakimi n et al. (2001), 
Hovakimian (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Alti (2006), and Kayhan and 
Titman (2007) find a negative relation between market-to-book ratios, used as a 
proxy for its growth opportunities, and leverage ratios.  
 
Fama and French (2002) proxy market-to-book ratio as firms’ expected 
investment opportunities, and they predict its relationship with leverage ratio by the 
pecking order theory. They argue that in the simple pecking order world, leverage 
ratio is determined by the accumulative differences b tween retained earnings and 
investment, in case profitability and investment outlays are persistent, for given 
profitability, book leverage ratio is positively related with investment opportunities. 
In the complex pecking order world, firms balance current and future financing costs, 
so firms with larger investment opportunities are likely to maintain low-risk debt 




leverage ratio and investment opportunities is negative. They discover a positive 
relation between book leverage ratio and market-to-bo k ratio, and a negative 
relation between market leverage ratio and market-to-book ratio.  
 
Market timing theory considers market-to-book ratio as proxy of time measure, 
suggesting that firms are likely to decrease (increase) their leverage ratio by issuing 
(repurchasing) equity when their stocks are overvalued (undervalued), i.e., when the 
market-to-book ratio is high (low) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that leverage ratio is strongly negative related 
to firms’ historical market-to-book ratios; Leary and Roberts (2005) replicate Baker 
and Wurgler’s (2002) analysis and report a negative relationship between leverage 
ratio and market-to-book value. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue the trade-off theory 
predicts that firms adjust the capital structure to offset the influence of market-to-
book ratio, while the market timing theory predicts that temporary fluctuations in 
market-to-book have permanent effects on leverage rtio.  
 
5.2.2.2 Asset Tangibility 
The control hypothesis and static trade-off theory expect a positive relationship 
between the leverage ratio and firms’ tangible assets—companies with safe, tangible 
assets and abundant taxable income to shield favour debt financing; unprofitable 
companies with risky, intangible assets should prefer quity financing (Brealey and 
Myers, 2003). Rajan and Zingales (1995) make further explanation on this 
relationship: when a large proportion of a firm’s assets are tangible, these assets are 
considered as collateral which diminishes the risk of the lender who suffering the 
agency costs of debt; moreover, assets retain more value in liquidation; hence, 
lenders are more willing to supply loans to the firms the greater proportion of 
tangible assets are. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Berger et al. (1997) proxy the 
ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets as the collateral 
value of assets; Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) use the 
ratio of fixed assets to book value of total assets as the assets tangibility; Hovakimian 
et al. (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Leary and 




Kayhan and Titman (2007) appoint net property, plant d equipment over total 
assets as the assets tangibility. All of them find positive relationship between 
leverage ratio and asset tangibility.  
 
However, Grossman and Hart (1982) make an opposite prediction on this 
relationship in the framework of information asymmetry: because the agency costs of 
debt are increasing with the intangible assets, and the bondholders of highly levered 
firms are inclined to monitor such firms closely on managers’ consumption on 
perquisites, firms with more intangible assets may choose high leverage ratio to limit 
managers’ consumption of perquisites.  
 
5.2.2.3 Profitability 
The static trade-off theory expects a positive relationship between the optimal 
leverage ratio and profitability: profitable firms tend to have higher tax shield of debt, 
lower probability of financial distress, and potentially higher overinvestment, and 
they are in favour of debt financing, so their leverage ratios are higher. The control 
hypothesis also predicts a positive relationship betwe n leverage ratio and 
profitability because high leverage ratio acts to prevent managers of firms with 
significant free cash flows from overinvesting. In contrary, the dynamic trade-off 
theory predicts a negative relationship between the optimal leverage ratio and 
profitability: firms that were highly profitable in the past tend to be under-levered 
because they cannot immediately offset the profitabil y that bumps them away from 
the optimal leverage ratio.  
 
The pecking order theory anticipates a strong negative relationship between 
leverage ratio and profitability: profitable firms are likely to use a substantial amount 
of the internal fund to repay the debt rather than to repurchase equity, and they are 
likely to experience share price increase, hence their leverage ratio is low. Since 
firms have no incentive to offset the effects of profitability on leverage ratios, the 
negative relationship between leverage ratio and profitability will be persistent in the 





Titman and Wessels (1988) employ the ratios of operating income over sales, 
and operating income over total assets as indicators of profitability, Fama and French 
(2002), and Flannery and Rangan (2006) use EBIT over total assets as indicator of 
profitability, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian et al. 
(2004), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Alti (2006) proxy EBITDA over total assets 
as profitability, and Berger et al. (1997), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian 
(2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007) use EBITD over total assets as a proxy of 
profitability; all of them find negative relationship between the leverage ratio and 
profitability.  
 
5.2.2.4 R&D Expense 
The research and development expense and selling expense are usually 
considered as the indicators of firms’ uniqueness, and their relationships with 
leverage ratio are explained by the static trade-off theory. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
postulate that R&D expense measures the uniqueness for the reason that the more a 
firm spends on R&D, the more difficult for its competitors to duplicate its 
innovations and products. Titman (1983), Titman andWessels (1988), Grinblatt and 
Titman (2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004) expect a negative relationship by four 
reasons. First, specialised assets and products imply greater stakeholder costs: the 
workers of such firms have job specific skills, thesuppliers have specific knowledge 
and capital, and customers may find it difficult to find alternative servicing for the 
unique products. Second, specialised assets and products imply potentially more 
shareholder-bondholder conflicts: firms with large R&D and selling expense are 
likely to be growth firms, the uncertainty faced by the growth firms creates severe 
shareholder-bondholder problems (high bankruptcy costs), thus these firms have few 
chances to approach sizable amount of debt financing. Third, firms with high R&D 
and selling expense may have little taxable earnings; as a result they are unable to 
use debt tax shields. Four, R&D and selling expense are usually considered as 
immediately expensed capital goods and they cannot be treated as collateral. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Fama and French (2002) regard R&D expense as 




taxable income, a lower expected corporate tax rate, and a lower expected payoff 
from interest tax shields, leverage ratio is negatively related with R&D expense. 
 
Fama and French (2002) use the ratio of R&D over total assets as the expected 
investment and the non-debt tax shields, Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Alti (2006) 
use R&D as a proportion of total assets as the R&D expense, Titman and Wessels 
(1988) utilize R&D over sales as the R&D expense; Brger et al. (1997) utilize R&D 
over sales as the asset uniqueness; Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian et al. 
(2004), and Kayhan and Titman (2007) employ R&D over net sales as R&D expense. 
All of them find negative relation between leverage ratio and R&D expense.  
   
5.2.2.5 R&D Dummy 
Since the missing data of R & D Expense does not mean that firms do not have 
R&D spending, the R&D Dummy is adopted to distinguish firms that do not report 
R&D spending from the firms report very low spending. The dummy is set to 1 if the 
firm does not report R&D expense. Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), Alti (2006) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) set th  R&D dummy variable to 
one if firms did not report R&D expense, and they find positive relationship between 
leverage ratio and R&D dummy. 
 
5.2.2.6 Selling Expense 
Besides R&D expense, selling expense is another indicator of uniqueness. It is 
expected to have a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, explained by the 
static trade-off theory. “Firms with relatively unique products are expected to 
advertise more and, in general, spend more in promoting and selling their products” 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) proxy selling expense over sales for the selling 
expense. They find a positive relation between selling expense and uniqueness, and a 
negative relation between the uniqueness and leverage r tio, thus there is indirect 
negative relationship between selling expense and leverage ratio. Berger et al. (1997) 




uniqueness; Hovakimian et al. (2004) use selling and dministrative expenses over 
net sales as the selling expense; Hovakimian et al. (2001), and Kayhan and Titman 
(2007) utilize selling expense over net sales as the selling expense. All of them find 
evidence of negative relationship between leverage tio and selling expense. 
 
5.2.2.7 Firm Size 
Control hypothesis and static trade-off theory foresee a positive relationship 
between leverage ratio and firm size: firms make financial decisions by considering 
the interests and costs of debt regarding to the size factor. Fischer et al. (1989), Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) argue that large firms may h ve high optimal leverage 
ratios because they have greater access to capital markets, have less volatile cash 
flows, and are less likely to become financially distressed. However, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) expect the effect of firm size on leverage ratio to be ambiguous: on 
the one hand, since large firms tend to be more divrsified and fail less often, firm 
size, as an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy, is positively related with 
leverage ratio; on the other hand, size might be a proxy for the information outside 
investors have, which increases the outside investors’ preference for equity. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) and Grinblatt and Titman (2002) supplement that small firms 
pay much more than large firms to issue new equity, which means by raising fund in 
the same way they may be more levered than large firms; small firms use 
significantly more short-term debt than long-term debt because the transaction costs 
of issuing long-term debt and the adverse incentive costs associated with long-term 
debt are higher for small firms than for large firms. 
 
Fama and French (2002) suggest firm size measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets is also an inverse symbol of volatility, and they explain the relationship 
between leverage ratio and firm size by pecking order theory. Since firm size is an 
adverse indicator of cash flow’s volatility, small firms are usually with volatile cash 
flows; in order to avoid issuing new risky equities or forgoing investment 





Berger et al. (1997), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Fama and French (2002), and 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) measure firm size by the natural logarithm of total 
assets. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988), Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005), Hovakimian (2006), 
Alti (2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) use the 
natural logarithm of net sale as firm size. Titman and Wessels (1988) discover a high 
correlation (0.98) between the log of total assets and log of total sales as the proxy 
for firm size in an unreported model. Fischer et al. (1989) select the average of the 
quarterly total liabilities plus common equity market value as the firm size. All of 
them prove the positive relation between the leverag  r tio and the firm size.  
 
5.2.2.8 Industry 
Industry variable is utilized to capture the industry-specific characteristics of 
leverage ratios not captured by other explanatory va iables. Hovakimian et al. (2001) 
and Hovakimian et al (2004) utilize firms’ industry median leverage ratio as the 
industry variable, and the industry classification s based on the three-digit SIC code; 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) use firms’ lagged industry median market debt ratio as 
the industry vairable. All of them find positive relation between leverage and the 
industry variable. Berger et al. (1997) use the first 2-digit of SIC code as industry 
dummies, and Kayhan and Titman (2007) introduce 47 industry dummies to 
represent the industry nature, and the industry classification is based on Fama and 
French 48-industry classification; they do not report the results of these industry 
dummies. This research has tested the industry dummies according to above authors 
on the 2-digit SIC code, 3-digit SIC code and the Fama and French 48-industry 
classification, and found serious singular problem due to the fact that many industries 
in the category claim no sample firm for them. So in the reported model the industry 
dummy is dropped and the impact of industry is represented by a constant variable, 
and the result for the regression is robust.  
 
Table 5-5 describes the predicted signs of the above independent variables by 


















Asset Tangibility +    
Profitability + - -  
R&D Expense -    
Selling Expense -    
Firm Size +  +  
 
 
5.2.3 Optimal Capital Structure 
The optimal leverage ratio can be derived by different methods. It can be 
obtained in dimensions of cross-sectional, time-serie  or panel data. A relatively 
simple method is to get the optimal leverage ratio from the firm’s industry average, 
or from the firm’s own historical average in the sample period (Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999), or a mixture. A relatively complex method is to get the optimal 
leverage ratio by running regressions on a number of determinant variables from one 
of these three dimensions. Three models are the most popular ones in the regression 
method: OLS regression, tobit regression, and the Fama-MacBeth regression. OLS is 
easy to manipulate and empirical evidences have proved that it adapts to various 
circumstances. Fama-MacBeth is used to avoid understating coefficient standard 
errors (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). A firm’s leverag  ratio can be above one if its 
value of debt is negative, value of equity is positive, and the absolute value of debt is 
larger than its value of equity, which is typical of cases of financial distress or large 
contingent claims (Bruner, 1988). A firm’s leverage ratio can be below zero if its 
value of debt is negative, value of equity is positive, and the absolute value of debt is 
smaller than the value of equity, which is untypical of operating company with 
abnormal high reservation of cash or unused debt capacity (Bruner, 1988). Some 
authors consider it is most common for the leverage ratio to be between 0 and 1, 




regression models are widely used in the study of optimal leverage ratio, and there is 
no evidence that any one model outperforms the other two.  
 
Berger et al. (1997), Fama and French (2002) and Alti (2006) make use of the 
OLS model in their studies; Hovakimian et al. (2001) utilize tobit model with double 
censoring at 0 and 1 for their test; Leary and Roberts (2005) use the Fama–MacBeth 
regression in their study. Rajan and Zingales (1995) use the tobit model which is left 
censored at -1, Hovakimian (2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007) use the tobit 
model which is double censored at 0 and 1, and they notice the tobit model results 
are very similar to the OLS model results. Flannery and Rangan (2006) employ both 
the Fama-MacBeth model and the OLS, and yield similar estimates. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) make use of all the three models (the tobit model is censored at 0 and 
1) and confirms the same results. Hovakimian et al. (2004) uncover that the results 
from the OLS model do not change when they use a truncated regression model or a 
censored regression model (tobit). 
 
5.2.4 Tobit Model 
James Tobin proposes the most popular econometric model for censored data 
about the relationship between household income and expenditure of durable goods. 
In economic surveys of households, the expenditures on automobiles or durable 
goods have a lower limit of zero for some respondents, but take on a wider range of 
values above the limit for the other respondents. Tobin (1958) recommends that 
when estimating statistical relationship of a limited variable to other variables and 
testing hypotheses about the relationship, the concentration of observations at the 
limiting value should be considered. Under the circumstances, the explanatory 
variable influences not only the probability of limit explained variable but also the 
size of non-limit explained variable. Although the probit analysis takes the 
probability of limit and non-limit explained variable into account, it ignores 
information on the value of the explained variable when it is available; though the 
multiple regression (OLS) considers the value of the explained variable, it is unable 
to deal with the probability of limit explained vari ble. Tobin thus presents a model 




model after Tobin’s name. It is also know as a censored normal regression model 
(Maddala, 2001).  
 
The tobit model expresses the explained variable (dependent variable) in terms of 
a latent variable: 
yi
* =α + xiβ +ε i   ε i ~IN (0, σ 2 ) 
The latent variableyi
* satisfies the classical linear model assumption with a normal, 
homoskedastic distribution and a linear conditional mean. xi can be in the forms of 
either a single variable or a vector.yi
* is observed if yi
* >0 and is not observed if 
yi
* ≤ 0. The observed yi  is defined as 
yi = yi
* =α + xiβ +ε i    if yi
* >0 
yi =0               if yi
* ≤ 0 
The likelihood function for the tobit model is a combination of two parts. For all 
observations thatyi
* >0, the contribution to the likelihood is: 
prob(yi





















βα xy ii −− ) 
because (yi -α - xiβ )/σ has a standard normal distribution. 
For all observations that yi
* ≤ 0, the contribution to the likelihood is 
prob(yi
* ≤ 0)=1-Φ (
σ
βα xi+ ) 
because 
σ
ε i  has a standard normal distribution. Putting both parts together, the 





















The first part resembles the multiple regression and the second part resembles the 




























Greene (2000) finds out that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are 
smaller than the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, and empirically the ML 
estimates can often be approximated by dividing the OLS estimates by the fraction of 





whereasn1  is the number of un-limit observations, and N is the number of total 
observations. 
 
The expected value ofyi is 
E( yi )=prob(yi =α + xiβ +ε i )×E( yi | yi =α + xiβ +ε i )+prob(yi =0)×E( yi | yi =0) 
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= β j    ),1( ij ∈  
The marginal effects of a change in a continuous explanatory variable on the 







= β j ×prob(yi
* >0)=β j × Φ ( σ
βα xi+ )    ),1( ij ∈  
More general, for the latent variableyi
* =α + xiβ +ε i  and observed variableyi if they 
satisfy 
 yi =m        if yi
* ≤ m 
 yi = yi





 yi =n        if yi
* ≥ n 







= β j ×prob(m<yi
* <n) 
The marginal effects of the explanatory variable on the observed variableyi , 
conditional on yi



















































































































E[ 0,| * >yxy iii ] 
The above equation shows that the change in the expcted value ofyi with respect 
to x j has two effects: the first part affects the conditional mean ofyi
* , and the second 
part affects the probability that the observation will be positive. 
 
Quite a few earlier papers have employed the tobit regression for their leverage 
ratio research. Rajan and Zingales (1995) run one si gle regression with the 
dependent variables in year 1991 and all the explanatory variables by four year 
averages between 1987 and 199016 ; Hovakimian et al. (2001) run one single 
regression for a sample of 39387 firm-year with the ev nt period between 1979 and 
1997; Hovakimian et al. (2004) run two single regressions for a sample of 1679 firm-
                                                
16 They average the explanatory variables to reduce the noise and to account for slow adjustments (Rajan and 




year and a sample of 21823 firm-year between 1982 and 2000; Hovakimian (2006) 
runs a single regression for a sample of 56259 firm-year between 1983 and 2002; 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) run one pooled regression on 109283 firm-year for the 
period between 1960 and 2003; Harford et al. (2007) run 20 separate annual 
regressions between 1981 and 2000, and the annual sample sizes are different subject 
to the availability of M&A announcements in each year.  
 
5.2.5 Estimation of Coefficients, Prediction, and Deviation of Optimal Leverage 
Ratios 
In this research, the book leverage ratio deviations are computed by three stages. 
At the first stage, the actual book leverage ratios (at time t) are regressed on the 
independent variables (at time t-1) to get the estimates for the coefficients: all the
sample firms are standardised into an 11 year window [-5, +5] and the tobit 
regression is run based on a sample of 3295 firms (deals) of the five years before the 
announcement year17 [-5, -1]. At the second stage, the estimated regression equation 
is used for predicting the value of optimal book leverage ratios for given values of 
independent variables: the estimated coefficients are substituted into each year of the 
11 years for actual values of independent variables to predict the optimal book 
leverage ratios. At the third stage, the predicted book leverage ratios are subtracted 
from the actual book leverage ratios to get the deviation.  
 
Stage 1: Estimation 
At this stage, the actual book leverage ratios are regressed on the independent 
variables to get the estimates for the coefficients by the tobit model. The dependent 
variable, the book leverage ratio (at time t) is regressed on a number of lagged 
independent variables (at time t-1): the Market-to-book Ratio, the Asset Tangibility, 
the Profitability, the R&D Expense, the R&D Dummy, the Selling Expense, and the 
Firm Size. These independent variables are lagged one period to reduce the problem 
of simultaneity: using contemporaneous variables may reduce explanatory power if 
the firm does not have enough time to respond to most recent changes in explanatory 
variables as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and 
                                                
17 In each year there are 659 firms, so combining the firms between year -5 and year -1 the sample for reg ession 




Alti (2006)18. There are 659 firms in each year of the standardised 11-year window. 
The tobit model runs a pooled cross-sectional regression on the firm-year [-5, -1] and 
the sample is made up of 3295 firms. The reason for the egression sample selection 
between year -5 and -1 is upon the assumption that firms’ leverage ratios are stable 
and unaffected by the event of M&A before the announcement year (year 0), 
therefore an out-of-sample regression should be a better estimation than the in-
sample regression to capture the impact of M&A on firms’ capital structure changes. 
The regression model is stated below.  
rageRatioActualLeve t = α + β 1 )/( 1BM t− + β 2 ilityAssetTagib t 1− + β 3
yofitabilitPr 1t − + β 4 DExpense&R 1t− + β 5 DDummyR t& 1− + β 6 enseSellingExp t 1−
+ β7 FirmSizet 1− + ε t  
 
Table 5-6 reports the descriptive statistics of actu l leverage ratios over the 11 
year window [-5, +5]. It divides the 659 sample firms into two groups according to 
whether the actual book leverage ratios increase or dec ease between year -1 and 
year 0. The Increase Group consists of 397 firms. In the 11-year period, this group 
shows minimum actual book leverage ratio of 0, and maximum ratio lower than 1 in 
years [-5, +1] and higher than 1 in years [+2, +5]. The median of actual book 
leverage ratios keeps decreasing between year -5 and -1, experiences a sudden jump 
from 0.160 in year -1 to 0.283 in year 0 (76.9% increase), and keeps decreasing again 
afterwards. The mean of actual book leverage shows the ame tendency and there is a 
jump from 0.178 in year -1 to 0.301 in year 0 (69.1% increase). The Decrease Group 
consists of 262 firms. In the 11-year period, this groups shows minimum actual book 
leverage ratio of 0. It shows maximum ratios lower than 1 in years [-5, -3], between 1 
and 2 in years [-2, +1], and higher than 2 in years [+2, +4]. The median fluctuates 
slightly between 0.173 and 0.183 in years [-5, -1],drops between year -1 and 0 from 
0.179 to 0.146 (18.4% reduce), surges between year 0 and 1 from 0.146 to 0.199 
(36.3% increase), and keeps stable afterwards. The mean shows the same tendency. 
For both groups, the median and mean approve the assumption that M&A changes 
                                                





firms’ actual book leverage ratios dramatically at the announcement year, and the 





Table 5-6 Descriptive Statistics of Firm’s Actual Book Leverage Ratios 
This table describes the statistics of sample firms’ actual book leverage ratios in the 11 year window [-5, +5]. 
The announcement year is set to 0, the previous year of the announcement year is set to -1, and the next year 
of the announcement year is set to 1. The sample is made up of 659 acquiring firms (deals). According to 
whether the actual book leverage ratios increase or decrease between year -1 and year 0, the sample is divided 
into two groups, the Increase Group and Decrease Group. Book Leverage ratio is defined as total debt/total 
assets.  
  -5  -4   -3    -2    -1   0   1    2     3      4    5 
Panel A (Increase Group) N=397 
Min  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Max 0.915  0.847  0.777  0.742  0.789  0.930  0.962  1.452  1.516  1.790  1.778  
Med 0.184  0.177  0.166  0.165  0.160  0.283  0.271  0.265  0.253  0.244  0.230  
Mean 0.208  0.200  0.191  0.188  0.178  0.301  0.291  0.288  0.275  0.267  0.262  
Std. Dev. 0.160  0.155  0.154  0.151  0.147  0.159  0.168  0.189  0.189  0.189  0.206 
Panel B (Decrease Group) N=262 
Min  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Max 0.671  0.729  0.796  1.484  1.345  1.130  1.125  2.207  2.158  2.056  1.959  
Med 0.173  0.183  0.180  0.183  0.179  0.146  0.199  0.196  0.193  0.203  0.194  
Mean 0.195  0.206  0.205  0.212  0.214  0.175  0.220  0.224  0.222  0.219  0.221  
Std. Dev. 0.152  0.161  0.167  0.194  0.193  0.170  0.184  0.222  0.220  0.216  0.229 





Table 5-7 describes the statistics of the variables of the whole 3295 firm-year 
sample. The market-to-book ratio ranges between -3.148 and 18.295 with a mean of 
2.032; the asset tangibility ranges between 0.006 and 0.946 with a mean of 0.371; the 
profitability ranges between -0.956 and 0.548 with a mean of 0.159; the R&D 
expense ranges between 0 and 10.216 with a mean of 0.040; the R&D dummy takes 
the value of either 0 or 1 and with a mean of 0.514; the selling expense ranges 
between 0.060 and 9.343 with a mean of 0.518; the firm size ranges between -0.438 




Table 5-7 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
This table describes the statistics of independent variables for the tobit regression. The sample is made up of 
3295 firm-year between year -5 and year -1. The indpendent variables include Market-to-book Ratio, the 
Asset Tangibility(net PPE/ total assets), the Profitability(EBITD/total assets), the R&D Expense(R&D/net 
sales), the R&D Dummy(set to 1 if the firms do not report R&D), the Selling Expense(selling expense/net 
sales), and the Firm Size(logarithm of net sales). 
  M/B  Asset  Profitability R&D          R&D          Selling          Firm 
   Tangibility   Expense     Dummy      Expense     Size 
Min  -3.148  0.006  -0.956  0.000  0.000  0.060  -0.438  
Max 18.295  0.946  0.548  10.216  1.000  9.343  4.839  
Med 1.564  0.335  0.157  0.000  1.000  0.369  2.621  
Mean 2.032  0.371  0.159  0.040  0.514  0.518  2.622  
Std. Dev. 1.707  0.206  0.090  0.317  0.500  0.588  0.741 





Table 5-8 illustrates the correlations between the independent variables by the 
Spearman correlation test and the Pearson correlation test. Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficient (or Spearman's rho), which is a nonparametric version of the 
Pearson correlation, measures the association between two variables based on the 
ranks of the data. Pearson correlation coefficient, which assumes the data are 
normally distributed, measures the association betwe n two variables at interval level. 
For the Spearman test, there are higher correlations between profitability and 
Market-to-book ratio with a value of 0.470, between R&D expense and R&D 
dummy with a value of -0.931, and between selling expense and profitability with a 
value of -0.409. As the independent variables are int rval rather than ordinal, the 
Pearson test is more reliable than the Spearman test. The Pearson test shows low 
correlations between variables, which supports the robustness of regression. The 
highest correlation in absolute value is between market-to-book ratio and 
profitability with a value of 0.355; the lowest correlation in absolute value is between 
profitability and R&D dummy with a value of -0.026. Market-to-book ratio has 
positive correlation with profitability, R&D expense and firm size; asset tangibility 
has positive correlation with profitability, R&D dummy, selling expense and firm 
size; profitability has positive correlation with market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility 
and firm size; R&D expense has positive correlation with market-to-book ratio and 
selling expense; R&D dummy has positive correlation with asset tangibility and 
selling expense; selling expense has positive correlation with asset tangibility, R&D 
expense and R&D dummy; firm size has positive correlation with market-to-book 





Table 5-8 Correlations between Independent Variables 
This table demonstrates the correlations between independent variables. The sample is made up of 3295 firm-
year between year -5 and year -1. The independent variables include Market-to-book Ratio, the Asset 
Tangibility(net PPE/ total assets), the Profitability(EBITD/total assets), the R&D Expense(R&D/net sales), 
the R&D Dummy(set to 1 if the firms do not report R&D), the Selling Expense(selling expense/net sales), and 
the Firm Size(logarithm of net sales). 
                Spearman  M/B  Asset  Profitability R&D          R&D         Selling           Firm 
Pearson   Tangibility   Expense     Dummy      Expense         Size 
M/B    -0.154  0.470  0.180  -0.105  -0.165  0.060  
Asset Tangibility -0.151    0.113  -0.244  0.211  0.261  0.208  
Profitability  0.355  0.090    0.071  -0.077  -0.409  0.120  
R&D Expense 0.102  -0.106  -0.281    -0.931  -0.042 0.007  
R&D Dummy  -0.084  0.249  -0.026  -0.130    0.046  -0.079  
Selling Expense -0.048  0.219  -0.332  0.121  0.150    0.050  
Firm Size 0.045  0.162  0.196  -0.180  -0.069  -0.115   







In order to check the robustness of the regressions, univariate tests are undertaken 
to probe the relations between the book leverage ratio and each of the independent 
variables. Table 5-9 reports the results of these univariate tests. The sample is the 
same as the one for the regressions, which is made up of 3295 firms (deals) of the 
five years before the M&A announcement. The independent variables include 
Market-to-book Ratio, the Asset Tangibility (net PPE/ total assets), the Profitability 
(EBITD/total assets), the R&D Expense (R&D/net sales), the R&D Dummy (set to 1 
if the firms do not report R&D), the Selling Expense (selling expense/net sales), and 
the Firm Size (logarithm of net sales).  
 
In Panel A, the independent variables are divided into 3 independent groups 
according to the percentile of values in ascending order (Group 1 with the lowest 
values, Group 2 with intermediate values, and Group 3 with highest values). The 
One-way ANOVA (Levene’s F-test) examines the equality of means (the means of 
actual book leverage ratios) among the three samples. The null hypothesis is that the 
three sample means are equal. For the market-to-book ratio (M/B), Group 1 (low 
value) is with mean of 0.244, Group 2 (mid value) is with mean of 0.195 and Group 
3 (high value) is with mean of 0.157, and the One-way ANOVA test is significant at 
the 1% level. This result illustrates that M/B indee  has an impact on the book 
leverage ratio, and the relationship is negative. In addition, profitability and R&D 
expense show significance and negative relation with the book leverage ratio. In 
contrast, the asset tangibility and selling expense show significance and positive 
relation with the book leverage ratio. The univariate test on firm size does not show a 
trend on the sample means and is statistically insignificant.  
 
In Panel B, the R&D dummy is divided into 2 groups according to its dummy 
value 0 and 1, and the Independent-Samples t-t t (two-tailed) examines the equality 
of means (the means of actual book leverage ratio) between the two samples. The 
null hypothesis is that the two sample means are equal. Being consistent with the 
regressions, this univariate test indicates the positive relation between book leverage 





Table 5-9 Univariate Tests of the Actual Book Leverage Ratios on Actual Independent Variables 
This table reports the univariate tests of the actual book leverage ratios on actual independent variables. The 
tests are based on a sample of 3295 firms (deals) of the five years before the announcement year. The 
independent variables include Market-to-book Ratio, the Asset Tangibility(net PPE/ total assets), the 
Profitability(EBITD/total assets), the R&D Expense(R&D/net sales), the R&D Dummy(set to 1 if the firms do 
not report R&D), the Selling Expense(selling expense/net sales), and the Firm Size(logarithm of net sales). In 
Panel A, the independent variables are divided into 3 independent groups according to the percentile of values 
in ascending order, and the One-way ANOVA (Levene’s F-test) examines the equality of means (the means 
of actual book leverage ratios) among the three samples. The null hypothesis is that the three sample eans 
are equal. In Panel B, the dummy variable is divided into 2 groups according to its value, and the Independent-
Samples t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the two samples. The null hypothesis is 
that the two sample means are equal. ***, ** and * enotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Panel A 
                                 Group         Percntile No.     Lev Mean   Std. Dev.   Std. Error   F-statistic 
Market to Book 1 0~30 988 0.244  0.165  0.005  76.319***  
 2 30~70 1319 0.195 0.154  0.004   
 3 70~100 988 0.157  0.158  0.005   
Asset Tangibility 1 0~30 988 0.159  0.157  0.005  128.599***  
 2 30~70 1319 0.179  0.141  0.004   
 3 70~100 988 0.264  0.173  0.006   
Profitability  1 0~30 988 0.241  0.185  0.006  128.889***  
 2 30~70 1319 0.215  0.158  0.004   
 3 70~100 988 0.134  0.118  0.004   
R&D Expense 1 0~30 988 0.232  0.174 0.006 93.301***  
 2 30~70 1319 0.216  0.166  0.005   
 3 70~100 988 0.142  0.127  0.004   
Selling Expense 1 0~30 988 0.102  0.111  0.004  524.189***  
 2 30~70 1319 0.190  0.117  0.003   
 3 70~100 988 0.307  0.190  0.006   
Firm Size 1 0~30 988 0.198  0.190  0.006  0.021  
 2 30~70 1319 0.199  0.167  0.005   
 3 70~100 988 0.198  0.119  0.004   
Panel B 
                                 Group        Dummy        No.       Lev Mean   Std. Dev.   Std. Error   t-statistic 
R&D Dummy  1  0  1601  0.163  0.132  0.003  -12.552***  





Table 5-10 reports the estimated coefficients of firms’ actual book leverage ratios 
on the independent variables by the tobit model. All the coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for market-to-book value is -0.006 and 
statistically significant. Market-to-book ratio stands for the growth/investment 
opportunities or a measurement of firms’ value of assets in place, which is explained 
by the static trade-off theory and the pecking order hypothesis. It also stands for time 
measure which is explained by the market timing theory. The static trade-off theory, 
the complex version of pecking order hypothesis and market timing predict a 
negative relationship between the book leverage ratio and the market-to-book ratio, 
and these predictions have been proved by quite a few empirical studies. Though the 
coefficient of market-to-book ratio in this research is not economically significant, its 
negative relationship and statistical significance ar consistent with those empirical 
results of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Houston and James (1996), Hovakimian et al. 
(2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Alti (2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007). 
 
The asset tangibility coefficient is 0.142 and stati ically significant. The control 
hypothesis and the static trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between the 
leverage ratio and the asset tangibility because they suppose tangible assets are 
considered as collateral and debt lenders are willing to supply loans to the firms with 
large proportion of “safe” assets. The result of this research fits the control 
hypothesis and the static trade-off theory, and is consistent with the empirical results 
of Hovakimian et al. (2001), Baker and Wurgler (200), Hovakimian et al. (2004), 
Leary and Roberts (2005), Hovakimian (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Alti 
(2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007), and Morellec and Zh anov (2008).  
 
The profitability coefficient is economically significant with a negative value of -
0.320 and statistically significant. This result proves the pecking order theory which 
anticipates a strong negative relation between the lev rage ratio and profitability that 
profitable firms are likely to use the profits to repay debt and profitable firms usually 
experience share price increases, therefore the leverage ratio decreases. This result 




suffer a loss) in the past are likely to be under-levered (or over-levered), which is 
explained by the effects of profitability on the deviation of actual leverage ratio from 
the optimal leverage ratio. This result is consistent with those of Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Berger et al. (1997), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Fama and French (2002), 
Baker and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), Alti (2006), Hovakimian (2006), Kayhan and Titman 
(2007), and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008). It does not support the static trade-off 
theory which predicts a positive relationship. 
 
The R&D expense coefficient is economically significant with a negative value 
of -0.101 and statistically significant. This result supports the static trade-off theory 
which considers R&D as an indicator of firms’ uniqueness and non-debt tax shields, 
and predicts a negative relationship between the lev rage ratio and R&D expense. 
This result fits the empirical results of Titman and Wessels (1988), Hovakimian et al. 
(2001), Fama and French (2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), Alti (2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007). 
 
The R&D dummy coefficient is 0.032 and statistically significant. The dummy is 
used to distinguish firms that do not report R&D spending from the firms which 
report very low spending. The dummy is set to 1 if firms do not report their R&D 
spending. There is no theory to predict the sign of this dummy. This result is 
consistent with those of Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Alti 
(2006) and Kayhan and Titman (2007).    
 
The selling expense coefficient is 0.089 and statistically significant. The static 
trade-off theory considers selling expense as indicator of uniqueness, and predicts a 
negative relationship between the leverage ratio and selling expense. This research 
result does not support previous research. However, this result is consistent with the 
univariate test in Table 5-9. 
 
The firm size parameter is 0.016 and statistically significant. This result upholds 




theory explains the positive relation between leverag  ratio and firm size by 
explaining that larger firms have greater access to capital markets with low costs, 
thus they can afford to be highly levered. The pecking order theory argues that small 
firms are likely to keep low leverage ratio in order to avoid costs of financial distress 
because the firm size is adversely related with cas volatility. This result is consistent 
with the result of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988), Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005), Hovakimian 





Table 5-10 Estimated Coefficients by Tobit Regression 
This table reports the estimated parameters of firms’ optimal book leverage ratios by the tobit model. This 
research standardises all the sample firms into an 11 year window (from 5 years before the announcement to 5 
years after the announcement) and runs the tobit regression based on a sample of 3295 firms (deals) of the five 
years before the announcement year. The dependent variable is the book leverage ratio, and the independent 
variables include Market-to-book Ratio, the Asset Tangibility(net PPE/ total assets), the 
Profitability(EBITD/total assets), the R&D Expense(R&D/net sales), the R&D Dummy(set to 1 if the firms do 
not report R&D), the Selling Expense(selling expense/net sales), and the Firm Size(logarithm of net sales).  
rageRatioActualLeve t = α + β 1 )B/M( 1t− + β 2 ilityAssetTagib 1t− + β 3 yofitabilitPr 1t− + β 4
DExpense&R 1t− + β 5 DDummy&R 1t− + β 6 enseSellingExp 1t− + β7 FirmSize 1t− + ε t  
For each independent variable, the estimated parameter is reported, and the Z-statistic, the F-statistic and the 
Log Likelihood Ratio are reported. ***, **, * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
           Coefficient          Std. Error                 Z-statistic 
Constant 0.102  0.012  8.368*** 
Market-to-book  -0.006  0.002  -3.425*** 
Asset Tangibility 0.142  0.014  9.979*** 
Profitability  -0.320  0.037  -8.736*** 
R&D  Expense -0.101  0.017  -5.979*** 
R&D Dummy  0.032  0.006  5.780*** 
Selling Expense 0.089  0.005  17.817*** 
Firm Size 0.016  0.004  4.216*** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.241 
F-statistic 150.730 *** 





A robust test is undertaken to check if any potential outliers of the independent 
variables in Table 5-7 bias the estimation. If outliers indeed exist, the exclusion of 
them should return a series of estimated coefficients which fit the theoretical model 
better than the estimated coefficients of the sample of 3295 firm-year. In the 
robustness check, all the independent variables (except the R&D dummy) are 
winsorized at the -/+ 3 standard deviation point, ad the sample size is reduced to 
3134 firm-years. The estimated coefficients by tobit regression are shown in the table 
below.  Comparing this table with Table 5-10, there is no improvement in the 
estimation coefficients. Hence there is no potential outlier problem and the sample 
size should be kept as 3295 firm-years as in Table 5-7. 
 
Robust Check: Estimated Coefficients by Tobit Regression 
This table reports the estimated coefficients by tobit regression of the truncated 
sample. All the independent variables (except R&D dummy) are truncated at -/+3 
standard deviation level to exclude potential outliers. The sample is made up of 3134 
firm-year.  
           Coefficient          Std. Error                 Z-statistic 
Constant 0.119  0.014  8.526***  
Market-to-book -0.008  0.003  -2.875***  
Asset Tangibility 0.081  0.019  4.394***  
Profitability -0.271  0.047  -5.704***  
R&D  -0.666  0.081  -8.205***  
R&D Dummy 0.008  0.006  1.358  
Selling Expense 0.186  0.013  14.010***  
Firm Size 0.010  0.004  2.426** 
Adjusted R-Squared                                                                                         0.237 
F-statistic 181.004 *** 
Log Likelihood Ratio χ 2 (7)                 1104.413 *** 
 
Table 5-11 reports the estimated coefficients by a multiple OLS regression. The 
multiple OLS regression shows qualitatively the same results as the tobit model. 
Except the constant and R&D dummy, all the other coefficients of the multiple OLS 
regression are slightly smaller than those of the tobit model, which is explained by 
Greene (2000) that empirically the ML estimates canoften be approximated by 





Table 5-11 Estimated Coefficients by Multiple OLS Regression 
This table reports the estimated parameters of firms’ optimal book leverage ratios by the OLS model. This 
research standardises all the sample firms into an 11 year window (from 5 years before the announcement to 5 
years after the announcement) and runs the multiple OLS regression based on a sample of 3295 firms (deals) 
of the five years before the announcement year. The dependent variable is the book leverage ratio, and the 
independent variables include Market-to-book Ratio, the Asset Tangibility(net PPE/ total assets), the 
Profitability(EBITD/total assets), the R&D Expense(R&D/net sales), the R&D Dummy(set to 1 if the firms do 
not report R&D), the Selling Expense(selling expense/net sales), and the Firm Size(logarithm of net sales).  
rageRatioActualLeve t = α + β 1 )B/M( 1t− + β 2 ilityAssetTagib 1t− + β 3 yofitabilitPr 1t− + β 4
DExpense&R 1t− + β 5 DDummy&R 1t− + β 6 enseSellingExp 1t− + β7 FirmSize 1t− + ε t  
For each independent variable, the estimated parameter is reported, and the Z-statistic, the F-statistic and the 
Log Likelihood Ratio are reported. ***, **, * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
           Coefficient         Std. Error                  Z-statistic 
Constant 0.119  0.011  10.604***  
Market-to-book  -0.006  0.002  -3.413***  
Asset Tangibility 0.128  0.013  9.705***  
Profitability  -0.278  0.034  -8.253***  
R&D Expense -0.064  0.008  -7.557***  
R&D Dummy  0.034  0.005  6.512***  
Selling Expense 0.088  0.005  18.804***  
Firm Size 0.010  0.003  2.995*** 







At this stage, the estimated coefficients of the tobit model are used to predict the 
value of the optimal book leverage ratio for given values of independent variables. 
For the i th firm in year t whereas i∈[1, 659] and t∈[-5,5], the optimal book leverage 





1β )B/M( 1t,i − +
^
2β ilityAssetTagib 1t,i − +
^
3β
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^
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^
5β DDummy&R 1t,i − +
^
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^
7β FirmSize 1t,i −  
 
Table 5-12 reports the descriptive statistics of predicted book leverage ratios by 
the tobit model over the 11 year window [-5, +5]. Since the predicted book leverage 
ratio in year t is determined by the actual independent variables in year t-1, the 
significant change of actual independent variables etween year -1 and year 0 should 
lead to significant change of predicted book leverag  ratios between year 0 and year 
1. This table divides the 659 sample firms into two gr ups according to whether the 
predicted book leverage ratios increase or decrease between year 0 and year 1. The 
Increase Group consists of 458 firms. In the 11-year period, the minimum predicted 
book leverage ratios are in the range of [0.002, 0.072], and the maximum ratio are in 
the range of [0.725, 8.791]. The median of predicte book leverage ratios fluctuates 
between year -5 and 0, experiences a jump from 0.183 in year 0 to 0.204 in year 1 
(11.5% increase), and keeps at a high level afterwards. The mean of predicted book 
leverage shows the same tendency and there is a jump fro  0.192 in year 0 to 0.232 
in year 1 (20.8% increase). The Decrease Group consists of 201 firms. The minimum 
predicted book leverage ratios are in the range of [0.000, 0.072], and the maximum 
ratio are in the range of [0.540, 0.986]. The median fluctuates between 0.196 and 
0.202 in years [-5, 0], drops between year 0 and 1 from 0.202 to 0.188 (6.9% reduce), 
surge between year 1 and 2 from 0.188 to 0.202 (7.4% increase), and keeps at a high 
level afterwards. The mean shows the same tendency. For both groups, the median 
and mean approve the assumption that M&A changes firms’ actual book leverage 
ratios dramatically in the announcement year thus changes firms’ predicted book 




Table 5-12 Descriptive Statistics of Firm’s Predicted Book Leverage Ratios 
This table describes the statistics of sample firms’ predicted book leverage ratios in the 11 year window [-5, 
+5]. The announcement year is set to 0, the previous year of the announcement year is set to -1, and the next 
year of the announcement year is set to 1. The sample is made up of 659 acquiring firms (deals). According to 
whether the predicted book leverage ratios increase or decrease between year 0 and year 1, the sample is 
divided into two groups, the Increase Group and Decrease Group. For the ith firm in year t whereas i∈ [1, 659] 





1β )B/M( 1t,i − +
^
2β ilityAssetTagib 1t,i − +
^
3β yofitabilitPr 1t,i −
+
^
4β DExpense&R 1t,i − +
^
5β DDummy&R 1t,i − +
^
6β enseSellingExp 1t,i − +
^
7β FirmSize 1t,i −  
  -5  -4   -3    -2    -1   0   1    2     3      4    5 
Panel A (Increase Group) N=458 
Min  0.067 0.002 0.060 0.058 0.034 0.005 0.062 0.072 0.053 0.049 0.008 
Max 0.873 0.988 0.725 0.731 0.736 1.168 2.440 2.887 8.791 3.949 8.222 
Med 0.186 0.188 0.185 0.183 0.182 0.183 0.204 0.203 0.208 0.207 0.207 
Mean 0.199 0.199 0.196 0.195 0.192 0.192 0.232 0.225 0.240 0.229 0.245 
Std. Dev. 0.080 0.083 0.072 0.075 0.073 0.086 0.157 0.150 0.409 0.193 0.411 
Panel B (Decrease Group) N=201 
Min  0.072 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.008 0.000 0.071 0.025 0.045 0.001 
Max 0.692 0.554 0.636 0.615 0.750 0.928 0.540 0.986 0.972 0.846 0.779 
Med 0.196 0.200 0.198 0.197 0.202 0.202 0.188 0.202 0.209 0.204 0.204 
Mean 0.215 0.214 0.215 0.214 0.223 0.225 0.204 0.223 0.226 0.223 0.219 
Std. Dev. 0.085 0.082 0.080 0.079 0.088 0.094 0.071 0.096 0.100 0.089 0.083  





Table 5-13 probes how acquisitions suddenly change the optimal book leverage 
ratios in year +1. The average value of each firm’s actual independent variables over 
years [-5, -1] is compared with its value in year 0 to examine this change. The 
sample of predicted book leverage ratios is divided into two groups according to 
whether these ratios increase or decrease between year 0 and year +1.  
 
All Pearson correlation tests are significant at 1% level, which means all 
variables satisfy the paired-samples assumption that observations for each pair are 
made under the same conditions and the mean differenc s are normally distributed. 
The Increase Group is made up of 458 firms. Between year [-5, -1] and year 0, for 
means, market-to-book ratio increases, asset tangibility decreases, profitability 
increases, R&D expense does not change, R&D dummy increases, selling expense 
increases, and firm size increases. Among them, the changes of R&D dummy, selling 
expense and firm size are consistent with the relationship between leverage ratio and 
estimations of coefficients by the tobit regression, a d attribute to pull up the 
predicted book leverage ratios in year +1. The paired-samples t-statistic procedure 
examines the significance of difference between the two sample means. It showed 
that the changes of means of market-to-book ratio, sset tangibility, profitability and 
firm size are statistically significant.  Since firm size is the only independent variable 
whose change is consistent with the estimation of tobit model and is statistically 
significant in the t-test, it concludes that the increase of predicted leverage ratios in 
year +1 mainly attributes to the increase of firm size. The Decrease Group consists of 
201 firms. Between year [-5, -1] and year 0, for means, market-to-book ratio 
increases, asset tangibility decreases, profitabiliy decreases, R&D expense decreases, 
R&D dummy increases, selling expense increases, and firm size increases. Among 
them, the changes of market-to-book ratio and asset tangibility are consistent with 
the relationship between leverage ratio and estimations of coefficients by the tobit 
regression, and attribute to push down the predicte book leverage ratios in year +1. 
The paired-samples t-statistics are significant for market-to-book ratio, asset 
tangibility, selling expense and firm size. Since market-to-book ratio and asset 
tangibility are the independent variables whose changes are consistent with the 




that the decrease of predicted leverage ratios in year +1 mainly attributes to the 






Table 5-13 Comparison of the Actual Independent Variables before and at the M&A 
This table compares the actual independent variables efore and at the M&A announcement. The average 
values of independent variables of each firm over [-5, -1] are compared with the independent variables of the 
firm in year 0. The Pearson correlation examines if the two samples of year [-5, -1] and year 0 satisfy the 
paired-samples assumption; the paired-samples t-statistic examines the significance of difference between the 
two sample means. The sample is divided into two groups according to whether the predicted book leverage 
ratios increase or decrease between year 0 and year 1. ***, ** and * denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% 
and 10%. 
 Median Mean 
 [-5, -1] 0 [-5, -1] 0 
     Pearson 
   Correlation  
Paired,Samples 
    t-statistic 
Increase Group (N=458) 
Market to Book 1.735  1.763  2.112  2.588  0.591***  -3.512***  
Asset Tangibility 0.324  0.323  0.367  0.359  0.926***  2.112** 
Profitability  0.162  0.175  0.166  0.182  0.673***  -5.522***  
R&D Expense 0.000  0.000  0.030  0.030  0.990***  0.294 
R&D Dummy  1.000  1.000  0.526  0.533  0.974***  -1.246  
Selling Expense 0.360  0.334  0.472  0.483  0.505***  -0.322  
Firm Size 2.542  2.712  2.592  2.749  0.969***  -19.473*** 
Decrease Group (N=201) 
Market to Book 1.405  1.677  1.849  2.233  0.676***  -3.482***  
Asset Tangibility 0.357  0.339  0.380  0.369  0.937***  2.331**  
Profitability  0.146  0.139  0.143  0.137  0.687***  1.459  
R&D Expense 0.003  0.001  0.062  0.047  0.997***  1.354  
R&D Dummy  0.200  0.000  0.487  0.493  0.946***  -0.517  
Selling Expense 0.417  0.457  0.622  0.714  0.677***  -2.119**  





Stage 3: Deviation 
At this stage, firms’ optimal book leverage ratios are subtracted from the actual 
book leverage ratios to obtain the deviations of book leverage ratios.   
 
Table 5-14 reports the deviations of book leverage ratios over the 11 year 
window. The deviation for the i th firm in year t is calculated as: 
tioLeverageRa t,i∆ = rageRatioActualLeve t,i - erageRatioedictedLevPr t,i  
whereas i∈[1, 659] and t∈[-5,5]. It divides the 659 sample firms into two groups 
according to whether the book leverage ratio deviations increase or decrease between 
year -1 and year 0. The Increase Group consists of 416 firms. In the 11-year period, 
the minimum deviations are in the range of [-3.127, -0.211], and the maximum 
deviations are in the range of [0.531, 1.560]. The m dian of deviations keeps 
decreasing between year -5 and -1, experiences a significant jump from -0.045 in 
year -1 to 0.078 in year 0, and decreases afterwards. The mean of deviations shows 
the same tendency and there is a jump from -0.030 in year -1 to 0.092 in year 0. The 
Decrease Group consists of 243 firms. The minimum deviations are in the range of [-
8.447, -0.275], and the maximum deviations are in the range of [0.419, 2.013]. The 
median fluctuates between -0.014 and -0.001 in years [-5, -1], drops significantly 
between year -1 and 0 from -0.001 to -0.042, surges between year 0 and 1 from -
0.042 to -0.014, and keeps at a high level afterwards. The mean shows the same 
tendency. The Overall Sample’s medians and means fall between those of the 
Increase Group and the Decrease Group, which is coniste t with the rationale of 
splitting the sample to avoid the offsetting effect of these two groups. For both 
groups, the median and mean approve the assumption that M&A changes firms’ 
book leverage ratio deviations dramatically at the announcement year, which is 
consistent with the predictions of the co-insurance and increasing debt capacity 
hypothesis, the unused debt capacity hypothesis, the financial slack hypothesis, the 
commitment device hypothesis, and the wealth transfer hypothesis. The trend that 
firms gradually revert back to their optimal leverage ratios in the years after M&A 





Table 5-14 Descriptive Statistics of Firm’s Book Leverage Ratio Deviations 
This table describes the statistics of sample firms’ book leverage ratio deviations in the 11 year window [-5, 
+5]. The announcement year is set to 0, the previous year of the announcement year is set to -1, and the next 
year of the announcement year is set to 1. The sample is made up of 659 acquiring firms (deals). According to 
whether the book leverage ratio deviations increase or decrease between year -1 and year 0, the sample is 
divided into two groups, the Increase Group and Decrease Group. For the ith firm in year t whereas i∈ [1, 659] 
and t∈ [-5,5], the deviation is given as:  
tioLeverageRa t,i∆ = rageRatioActualLeve t,i - erageRatioedictedLevPr t,i    
  -5  -4   -3    -2    -1   0   1    2     3      4    5 
Panel A (Increase Group) N=416 
Min  -0.638  -0.587  -0.486  -0.578  -0.576  -0.211  -1.734  -0.498  -0.799  -0.471  -3.127  
Max 0.601  0.585  0.531  0.619  0.587  0.633  0.698  1.255  1.285  1.557  1.560  
Med -0.019  -0.025  -0.032  -0.034  -0.045  0.078  0.047  0.037  0.018  0.010  0.005  
Mean -0.004  -0.008  -0.014  -0.016  -0.030  0.092  0.057  0.056  0.040  0.037  0.029  
Std. Dev. 0.147  0.144  0.137  0.139  0.132  0.151  0.188  0.177  0.178  0.180  0.248 
Panel B (Decrease Group) N=243 
Min  -0.275  -0.294  -0.279  -0.328  -0.387  -0.894  -1.178  -2.584  -8.447  -3.545  -7.707  
Max 0.463  0.419  0.517  1.129  0.903  0.888  0.857  2.013  1.750  1.685  1.627  
Med -0.007  -0.014  -0.010  -0.002  -0.001  -0.042  -0.014  -0.014  -0.006  -0.017  -0.021  
Mean 0.004  0.011  0.009  0.019  0.027  -0.025  0.009  0.007  -0.021  -0.008  -0.027  
Std. Dev. 0.127  0.130  0.132  0.158  0.155  0.148  0.169  0.261  0.576  0.293  0.533 
Panel C (Overall Sample) N=659 
Min  -0.638  -0.587  -0.486  -0.578  -0.576  -0.894  -1.734  -2.584  -8.447  -3.545  -7.707  
Max 0.601  0.585  0.531  1.129  0.903  0.888  0.857  2.013  1.750  1.685  1.627  
Med -0.014  -0.022  -0.022  -0.024  -0.028  0.034  0.03   0.024  0.008  0.003  -0.008  
Mean -0.001  -0.001  -0.006  -0.003  -0.009  0.049  0.039  0.038  0.018  0.021  0.009  




Chart 5-1 reports the result of Table 5-14 in an intuitive way. Chart 5-2 reports 
the deviations of the top 10% and the bottom 10% firms, ranking them by the 
difference of deviations between year -1 and year 0. Chart 5-2 supports the result of 
Table 5-14 and Chart 5-1 further. Bruner (1988) gives evidence of negative leverage 
ratio change in the second year before the takeover, suggesting that acquirers are 
building up debt capacity before merger. Ghosh and Jain (2000) find out that the 
acquiring firms are under-levered in the 2-year period before the M&A compared 
with benchmark firms with matched industry and size, and leverage ratios increase 
and stay at a high level in the 5-year period after th  M&A. Their results of the 
deviations before and at the announcement are consiste t with the Increase Group 
trend in Chart 5-1. 
  
Chart 5-3 and Chart 5-4 report the leverage deviation results of Morellec and 
Zhdanov (2008) and Harford et al. (2007) for comparison. Both of these charts show 
that acquiring firms are under-levered before annoucement, and lever up 
dramatically between year -1 and year 0, which is consistent with this research’s 
Increase Group. However, their results reveal that e increase of leverage at the 
announcement is unable to push firms well above their optimal leverage ratios, i.e., 
acquiring firms are nearly under-levered throughout their life, which is contradictory 
with the reality that takeovers make many acquiring f rms over-levered. Moreover, in 
reality, a number of firms are not under-levered in the years before M&A 
announcement (eg, firms in Decrease Group of Chart 5-1). Last, in the long run after 
M&A, their trend of deviation does not show clear evid nce of dynamic trade-off 
that firms’ leverage ratios converge to their optimis s.  
 
The different results between Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) and Harford et al. 
(2007) and this research attributes to three factors. First, when a firm involves 
successive takeovers in the object window, they do not distinguish one deal’s 
influence from another, but this research excludes tho e firms with successive deals. 
Second, they mix the estimation window and the event wi dow thus the impact of 
event is diluted; however, this research draws a cle r ine between the estimation 




whether the deviation increases or decreases at announcement year, so the leverage 
deviations of firms that lever up and firms that lever down cancel out with each other; 
in contrast, this research distinguishes the Increase Group and Decrease Group firms. 
Consequently, this research discovers more significa t hanges of deviations both at 
the announcement period and in the post-merger period, not only illustrates the 
considerable influence of M&A on acquiring firms’ leverage ratios, but also is a 
better support of the dynamic trade-off theory that firms revert to their optimal 





Chart 5-1 Book Leverage Ratio Deviations (Median) 
This chart describes the sample firms’ book leverag ratio deviations (median value) in the 11 year window 
by dividing the firms into two groups: for the Increase Group, the deviation value increases between yar -1 
and year 0; for the Decrease Group, the deviation value decreases between year -1 and year 0. The Incrase 
Group is made up of 416 firms and the Decrease Group is made up of 243 firms. The deviations are calcul ted 
by subtracting the predicted book leverage ratios fr m the actual book leverage ratios.  

























Chart 5-2 Top & Bottom Book Leverage Ratio Deviations (Median) 
This chart describes the top 10% and bottom 10% book leverage ratio deviations (median value) in the 11 year 
window [-5, +5]. The deviations are calculated by subtracting the predicted book leverage ratios from the 
actual book leverage ratios. The top 10% deviation group and the bottom 10% deviation group, ranked by the 
difference between year -1 and year 0 of the 659 firms, each have 65 firms.  




























Chart 5-3 Market Leverage Ratio Deviations 
This chart reports the 6-year market leverage ratiodeviations by Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) (see their Fig 7, 





























Chart 5-4 Market Leverage Ratio Deviations (Median) 
This chart reports the market leverage ratio deviations by Harford et al. (2007) (see their Table 6, page 35). 
The sample for “All Firms” consists of 1188 acquiring firms that announce M&A between the beginning of 
1981 and the end of 2000. The “Firms with Only Large Acquisitions” consists of about 618 acquiring firms 
(52% of the 1188 firms) that take just one acquisition within a 11-year period.  



























It is possible that the method of payment could be a main discriminator of 
leverage change, therefore the split of sample according to the method of payment 
should demonstrate a more significant difference betwe n these two groups. The 
deviations are split into two groups according to the method of payment, and the 
result is displayed in the chart below. The trends of the cash payment group and the 
non-cash payment group are similar, and the difference between these two groups is 
less explicit than the difference between the groups in Chart 5-1. Thus, the possibility 
that method of payment is a main discriminator on deviations is refused. 





















Cash Payment Non-cash Payment
 
 
To sum up, deviation’s movement over the time in Chart 5-1 has four 
implications: (1) firms do have optimal book leverage ratios; (2) firms under-levered 
(over-levered) before the M&A are observed to increase (decrease) leverage at M&A 
announcement; (3) M&A has crucial impact on firms’ book leverage ratios—it either 
increases or decreases the deviations (in this research, the increase impact is stronger 
than the decrease impact); (4) after M&A, firms gradu lly revert the deviations. The 
empirical discovery that firms do not adjust their l verage ratios immediately after 
the M&A but revert back to the optimal level gradually in a long run, supports the 
dynamic trade-off theory. According to that theory, there are costs and delays for 
firms to adjust to their optimal leverage ratio. Therefore, when M&A bumps firm 




they choose to revert the leverage ratio in a long period. This evidence of dynamic 
trade-off theory is consistent with those from Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian 
et al. (2004), Alti (2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007). 
 
5.3 Partial Adjustment 
Graham and Harvey (2001) report in their survey that 81% of the firms consider 
an optimal leverage ratio or range when they make financial decisions. Dynamic 
trade-off theory maintains that firms take positive st ps to offset deviations from 
their optimal leverage ratios, and the speed with which firms reverse depends on the 
cost of adjustment (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). If firm values are highly sensitive 
to the deviations and the leverage ratio adjustment cos  is relatively low, historical 
variables should have only a temporary effect on the actual leverage ratios; in the 
extreme, if the adjustment cost is zero, firms should never deviate from their optimal 
leverage ratios. If firm values are less sensitive o the deviations and the adjustment 
cost is high, historical variables should have a persistent effect on the actual leverage 
ratios; in the extreme, if the adjustment cost is infin te, firms should never move back 
to optimal leverage ratios. Alternative theories such as pecking order hypothesis, 
market timing theory and the managerial inertia reject the optimal leverage ratios and 
firms’ convergence towards the optimisms.  
 
This section uses the standard partial adjustment model to test the speed of 
adjustment a firm moves towards the optimal leverag ratios in the post-merger 
period on the dynamic trade-off theory. It then uses several modified partial 
adjustment models to test the influences of competing theories on the adjustment 
speed. These competing theories include pecking order hypothesis (the financial 
deficit variable), market timing theory (the external finance weighted average 
variable, the yearly timing variable, the long-term ti ing variable, and the share 









5.3.1 Dynamic Trade-off Theory and Partial Adjustment Model 
The Model 
“The partial adjustment model has been used in many reas of applied 
economics as a description of optimal behaviour in the face of adjustment costs.” 
(Kennan, 1979: 1441) It says that firms adjust their variables only partially towards 
their optimal levels. A standard partial adjustment model consists of two parts, the 
dynamic partial adjustment process (5.3-1) and the s atic expectation which describes 
how the optimism is determined (5.3-2). The dynamic partial adjustment process is 
given by 
rageActualLeve t - rageActualLeve t 1− =λ ( erageedictedLevPr t -
rageActualLeve t 1− )+ε t  
(5.3-1) 
whereasλ is the adjustment speed (0<λ <1): a typical firm closes a proportionλ of 
the gap between its actual leverage ratio and predicted leverage ratio each year. The 
predicted leverage ratio takes the form of: 
erageedictedLevPr t = X tβ 1−  
(5.3-2) 
whereas X t 1−  is a vector of firm characteristics related to thecosts and benefits of 
operating with various leverage ratios defined in section 5.2: the Market-to-Book 
Ratio, the Asset Tangibility, the Profitability, the R&D Expense, the R&D Dummy, 
the Selling Expense and the Firm Size. Substitute (5.3-2) into (5.3-1) and rearrange, 
the estimable model is given by: 
rageActualLeve t = X t 1)( −λβ + rageActualLeve t)1( 1λ− − +ε t  
(5.3-3) 
 
The reason why firms make only a partial adjustment to he optimal level is 
explained by the adjustment cost. Adjustment costs could be transaction costs (to 
issue or retire securities), adverse selection costs (equity sells for less than it is really 
worth), scarce managerial time, and so on. The adjustment cost and the cost of being 
in disequilibrium mutually decide the adjustment speed. In equation (5.3-3), the null 




as erageedictedLevPr t (see equation (5.3-1)), or rageActualLeve t = X t 1)( −λβ  (see 
equation (5.3-3)), which is a complete adjustment (instantaneous adjustment) and the 
actual leverage ratio is always at its optimal leve. If λ =0, the adjustment is 
infinitely slow or the adjustment does not exist, and rageActualLeve t follows a 
random walk. Hence if 0<λ <1 and the t-test for )1( λ− is significant, the partial 
adjustment holds true.   
 
Model Analysis 
Acquiring firms are tested by the standard partial adjustment model (5.3-3) upon 
the dynamic trade-off theory in the post-takeover piod. Table 5-15 reports the 
results of OLS estimates. The first five columns Year +1 to Year +5 present the 
estimates of the annually cross-sectional regression ; the last column Year [+1, +5] 
reports the estimates of the 5-year pooled cross-sectional regression. 659 acquiring 
firms are split into two samples according to whether the median deviation of 
leverage increases or decreases between year -1 and year 0. All the F-tests are 
statistically significant at 1% level. The adjusted R-squares are between 0.608 and 
0.823 for the Increase Group and between 0.524 and 0.910 for the Decrease Group. 
These values are consistent with the R-square of 0.756 in Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
(Table 2, page 478) and the R-squares of 0.80 and 0.68 in Fama and French (2002) 
(Table 4, page 24).  
 
For both the Increase Group and Decrease Group in column Year [+1, +5], all 
those firm characteristics variables that are statistically significant hold the same 
signs with the estimators in Table 5-10 and Table 5-11 (except profitability in the 
Decrease Group): asset tangibility in the Increase Group, market-to-book ratio, R&D 
expense, R&D dummy and selling expense in the Decrease Group. Comparing with 
Table 5-10 and Table 5-11, the statistical insignifcance and opposite sign of some of 
the firm characteristics variables in Table 5-15 may attribute to the split of sample 
into Increase Group and Decrease Group, and the out-of-sample estimation. The out-
of-sample factor could be the explanation for the potential differences (if there are 
any) between the results of previous research and this research. For previous research 




Titman (2007), there are no events, thereafter the partial adjustment models are based 
on the in-sample estimations. This research considers M&A as an event, and the 
event window is separated from the estimation window; thus the estimation is an out-
of-sample estimation. The in-sample estimation incorporates all the observations so 
the coefficients of estimators should to be uniform, but provide less objective 
evidence of the influence of event than the out-of-sample estimation. Although 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) use the in-sample prediction, it is unexplained why 
some of their estimators hold the opposite signs of hypothesis and are statistically 
insignificant (in their Table 2, page 478).   
 
Results on (1-λ ) 
The coefficients for the lagged actual leverage ratios, (1-λ ), are all statistically 
significant at 1% level. For the Increase Group, the adjustment speedλ is 19% for 
Year +1, 3.5% for Year +2, 10% for Year +3, 15.8% for Year +4 and 2.8% for Year 
+5, and 10.3% for Year [+1, +5]. For the Decrease Group, the adjustment 
speedλ is 14.9% for Year +1, 10.3% for Year +2, 10.7% for Year +3, 11.0% for 
Year +4 and 12.3% for Year +5, and 11.7% for Year [+1, +5]. These results are 
similar with Fama and French (2002) and Flannery and Rangan (2006). Fama and 
French (2002) discover 7%~10% adjustment speed for dividend payers and 
15%~18% adjustment speed for dividend nonpayers (in their Table 4, page 24) based 
on the Fama and MacBeth regression model. Flannery and Rangan (2006) report 
13.3% adjustment speed by the Fama and MacBeth regression model (in their 
column (1) of Table 2, page 478) and 13.6% by the OLS regression model (in their 
column (2) of Table 3, page 483). The low adjustment speed might reflect the 
adjustment costs that prevent firms to converge to their optimal leverage ratios 
immediately, explained by the dynamic trade-off theory. The speed results here are 
also consistent with the trends in Chart 5-1 and Chart 5-2. Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) also use Fama and MacBeth panel regression, Fama and MacBeth demeaned 
regression and Fama and MacBeth demeaned regression with year dummy, and they 
find evidence of higher speeds of adjustment which are over 30% per year (see their 




speed to influence of the firm-specific unobserved effects which are captured by 
these models.  
 
The low adjustment speed could arise from either th high adjustment costs or the 
alternative capital structure considerations. Previous papers have suggested that 
variables for the pecking order hypothesis, market timing theory and managerial 
inertia could compete with variables associated with the dynamic trade-off theory, 
and “the variables associated with the true theory are more important than their 
competitors” (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). In order to test if the alternative 
considerations outweigh the cost of deviating from predicted leverage ratios, 
variables for these competing theories are added to the main specification in (5.3-3) 
for further tests.  
 
5.3.2 Pecking Order Hypothesis and Financial Deficit 
The Model 
Financial deficit is defined as the net amount of equity and debt that a firm 
issues or repurchases in a given year (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Kayhan and Titman, 
2007). A positive financial deficit means the firm invests more than its internal cash 
flows; a negative financial deficit means the firm has more internal cash flows than 
its investments. Myers and Majluf (1984) analyse financial deficit by an adverse 
selection model that firms with higher financial deficits are inclined to increase their 
leverage. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) explain 
financial deficit by the pecking order theory that firms with high financial deficits are 
likely to increase their debt ratios because debt is likely to be the marginal source of 
financing. Flannery and Rangan (2006) argue that fin ncial deficit explains a firm’s 
contemporaneous changes in its book leverage ratio. They test the pecking order 
hypothesis against the dynamic trade-off theory by adding a financial deficit variable 
to the partial adjustment model: 
rageActualLeve t - rageActualLeve t 1− = X t 1)( −λβ - rageActualLeve 1t−λ  





whereasλ is the adjustment speed stands for the dynamic theory, andγ is the 
coefficient of financial deficit stands for the pecking order hypothesis. The question 
is whether financial deficit affects the estimated coefficients onX 1t−  or the lagged 
actual leverage ratio. If partial adjustment (dynamic trade-off theory) holds, λ will be 
between 0 and 1, and the t-test for -λ will be significant. If pecking order hypothesis 
fully holds,γ should be 1 and statistically significant, and substantially alter the other 
variables’ signs and significance levels. Otherwise, pecking order effect is just part 
of a generalised version of the trade-off theory (Flannery and Rangan, 2006).  
 
This research first examines pecking order by Frank and Goyal (2003) definition 






This calculation is based on cash flow statements. However, since US firms were not 
required to submit cash flow statements until 1988, Compustat does not cover cash 
flow data comprehensively. In this research, only 10% of the sample firms are with 
valid cash flow statement data. Due to the low power of model cause by data 
invalidity, regression results are not reported here.   
 
Kayhan and Titman (2007: 10) acknowledge this cash flow statement data 
problem, and they calculate financial deficit by balance sheet data. They argue that 
although “balance sheet calculation reflects changes in account balances that do not 
necessarily have underlying cash components and hence l ads to noise”, the two 
results are qualitatively similar. This research then examines pecking order following 
definition of Kayhan and Titman (2007) (see Table 5-4).  
 
Model Analysis 
Table 5-16 reports the results of OLS estimates on equation (5.3-4) with balance 
sheet data. The first five columns Year +1 to Year +5 present the estimates of the 
annually cross-sectional regressions; the last column Year [+1, +5] reports the 




also split into two samples. Compared with Table 5-15, the adjusted R-squares in 
Table 5-16 reduce from 0.524~0.910 to 0.002~0.270, and the F-tests are statistically 
insignificant for Increase Group in Year +2 and for Decrease Group in Year +2 and 
Year +3, and the values of all F-tests drop considerably. These results show that the 
financial deficit variable has some influence on this model. For the coefficients of 
firm characteristics variables in Year +1 to Year +5, there are tiny changes in the 
signs and significance levels compared with Table 5-15, but they are inconclusive; 
these coefficients in Year [+1, +5] are qualitatively the same for Table 5-15 and 
Table 5-16.  The adjusted R-squares are between 0.002 and 0.114 for the Increase 
Group and between 0.005 and 0.270 for the Decrease Group. These values are 
consistent with the R-square of 0.198 in Flannery and Rangan (2006) (column (3), 
Table 5, page 489). These low R-squares indicate that the financial deficit variable 
for pecking order decreases the goodness of fit of the model.  
 
Results on -λ andγ  
The coefficients for the lagged actual leverage ratios, -λ , are statistically 
significant for Increase Group in Year +1 and Year +3, and for Decrease Group from 
Year +1 to Year +4; the coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level for both 
the 5-year pooled cross-sectional models as ever befo e. The adjustment speed,λ , is 
qualitatively the same as in Table 5-15: for the Increase Group, the adjustment speed 
is 17.4% for Year +1, 3.1% for Year +2, 9.7% for Year +3, 18.6% for Year +4 and 
4.7% for Year +5, and 10.7% for Year [+1, +5]; for the Decrease Group, the 
adjustment speed is 13.7% for Year +1, 11.2% for Year +2, 10.5% for Year +3, 
10.2% for Year +4 and 10.3% for Year +5, and 10.7% for Year [+1, +5]. The 
coefficients of financial deficit,γ , take values between -0.164 and 0.222, and their 
absolute values are close to zero. These coefficients are statistically significant for 
Increase Group in Year +4 and Year +5, for Decrease Group in Year +1, Year +2, 
Year +4 and Year [+1, +5]. The pecking order hypothesis predicts positive relation 
between the financial deficit and the leverage ratio; however, three of these 
statistically significant coefficients signify negative relation, which may attribute to 





Even if the financial deficit variable has some impact on the model, in general, 
the stability of adjustment speedλ and the low value ofγ for these regressions can 
reject the pecking order hypothesis against the dynamic trade-off theory. Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) reports that the financial deficit coefficient is significantly 
positive, but does not substantially change the othr variables’ signs and significance 
levels (in their column (3), Panel A, Table 5), thereafter the pecking order forces is 
just part of a generalized version of the dynamic trade-off theory, rather than a 
unique determinant of leverage ratios. They also find out that a one-standard 
deviation change in predicted book leverage ratio changes the 
LeverageActualBookLeverageActualBook 1tt −−  as 15.13 times (0.0711 divide 0.0047) 
as a one-standard deviation change in financial deficit changes the 
LeverageActualBookLeverageActualBook 1tt −−  (in their Panel B, Table 5), so they 
conclude changes in optimal leverage ratios is much more important than financial 
deficit in explaining book leverage ratios.  
 
5.3.3 Market Timing Theory and External Finance Weighted Average 
The Model 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) argue that firms adjust 
their leverage ratios by timing the stock market, i.e., firms tend to raise funds with 
equity when their stock price is high and with debt when their stock price is low. As 
a result, firms reduce their leverage ratios by raising funds in equity when the stock 
market is perceived to be favourable (with a high market-to-book ratio). Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) test the market timing theory by including the lagged external 
finance weighted average market-to-book ratio (defined by Baker and Wurgler, 2002) 
into the partial adjustment model: 














 is the firm’s external finance weighted average market-to-book 










partial adjustment (dynamic trade-off theory) holds, (1-λ ) will be between 0 and 1, 
and the t-test will be significant. If market timing theory holds, δ should be negative 
and statistically significant, and substantially alter the other variables’ signs and 
significance levels. Baker and Wurgler (2002: 12) argue that the weighting scheme 
“gives more weight to valuations that prevailed when significant external financing 
decisions were being made”, therefore, “the weighted average is better than a set of 
lagged market-to-book ratios because it picks out, f r each firm, precisely which lags 





























whereas j is the sequence of year which takes value [0, +4].equity∆ and debt∆ denote 
net equity issues and net debt issues, respectively, as defined in Table 5-4 by Kayhan 
and Titman (2007). For example, j=3 stands for the 3rd year after M&A 
announcement, and the weight is the sum of net equity issue and net debt issue in 
year 3, divided by the cumulative sum of net equity issues and net debt issues for 


















are winsorized at the 1st and 










                                                
19 Baker and Wurgler (2002: 12): The purpose of not all wing negative weights is to ensure the forming of 
weighted average. Otherwise, the weights may not be incr asing in the total amount of external finance raised in 
each period, which would eliminate the intuition that the weights correspond to times when capital structu e was 
most likely to be changed. A zero weight means the variable contains no information about the market-to-book 





Table 5-17 reports the results of OLS estimates on equation (5.3-5). The columns 






takes a weighted average value summarising on years [0, t-1]. 659 
acquiring firms are split into two samples. Compared with Table 5-15, the adjusted 
R-squares and F-tests in Table 5-17 are qualitatively the same. The coefficients of 
firm characteristics variables remain basically unchanged when compared with Table 
5-15, except that the simple market-to-book coefficients those were significant lose 
significance (the coefficients of market-to-book in Table 5-15 that were significant 
are no longer significant in Table 5-17, and for the others the absolute -values now 
reduce). This may ascribe to the split of market-to-bo k effect between the lagged 






. The adjusted R-squares are between 0.616 and 0.818 for the 
Increase Group and between 0.431 and 0.903 for the Decrease Group. Compared 






variable for market timing does not change the goodness of fit of the model.  
 
Results on (1-λ ) andδ  
The coefficients for the lagged actual leverage ratios, (1-λ ), are all statistically 
significant at 1% level. The adjustment speed,λ , is qualitatively the same as 
compared with the results in Table 5-15 (except thae mean of these speeds 
increase slightly). For Increase Group, the adjustment speed is18.3% for Year +1, 
4.1% for Year +2, 9.1% for Year +3, 18.1% for Year +4 and 2.7% for Year +5; for 
Decrease Group, the adjustment speed is18.1% for Yea +1, 12.1% for Year +2, 
10.4% for Year +3, 10.6% for Year +4 and 16.8% for Year +5. The coefficient of 
market timing,δ , takes values between -0.011 and 0.005, which are close to zero. 
Only two of the coefficients are statistically significant at 10% level, for Decrease 
Group in Year +2 and Year +5, and both coefficients are negative. This result is 




best marginally significant with p-value 0.093. The negative relationship between 





fits the market timing theory, which is consistent 
with Baker and Wurgler (2002) (see their Table III and Table IV) and Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) (see their column (2) and (4), Panel A, Table 5, page 489).  
 
The stability of adjustment speedλ , and the low value and statistical 
insignificance for most of the market timing coefficientsδ could reject the market 
timing effect against the dynamic trade-off. Flannery and Rangan’s (2006) result also 
refuse the market timing effect: a one-standard deviation’s effect of the optimal book 
leverage ratio on the actual book leverage ratio is 44.07 times (0.0617 divide -0.0014) 



















( . They argue that the first term in 
the decomposition is scaled by the average financial deficit, making it irrelevant to 
the amount of fund raised; the second term might not capture the market timing 
intuition because market-to-book ratio is likely toproxy for the investment 






 timing measure which they believe to be more preferabl .  
Yearly timing YT= )
B
M
,FD(Cov  is the covariance between the financial deficit 
and the market-to-book ratio. It captures the idea th t firms are more likely to 
decrease their leverage ratios if they raise funds i  the stock market when the stock 
price is relatively high. It assumes that managers time the stock market and take 
advantage of short-term stock over-valuation, i.e., they compare the firms’ 
contemporary market-to-book ratios with those in the surrounding years. According 




timing is likely to affect a firm’s capital structure to a greater degree if the firm raises 
more external capital”. They predict a negative relationship between YT and leverage 










Long-term timing measure LT= )
B
M
(FD ×  is the product of average external 
financing and average market-to-book ratio. Kayhan and Titman (2007) prefer this 
measure to the Baker and Wurgler (2002) measure (second term in the 
decomposition) for three assumptions. First, managers judge whether their stock is 
over or undervalued by comparing their market-to-bok ratios to all firms in general. 
Second, managers act as though their cost of equity financing is negatively related 
with their market-to-book ratio. The third assumption s made upon the pecking order 
hypothesis which has nothing to do with market timing. Three reasons explain why 
the market-to-book ratio could be related to the pecking order hypothesis. 1) 
Asymmetric Information—firms with relatively high market-to-book ratio are facing 
fewer asymmetric information problems than other firms, hence they bear lower 
costs to raise fund in the equity market. 2) Signalli g—firms with relatively high 
market-to-book ratio are willing to be exposed under public scrutiny. 3) Growth 
Opportunity—firms with relatively high market-to-book ratio are likely to be firms 
with high growth rate, and they avoid debt issue to keep financial flexibility. Kayhan 
and Titman (2007) argue that in case the leverage rtio changes more slowly than 
investment opportunities, or if the market-to-book ratio is a very noisy proxy for 
investment opportunities, the average market-to-book ratio might be a better proxy 
for the investment opportunities than the one-year lagged market-to-book ratio 
recommended by Baker and Wurgler (2002). Kayhan and Titman (2007) also predict 
a negative relationship between this variable and the leverage ratio. The long-term 



















okRatioMarkettoBoeficitFinancialD × .   
 
A new equation is set up to test market timing by substituting Kayhan and 






into equation (5.3-6): 
rageActualLeve t = X t 1)( −λβ + rageActualLeve)1( 1t−− λ  + gminYearlyTi 1t−η  + 
gminLongTermTi 1t−ψ +ε t  
(5.3-7) 
If the market timing theory holds, η andψ should be negative and statistically 
significant, and substantially change the other variables’ signs and significance levels. 
 
Model Analysis 
Table 5-18 reports the results of OLS estimates on equation (5.3-7). Columns 
Year +2 to Year +5 present the estimates of the annually cross-sectional regression. 
The definition of YT requires at least two years’ data, so Year +1 is not subject to 
analysis (because Year +1 has only one year data on financial deficit and market-to-
book ratio, all YTs equal to zero). 659 firms are split into two samples. Compared 
with Table 5-15 and Table 5-17, the adjusted R-squares, F-tests and firm 
characteristics variables are qualitatively the same. The t-tests of simple market-to-
book ratio in Table 5-18 are slightly less significant than those in Table 5-15 but a bit 
more significant than those in Table 5-17. The adjusted R-squares are between 0.698 
and 0.820 for the Increase Group and between 0.525 and 0.909 for the Decrease 
Group. Compared with Table 5-15, these R-squares indicate that the inclusion of the 
yearly timing variable and the long-term timing variable does not change the 







Results on (1-λ ), η andψ   
The coefficients for the lagged actual leverage ratios, (1-λ ), are all statistically 
significant at 1% level. The adjustment speed,λ , is qualitatively the same as results 
in Table 5-15 and Table 5-17 (by considering the four years Year +2 to Year +5, the 
mean adjustment speed in Table 5-18 is higher than that in Table 5-15 but lower than 
that in Table 5-17). For Increase Group, the adjustment speed is 3.6% for Year +2, 
10.3% for Year +3, 16.4% for Year +4 and 2.8% for Year +5; for Decrease Group, 
the adjustment speed is 10.2% for Year +2, 10.8% for Year +3, 11% for Year +4 and 
12.4% for Year +5. The coefficient of YL,η , takes values between -0.001 and 0.001, 
which are close to zero. The coefficient of LT,ψ , takes value 0. Only the coefficients 
of YT and LT for Year +2 in Decrease Group are statistically significant. The sign of 
this YT is negative and consistent with the prediction of market timing. The sign of 
this LT is positive (in the table it is reported 0.000, and its actual value is 0.000301) 
and opposite to the prediction. The noise might come from M&A’s influence on 
stock prices and the split of sample: acquiring firms usually experience negative 
abnormal stock returns in the post-merger period, meanwhile firms might reduce 
their leverage ratios between year +1 and year +2 (see Chart 5-2), thus LT could be 
positively related with actual leverage ratio in year +2.  
 
The stability of adjustment speedλ , and the low value and statistical 
insignificance ofη andψ reject the market timing (and pecking order) effect against 
the dynamic trade-off. This conclusion supports the results of Table 5-17.  
 
5.3.4 Managerial Inertia, Market Timing and Stock Returns  
The Model 
Welch (2004) asserts that firms do little to counteract the influence of stock price 
changes on their capital structures; as a result, stock price changes are negatively 
related to leverage ratios. Flannery and Rangan (2006) call this effect of stock return 
as the managerial inertia theory. Managerial inertia theory has the same prediction as 
market timing theory. Graham and Harvey (2001), Hovakimian et al. (2001) and 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) suggest that managers time the quity market: they tend 




can raise fund under more favourable terms. The market timing theory implies that 
leverage ratios are strongly negatively related to past stock returns. The difference 
between the stock return measure (managerial inertia) and the yearly timing (YT) 
measure (market timing) is that the former one focuses on stock price changes 
whereas the later one focuses on stock values. In order to test the stock price 
mechanics, Flannery and Rangan (2006) define the partial djustment model as: 
rageActualLeve t = ευλλβ t1t1t1t SPE)1(rageActualLeve)1(X)( +−+−+ −−−  
(5.3-8) 
whereasλ is the adjustment speed for the anticipated deviation, andυ is the 












turnReStock t,1t− is the realized appreciation in share price during the period between 






−− . P is the monthly stock price (without dividends) from 
CRSP20. If the managerial inertia theory holds, υ  should equal to 0 (the shock of 
stock return on leverage ratios follows a random walk), nd the other variables’ signs 
and significance levels are substantially changed. Give an example on how the stock 
price change affects SPEt-1. Suppose in year t-1 the value of total debt is 2 and the 





stock price change, SPEt-1=0. If the stock price change between year t-1and year t 











−  thus 
SPEt-1 equals -0.09 (=0.11-0.2). The 100% stock return decreases the leverage ratio 




                                                
20 Price (Prc) is the closing price or the negative bid/ask average for a trading day. If the closing price is not 
available on any given trading day, the number in the price field has a negative sign to indicate thatit is a bid/ask 
average and not an actual closing price. Please note tha  in this field the negative sign is a symbol and that the 





Table 5-19 reports the results of OLS estimates on equation (5.3-8). The first 
five columns Year +1 to Year +5 present the estimates of the annually cross-
sectional regressions; the last column Year [+1, +5] reports the estimates of the 5-
year pooled cross-sectional regression. 659 acquiring firms are split into two samples. 
Compared with Table 5-15, the adjusted R-squares and F-tests in Table 5-19 are 
qualitatively the same. There are slight changes on the coefficients of firm 
characteristics variables but inconclusive. The adjusted R-squares are between 0.653 
and 0.805 for the Increase Group and between 0.535 and 0.923 for the Decrease 
Group. These R-squares are similar to the high R-square of 0.860 in Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) (column (3), Table 7). Compared with Table 5-15, these R-squares 
indicate that the inclusion of the SPEt-1 variable for managerial inertia does not 
improve the goodness of fit of the model. 
 
Results for (1-λ ) and (1-υ ) 
The coefficients for the lagged actual leverage ratios, (1-λ ), are all statistically 
significant at 1% level. The adjustment speed,λ , is higher than Increase Group 
results and lower than Decrease Group results in Table 5-15. For Increase Group, the 
adjustment speed is 20.2% for Year +1, 5.0% for Year +2, 10.8% for Year +3, 
21.9% for Year +4 and 2.8% for Year +5, and 12.1% for Year [+1, +5]; for 
Decrease Group, the adjustment speed is 9.5% for Yea +1, 8.5% for Year +2, 7.5% 
for Year +3, 9.1% for Year +4 and 15.2% for Year +5, and 10.0% for Year [+1, +5]. 
The coefficients for the managerial inertia variable SPE, (1-υ ), are statistically 
significant for Year +1, Year +4 and Year [+1, +5] in Increase Group and Year +2 in 
Decrease Group. For these significant coefficients, the adjustment speeds are 88.2% 
( υ =1-0.118), 90.7% (υ =1-.093), 93.8% (υ =1-.062) and 91.4% (υ =1-.086), 
respectively. These high adjustment speeds indicate that firms actively absorb the 
effect of share price, and reject Welch (2004) manageri l inertia hypothesis. The 
results for bothλ andυ support the dynamic trade-off theory. Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) report 9.1% adjustment speed for the trade-off variable and -2.9% adjustment 
speed for the managerial inertia variable by an OLS model (see their column (3), 




surprises. Nevertheless, when they include the firmixed effects, they discover 
34.2% adjustment speed for the trade-off variable and 2.9% for the managerial 
inertia variable (see their column (4), Table 7, page 495). They suggest that although 
the low adjustment speed on managerial inertia variable indicates that firms ignore 
stock price changes in the year they occur, the high adjustment speed on trade-off 
variable means the stock price changes pass into the lagged actual leverage in 
subsequent year; so their results do not support the Welch (2004) hypothesis.  
 
The Model 
This research then replaces the Welch (2004) managerial inertia variable with 
the Kayhan and Titman (2007) market timing variable to examine the stock price 
effects: 
rageActualLeve t = X t 1)( −λβ + rageActualLeve)1( 1t−− λ + turnReStock 1t−κ +ε t  
(5.3-9) 
whereas the stock return variable is calculated as the cumulative log of 12 monthly 








According to market timing theory, the coefficient of stock return,κ ,is expected to 




Table 5-20 reports the results of OLS estimates on equation (5.3-9). The first 
five columns Year +1 to Year +5 present the estimates of the annually cross-
sectional regressions; the last column Year [+1, +5] reports the estimates of the 5-
year pooled cross-sectional regression. 659 acquiring firms are split into two samples. 
Compared with Table 5-15 and Table 5-19, the adjusted R-squares, F-tests and firm 
characteristics variables are qualitatively the same. The adjusted R-squares are 
between 0.592 and 0.810 for the Increase Group and between 0.538 and 0.923 for the 
Decrease Group. Compared with Table 5-15, these R-squares indicate that the 
inclusion of the stock return variable for market timing does not improve the 




Results for (1-λ ) and κ  
The coefficients for the lagged actual leverage ratios, (1-λ ), are all statistically 
significant at 1% level. The adjustment speed,λ , is higher than Increase Group 
results in Table 5-19. For Increase Group, the adjustment speed is 21.0% for Year +1, 
6.4% for Year +2, 11.0% for Year +3, 22.1% for Year +4 and 5.0% for Year +5, and 
13.5% for Year [+1, +5]; for Decrease Group, the adjustment speed is 9.2% for Year 
+1, 9.3% for Year +2, 9.0% for Year +3, 10.1% for Year +4 and 12.4% for Year +5, 
and 10.4% for Year [+1, +5]. The coefficient for stock return,κ , takes values 
between -0.068 and 0.059, which are all close to zer . Only four of the coefficients 
are statistically significant, Year +1, Year +5 and Year [+1, +5] for Increase Group, 
and Year +2 for Decrease Group. All of these coefficients are negative, which is 
consistent with the market timing prediction. The ngative relation between the 
actual leverage ratios and the stock returns are consistent with the result of Kayhan 
and Titman (2007) (see their Table 2, page 14). The stability of adjustment speed,λ  
and the low value of stock return coefficient,κ , is in favour of the dynamic trade-off 
effect.  
 
In summary, Section 5.3 utilizes partial adjustment models to test whether there 
exists an optimal leverage ratio, and the speed of adjustment a firm moves towards 
its optimism. It uses a standard partial adjustment model to test the adjustment speed 
on dynamic trade-off theory. The adjustment speeds (generally between 10% and 
19%) are similar to those reported by Fama and French (2002) and Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), therefore supports the dynamic trade-off theory. However, this low 
adjustment speed could be caused by either the high adjustment cost, or by the 
dominance of competing capital structure theories. In order to distinguish those two 
factors, it then includes extra variables into the partial adjustment model to test the 
effects of pecking order hypothesis, market timing theory and managerial inertia 
hypothesis against the dynamic trade-off theory. All the results reject the alternative 
theories and are in favour of the dynamic trade-off ef ects, hence give indirect 






Table 5-15 Dynamic Trade-off Theory  
rageActualLeve t = X)( 1tλβ − + rageActualLeve)1( 1tλ− − +ε t     (5.3-3) 
The lagged actual leverage is the dynamic trade-off variable with coefficient (1-λ ), and λ is adjustment speed. 
 Year +1  Year +2  Year +3  Year +4  Year +5  Year [+1,+5] 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Panel A: Increase Group 
 N=416 N=416 N=416 N=416 N=416 N=2080
  
Constant 0.104  2.765***  -0.043  -1.576  0.019  0.833  0.035  0.871  0.020  0.696  0.024 1.725* 
Market to Book 0.005  2.007**  -0.000  -0.874  -0.001  -0.659  0.003  1.757*  -0.001  -0.582  0.000 0.722 
Asset Tangibility 0.061  1.578  -0.005  -0.204  -0.003  -0.136  0.021  0.892  0.036  1.492 0.018 1.642*  
Profitability  -0.249  -2.287**  0.007  0.075  -0.060  -0.765  -0.042  -0.442  0.035  0.324 -0.040 -1.022  
R&D Expense -0.058  -2.424**  0.005  1.727*  -0.016  -0.806  0.001  0.011  0.020  0.519 -0.001 -0.159  
R&D Dummy  -0.018  -1.572  0.010  0.983  -0.000  -0.036  0.023  1.729*  0.003  0.317 0.004 0.709  
Selling Expense -0.021  -0.803  -0.003  -1.521  -0.012  -1.375  0.002  0.253  -0.002  -0.182 -0.004 -1.312  
Firm Size -0.007  -0.787  0.016  2.287**  0.005  0.733  -0.007  -0.870  -0.010  -1.413 -0.001 -0.223  
Actual Leverage 0.810  18.318***  0.965  22.732***  0.900  20.136***  0.842  7.042***  0.972  25.018*** 0.897 28.664***  
Adjusted R-square  0.608   0.747   0.823   0.704   0.785   0.735 
F-Statistic  81.419***   153.880***   242.257***   124.268***   189.965***  721.203*** 
Panel B: Increase Group 
 N=243 N=243 N=243 N=243 N=243 N=1215
  
Constant 0.073  2.495**  -0.004  -0.159  0.004  0.126  0.015  0.667  0.009  0.311  0.024 1.944** 
Market to Book -0.005  -2.153**  -0.005  -1.591  0.002  0.919  -0.005  -1.882*  -0.003  -1.460 -0.003 -2.483***  
Asset Tangibility -0.039  -0.811  -0.062  -1.791*  0.015  0.380  0.04   1.633  -0.052  -1.160  -0.015 -0.843 
Profitability  0.062  0.653  0.243  1.322  0.010  0.134  0.028  0.435  0.216  2.165**  0.111 2.555*** 
R&D Expense 0.005  0.113  -0.054  -1.399  -0.079  -1.355  -0.013  -0.309  -0.044  -0.649  -0.024 -1.878* 
R&D Dummy  0.033  2.086**  0.012  0.608  -0.001  -0.063  0.00  0.027  0.012  0.759  0.012 1.719* 
Selling Expense -0.002  -0.188  0.025  1.574  0.022  1.473  0.005  0.345  0.018  0.755  0.009 2.071** 
Firm Size -0.004  -0.503  0.004  0.360  0.001  0.063  -0.002  -0.392  -0.001  -0.192  -0.003 -0.700 
Actual Leverage 0.851  14.929***  0.897  20.863***  0.893  18.844***  0.890  27.738***  0.877  11.553***  0.883 38.61*** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.680   0.524   0.809   0.910   0.765   0.740 





Table 5-16 Pecking Order Hypothesis vs. Dynamic Trade-off Theory  
rageActualLeve t - rageActualLeve t 1− = X t 1)( −λβ - rageActualLeve 1t−λ + eficitFinancialD tγ +ε t  whereas λ  is adjustment speed.   (5.3-4) 
The lagged actual leverage is the dynamic trade-off variable with coefficient -λ , and λ is adjustment speed. Financial deficit is the pecking order variable with 
coefficientγ . 
 Year +1  Year +2  Year +3  Year +4  Year +5  Year [+1,+5] 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Panel A: Increase Group 
 N=413 N=412 N=412 N=414 N=414 N=2065
  
Constant 0.088  2.305**  -0.044  -1.644*  0.021  0.908  0.036  0.928  -0.003  -0.112  0.026 1.819* 
Market to Book 0.005  1.881*  -0.000  -0.964  -0.001  -0.695  0.003  2.055**  -0.001  -0.407  0.001 0.762 
Asset Tangibility 0.063  1.600  -0.008  -0.289  -0.004  -0.202  0.027  1.137  0.044  1.960*  0.020 1.703* 
Profitability  -0.271  -2.263**  0.009  0.091  -0.071  -0.894  -0.003  -0.033  0.159  1.605 -0.032 -0.833  
R&D Expense -0.054  -2.061**  0.005  1.824*  -0.023  -1.053  0.001  0.019  -0.008  -0.139  -0.000 -0.154 
R&D Dummy  -0.019  -1.794*  0.010  0.988  -0.001  -0.167  0.025  1.839*  0.009  0.917  0.004 0.840 
Selling Expense -0.023  -0.854  -0.003  -1.537  -0.012  -1.393  0.006  0.703  -0.002  -0.185  -0.004 -1.268 
Firm Size -0.003  -0.389  0.016  2.272**  0.005  0.706  -0.008  -0.983  -0.008  -1.332  -0.001 -0.388 
Actual Leverage -0.174  -4.208***  -0.031  -0.756  -0.097  -2.193**  -0.186  -1.504  -0.047  -1.255  -0.107 -3.405*** 
Financial Deficit 0.086  1.509  0.022  0.399  0.023  0.639  -0.138  -2.198**  -0.164  -3.506*** -0.027 -0.996  
Adjusted R-square  0.114   0.002   0.055   0.104   0.090   0.035 
F-Statistic  6.905***   1.110   3.654***   6.312***   5.544***  9.431*** 
Panel B: Increase Group 
 N=242 N=242 N=241 N=241 N=242 N=1208
  
Constant 0.035  1.357  -0.017  -0.647  0.004  0.132  0.012  0.528  0.010  0.348  0.023 1.841* 
Market to Book -0.006  -1.884*  -0.005  -1.492  0.002  0.930  -0.003  -1.212  -0.003  -1.416  -0.002 -1.923** 
Asset Tangibility -0.053  -1.347  -0.046  -1.320  0.012  0.340  0.041  1.661*  -0.059  -1.405  -0.020 -1.199 
Profitability  0.011  0.134  0.307  1.597  -0.004  -0.048  -0.011  -0.172  0.186  1.985**  0.078 1.708* 
R&D Expense -0.008  -0.165  -0.051  -1.494  -0.075  -1.325  -0.012  -0.270  -0.032  -0.479  -0.022 -1.708* 
R&D Dummy  0.022  1.751*  0.010  0.500  0.000  0.008  0.003  0.347  0.016  0.958  0.014 1.931** 
Selling Expense 0.005  0.633  0.024  1.687*  0.021  1.446  0.005  0.304  0.014  0.589  0.008 1.911* 
Firm Size 0.006  0.729  0.005  0.413  0.001  0.148  -0.002  -0.328  -0.001  -0.169  -0.002 -0.386 
Actual Leverage -0.137  -2.765***  -0.112  -2.667***  -0.105  -2.148**  -0.102  -3.209***  -0.103  -1.507  -0.107 -4.904*** 
Financial Deficit 0.222  4.924***  -0.104  -2.532**  0.016  0.245  0.044  1.996**  0.061  0.622  0.053 1.951** 
Adjusted R-square  0.270   0.005   0.020   0.123   0.050   0.053 




Table 5-17 Market Timing Theory vs. Dynamic Trade-off Theory (Baker and Wurgler Variable Definition) 







+ε t     (5.3-5) 
The lagged actual leverage is the dynamic trade-off variable with coefficient (1-λ ), and λ is adjustment speed. )B/M( 1t,efwa −  is the market timing variable with 
coefficientδ . 
 Year +1  Year +2  Year +3  Year +4  Year +5 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t   
Panel A: Increase Group 
 N=403 N=398 N=392 N=388 N=386   
Constant 0.113  3.079***  -0.048  -1.356  0.018  0.649  0.040  1.009  0.028  0.946  
Market to Book 0.002  0.742  -0.001  -0.127  -0.004  -0.757  0.002  0.491  -0.002  -0.369  
Asset Tangibility 0.083  2.089**  -0.007  -0.264  -0.009  -0.444  0.020  0.863  0.043  1.487  
Profitability  -0.325  -3.342***  -0.012  -0.073  -0.043  -0.455  -0.039  -0.363  0.004  0.034  
R&D Expense -0.060  -0.362  0.003  0.038  -0.028  -0.201  0.025  0.252  -0.183  -1.180  
R&D Dummy  -0.025  -1.917*  0.009  0.882  -0.003  -0.300  0.022  1.542  -0.008  -0.707  
Selling Expense -0.035  -1.294  -0.004  -2.061**  -0.008  -0.928  0.013  1.335  -0.002  -0.093  
Firm Size -0.006  -0.633  0.019  2.557**  0.006  0.845  -0.011  -1.334  -0.011  -1.390  
Actual Leverage 0.817  20.048***  0.959  19.392***  0.909  19.327***  0.819  6.507***  0.973  23.584***  
M/B efwa 0.003  0.691  0.001  0.370  0.000  0.129  0.003  0.876  0.003  0.552  
Adjusted R-square  0.616   0.727   0.818   0.705   0.786  
F-Statistic  72.766***   118.655***   196.180***   103.973***   158.502*** 
Panel B: Increase Group 
 N=239 N=235 N=232 N=231 N=230   
Constant 0.077  2.587**  -0.001  -0.031  -0.009  -0.298  0.012  0.452  0.048  1.425  
Market to Book 0.000  0.054  0.005  1.275  0.001  0.093  -0.004  -1.429  -0.001  -0.342  
Asset Tangibility -0.020  -0.423  -0.058  -1.629*  0.020  0.492  0.045  1.789*  -0.054  -1.123  
Profitability  -0.014  -0.143  0.206  1.029  -0.000  -0.001  0.007  0.103  0.188  1.560  
R&D Expense 0.003  0.068  -0.048  -1.200  -0.080  -1.251  0.002  0.045  -0.101  -1.229  
R&D Dummy  0.033  2.018**  0.015  0.766  -0.001  -0.074  0.005  0.527  0.009  0.520  
Selling Expense -0.005  -0.484  0.022  1.348  0.022  1.347  -0.000  -0.015  0.015  0.762  
Firm Size -0.005  -0.519  0.005  0.439  0.002  0.268  -0.002  -0.258  -0.002  -0.183  
Actual Leverage 0.819  11.099***  0.879  18.211***  0.896  17.086***  0.894  24.639***  0.832  10.481***  
M/B efwa -0.002  -0.194  -0.009  -1.916*  0.005  0.821  0.001  0.232  -0.011  -1.801*  
Adjusted R-square  0.591   0.431   0.781   0.903   0.748  





Table 5-18 Market Timing Theory vs. Dynamic Trade-off Theory (Kayhan and Titman Variable Definition) 
rageActualLeve t = X t 1)( −λβ + rageActualLeve)1( 1t−− λ + gminYearlyTi 1t−η + gminLongTermTi 1t−ψ +ε t     (5.3-7) 
The lagged actual leverage is the dynamic trade-off variable with coefficient (1-λ ), and λ is adjustment speed. gminYearlyTi 1t− is the market timing variable with 
coefficientη . gminLongTermTi 1t−  is the pecking order variable with coefficientψ . 
   Year +2  Year +3  Year +4  Year +5 
   Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t   
Panel A: Increase Group 
  N=411 N=409 N=409 N=409   
Constant   -0.044  -1.596  0.018  0.734  0.038  0.926  0.022  0.758  
Market to Book   0.000  0.158  -0.001  -0.580  0.002  1.538  -0.001  -0.517  
Asset Tangibility   -0.006  -0.221  -0.002  -0.081  0.021  0.888  0.04   1.660*  
Profitability    0.008  0.084  -0.055  -0.665  -0.038  -0.402  0.033  0.302  
R&D Expense   0.016  0.644  0.015  0.243  -0.014  -0.199  0.007  0.144  
R&D Dummy    0.011  1.001  0.000  0.061  0.023  1.643*  0.003  0.306  
Selling Expense   -0.003  -1.437  -0.011  -1.332  0.003  0.357  -0.003  -0.208  
Firm Size   0.016  2.156**  0.005  0.680  -0.007  -0.889  -0.011  -1.512  
Actual Leverage   0.964  22.109***  0.897  19.454***  0.836  6.823***  0.972  24.268***  
YT    0.000  0.381  0.000  0.619  0.000  0.091  0.000  1.011  
LT    0.000  0.021  0.000  0.878  -0.000  -0.420  -0.00   -0.824  
Adjusted R-square    0.742   0.820   0.698   0.782  
F-Statistic    118.775***   187.125***   95.115***   147.468*** 
Panel B: Increase Group 
  N=242 N=242 N=241 N=241   
Constant   0.016  0.521  0.007  0.229  0.010  0.384  0.011  0.352  
Market to Book   -0.005  -1.551  0.002  0.928  -0.005  -1.832*  -0.003  -1.441  
Asset Tangibility   -0.052  -1.486  0.015  0.385  0.034  1.293  -0.051  -1.082  
Profitability    0.219  1.232  0.003  0.046  0.044  0.666  0.215  2.138**  
R&D Expense   -0.044  -1.258  -0.075  -1.215  -0.018  -0.422  -0.043  -0.620  
R&D Dummy    0.013  0.688  -0.000  -0.015  0.000  0.029  0.013  0.786  
Selling Expense   0.020  1.430  0.021  1.320  0.007  0.461  0.017  0.721  
Firm Size   -0.001  -0.103  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.147  -0.002  -0.229  
Actual Leverage   0.898  21.065***  0.892  18.175***  0.890  27.786***  0.876  11.413***  
YT    -0.001  -2.956***  0.001  0.679  -0.001  -0.828  -0.000  -0.173  
LT    0.000  2.859***  0.000  0.072  -0.000  -0.046  0.000  0.409  
Adjusted R-square    0.525   0.807   0.909   0.762  




Table 5-19 Managerial Inertial vs. Dynamic Trade-off (Welch Variable Definition)  
rageActualLeve t = ευλλβ t1t1t1t SPE)1(rageActualLeve)1(X)( +−+−+ −−−     (5.3-8) 
The lagged actual leverage is the dynamic trade-off variable with coefficient (1-λ ), and λ is adjustment speed. SPE 1t− is the managerial inertia variable with 
coefficient υ−1 andυ is the adjustment speed for share price surprises. 
 Year +1  Year +2  Year +3  Year +4  Year +5  Year [+1,+5] 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Panel A: Increase Group 
 N=398 N=398 N=397 N=396 N=397 N=1986
  
Constant 0.054  1.693*  -0.049  -1.784*  -0.003  -0.131  0.017  0.531  0.003  0.110  0.010 0.732 
Market to Book 0.004  1.658*  -0.000  -0.936  -0.001  -0.561  0.004  2.986***  -0.001  -0.473  0.001 0.880 
Asset Tangibility 0.009  0.346  0.012  0.545  -0.007  -0.349  0.015  0.691  0.039  1.573  0.017 1.743* 
Profitability  -0.069  -0.780  0.058  0.545  -0.044  -0.519  0.002  0.025  0.097  0.808  0.011 0.270 
R&D Expense -0.037  -2.258**  0.006  1.882*  -0.008  -0.370  -0.012  -0.222  0.034  0.857  -0.001 -0.349 
R&D Dummy  -0.016  -1.465  0.005  0.494  0.001  0.144  0.018  1.435  0.006  0.566  0.002 0.405 
Selling Expense 0.032  1.954**  -0.002  -1.294  -0.009  -0.792  0.016  1.294  -0.001  -0.064  0.001 0.287 
Firm Size -0.001  -0.112  0.015  2.569***  0.012  1.571  -0.001  -0.139  -0.010  -1.371  0.002 0.527 
Actual Leverage 0.798  19.742***  0.950  32.258***  0.892  17.654***  0.781  6.387***  0.972  17.659***  0.879 26.220*** 
SPE 0.118  2.858***  -0.002  -0.064  0.060  1.586  0.093  1.672*  0.038  0.699  0.062 2.862*** 
Adjusted R-square  0.653   0.749   0.805   0.660   0.745   0.719 
F-Statistic  84.120***   132.690***   182.463***   86.345***   129.641***  564.567*** 
Panel B: Increase Group 
 N=232 N=233 N=232 N=233 N=233 N=1163
  
Constant 0.090  3.217***  -0.033  -1.235  -0.013  -0.544  0.002  0.102  0.020  0.644  0.022 1.783* 
Market to Book -0.005  -2.236**  -0.000  -0.018  0.003  1.370  -0.004  -1.599  -0.008  -1.382  -0.003 -1.785* 
Asset Tangibility -0.012  -0.295  -0.065  -1.890*  0.008  0.218  0.045  1.947**  -0.051  -1.106  -0.012 -0.747 
Profitability  0.028  0.349  0.322  1.896*  0.024  0.350  0.035  0.542  0.129  1.337  0.099 2.448*** 
R&D Expense 0.033  0.831  -0.060  -1.736*  -0.015  -0.445  -0.008  -0.210  -0.026  -0.412  -0.015 -1.353 
R&D Dummy  0.023  1.529  0.018  0.900  0.000  0.012  -0.007  -0.817  0.016  1.038  0.010 1.469 
Selling Expense -0.007  -1.010  0.028  1.969**  0.005  0.629  0.003  0.254  0.011  0.513  0.006 1.581 
Firm Size -0.012  -1.628  0.002  0.165  0.004  0.572  -0.001  -0.110  0.005  0.565  -0.002 -0.655 
Actual Leverage 0.905  20.223***  0.915  23.579***  0.925  21.550***  0.909  26.462***  0.848  9.337***  0.900 38.369*** 
SPE 0.011  0.282  0.086  1.633*  0.012  0.249  0.030  0.893  -0.078  -1.054  0.005 0.217 
Adjusted R-square  0.724   0.535   0.830   0.923   0.773   0.755 




Table 5-20 Market Timing vs. Dynamic Trade-off Theory (Kayhan and Titman Variable Definition) 
rageActualLeve t = X t 1)( −λβ + rageActualLeve)1( 1t−− λ + turnReStock 1t−κ +ε t     (5.3-9) 
The lagged actual leverage is the dynamic trade-off variable with coefficient (1-λ ), and λ is adjustment speed. turnReStock 1t− is the market timing variable with 
coefficientκ . 
 Year +1  Year +2  Year +3  Year +4  Year +5  Year [+1,+5] 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Panel A: Increase Group 
 N=405 N=405 N=405 N=405 N=405 N=2025
  
Constant 0.105  2.827***  -0.049  -1.922*  0.008  0.374  0.038  0.958  0.015  0.571  0.021 1.540 
Market to Book 0.004  1.433  -0.000  -1.042  -0.001  -0.823  0.004  3.166***  -0.001  -0.786  0.000 0.577 
Asset Tangibility 0.075  1.845*  0.006  0.240  -0.002  -0.103  0.028  1.303  0.042  1.759*  0.026 2.398** 
Profitability  -0.212  -2.019**  0.052  0.540  -0.079  -1.117  -0.065  -0.607  0.065  0.599  -0.030 -0.768 
R&D Expense -0.054  -2.438**  0.005  1.711*  -0.015  -0.618  -0.032  -0.525  0.009  0.205  -0.001 -0.278 
R&D Dummy  -0.019  -1.747*  0.007  0.715  0.002  0.330  0.021  1.597  0.005  0.505  0.003 0.648 
Selling Expense -0.031  -0.965  -0.002  -0.954  -0.013  -1.453  0.007  0.820  -0.000  -0.029  -0.003 -0.905 
Firm Size -0.008  -0.909  0.017  2.653***  0.011  1.549  -0.004  -0.500  -0.010  -1.374  0.001 0.343 
Actual Leverage 0.790  17.542***  0.936  32.094***  0.890  21.218***  0.779  6.333***  0.950  19.711***  0.865 26.410*** 
Stock Return -0.059  -1.854*  -0.027  -1.196  -0.003  -0.090  -0.020  -0.584  -0.058  -1.719*  -0.039 -2.588*** 
Adjusted R-square  0.592   0.745   0.810   0.656   0.752   0.709 
F-Statistic  66.141***   132.161***   192.095***   86.604***   137.294***  550.105*** 
Panel B: Increase Group 
 N=233 N=234 N=234 N=234 N=234 N=1169
  
Constant 0.094  3.478***  -0.022  -0.894  -0.015  -0.577  0.004  0.200  0.008  0.280  0.021 1.755* 
Market to Book -0.005  -2.440**  -0.003  -1.244  0.001  0.627  -0.004  -1.964**  -0.005  -1.222  -0.003 -2.274** 
Asset Tangibility -0.010  -0.254  -0.063  -1.848*  0.022  0.555  0.047  2.024**  -0.053  -1.128  -0.008 -0.451 
Profitability  0.026  0.334  0.284  1.546  0.027  0.364  0.013  0.208  0.182  1.677*  0.097 2.314** 
R&D Expense 0.028  0.671  -0.055  -1.614  -0.029  -0.848  -0.005  -0.124  -0.027  -0.416  -0.015 -1.366 
R&D Dummy  0.022  1.491  0.018  0.878  -0.005  -0.265  -0.006  -0.626  0.016  0.976  0.010 1.346 
Selling Expense -0.008  -1.044  0.024  1.745*  0.010  1.057  0.002  0.164  0.012  0.526  0.006 1.582 
Firm Size -0.014  -1.801*  0.003  0.289  0.006  0.971  0.001  0.128  0.002  0.276  -0.002 -0.538 
Actual Leverage 0.908  21.514***  0.907  24.799***  0.910  22.129***  0.899  29.198***  0.876  10.914***  0.896 40.611*** 
Stock Return -0.028  -0.919  -0.068  -2.591***  0.004  0.129  -0.019  -0.887  0.059  1.156  -0.010 -0.703 
Adjusted R-square  0.728   0.538   0.821   0.923   0.773   0.755 




5.4 Method of Payment and Source of Fund 
Ghosh and Jain (2000) suggest that the post-takeover increase in leverage ratio 
could take place because of an increase in debt, decrease in the market value of the 
firm, or both. They find that both the market value of firms and book value of debt 
increase. Therefore they conclude that an increase in l verage ratio is likely to 
attributes to the additional debt taken by the firms, and mostly because of long-term 
debt.  
 
This section examines whether the leverage ratio increase at M&A 
announcement is caused by the method of payment and source of fund. When 
acquiring firms select the method of payment and source of fund, they have to 
consider quite a few factors such as EPS dilution, currency, ownership structure, 
asymmetric information, debt covenants, availability and costs of different funds, tax 
consideration, accounting treatment21, compensation effects22, regulation effects23 
and financial strategy. This research focuses on the financial strategy and tests its 
link with the method of payment and source of fund based on the dynamic trade-off 
theory. Dynamic trade-off theory assumes that firms actively adjust their leverage 
ratios to trade off between the benefits and costs f debt; the speed of adjustment is 
influenced by the costs and delays, hence financial adjustments are realised gradually. 
According to this theory, the leverage ratio deviations before the M&A 
announcement, at the announcement and after the announcement could be linked 
with the method of payment and source of fund.  
 
Method of payment in acquisitions includes cash, stock exchange, cash 
underwritten share offer, loan stock, convertible loan or preferred shares, deferred 
payment and a mixture of any of them (Sudarsanam, 2003). Pure cash, pure stock 
and a mixture are the three most commonly used payment ethods. Firms usually 
raise debt to make the cash payment thus cash should be connected with increase of 
leverage ratios. Hereby the leverage ratio deviations are tested by whether they 
                                                
21 Pooling method vs. purchase method. 
22 Amortization reduces reported earnings, therefore managements avoid the amortization of good will if their 
compensation is linked with accounting performance.  
23 Tender offers in the form of stock exchange needs the approval of Securities and Exchange Commission, thus 




involve cash payment. Among the 659 deals, 279 involve the cash payment 
(including 150 deals with pure cash payment).  
 
Table 5-21 reports the univariate tests of leverage tio deviations on the method 
of payment.  The first test is on if cash payment is negatively associated with the pre-
merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations in year [-3, -1]: it examines if the firms 
with unused debt capacity before the merger is more likely to pay by cash. The 
second test is on if cash payment is positively associated with the increase of 
leverage ratio deviations in year [-1, 0]: it examines if the deviation change at 
announcement is caused by the cash payment. The third test is on if cash payment is 
positively associated with the post-merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations in 
year [0, +5]. The sample firms are divided by three different criteria. I.) Cash>0% 
measures if the payment includes cash—Code 0 group is made up of 380 firms 
without cash payment, and Code 1 group is made up of 279 firms with cash payment. 
II.) Cash>50% measures if the cash accounts for over 50% of the payment—Code 0 
group is made up of 440 firms with cash less than 50%, and Code 1 group is made up 
of 219 firms with cash over than 50%. III.) Cash=100% measures if the payment is 
pure cash—Code 0 group is made up of 509 non-pure cash payment firms, and Code 
1 group is made up of 150 pure cash payment firms.  
 
The results show that pre-merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations are not 
influenced by the cash payment, so there is no evidence that firms consider the 
unused debt capacity when they make decisions on the method of payment. The 
announcement deviation changes are statistically significant at 1% level for all the 
three t-statistics, and for each split the Code 1 group has higher mean than the Code 0 
group. It provides evidence that the increase of leverage ratio at announcement is 
caused by the cash payment. The post-merger cumulative everage ratio deviations 
are statistically significant at 10% level for the t-statistic of Cash>0% and Cash>50%, 
and for both splits the Code 1 group is with higher means. It gives evidence that the 
post-merger leverage ratios is more likely to remain at a high level if the payment is 





Table 5-21 Univariate Tests on Method of Payment 
This table tests the relationship of cash payment with the pre-merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations, the 
announcement deviation changes, and the post-merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations. The pre-merger 
cumulative leverage ratio deviation is the sum of deviations in years [-3, -1]; the announcement deviation 
change is the difference between deviations in year-1 and year 0; the post-merger cumulative leverage tio 
deviation is the sum of deviations in years [0, +5]. Cash>0% splits the firms into two groups: non-cash 
payment group with Code 0 and with-cash payment group with Code 1; Cash>50% splits the firms into two 
groups: cash payment less than 50% firms with Code 0 and cash payment more than 50% firms with Code 1; 
Cash=100% splits firms into two groups: non-pure cash payment firms with Code 0 and pure cash payment 
firms with Code 1. The independent samples t-test (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between the 
two samples. The null hypothesis is that the two sample means are equal. ***, ** and * denotes the 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
  Year [-3, -1]   Year [-1, 0]  Year [0, +5] 
Code  No.               Mean   t-statistic         Mean   t-statistic       Mean   t-statistic  
Cash>0% 0 380 -0.021 -0.253 0.044 -2.841*** 0.092 -1.839* 
 1 279 -0.013  0.076  0.284 
Cash>50% 0 440 -0.019 -0.151 0.042 -3.901*** 0.105 -1.875* 
 1 219 -0.014  0.089  0.310 
Cash=100% 0 509 -0.015 0.313 0.049 -2.886*** 0.142 -1.129 







When payment method is cash, the source of fund could include cash on hand, 
new issue of debt and new issue of stock; when payment ethod is equity, the source 
of fund could include shares in treasury and new issue of shares. The pecking order 
hypothesis suggests that the value maximising acquirer will prefer to use internal 
resources before seeking external financing. However, th  financing source could 
also be determined by CEOs’ personal preference and their opportunistic response to 
the capital market. Thomson One banker classifies source of fund into borrowing, 
bridge loan, common stock offering, internal corporate funds, debt issue, junk bond 
issue, line of credit, preferred stock issue, mezzanine loan, and so on. The 659 
sample firms involve 84 borrowing, 8 bridge loan, 7 common stock offering, 61 
internal corporate funds, 24 debt issue, 74 line of credit and 4 preferred stock issue 
(some firms may involve more than one source of fund). Among them, the borrowing, 
bridge loan, debt issue, line of credit and preferrd issue engage the raise of debt. 
Thus, if the source of fund involves at least one of these five sources, the deal is 
labelled as dummy 1 and otherwise 0.  
 
Table 5-22 reports the result of univariate tests on s urce of fund. The pre-
merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations are not influenced by the source of fund, 
so there is no evidence that firms consider the unused debt capacity when they make 
decisions on the source of fund. The announcement deviation changes are 
statistically significant at 1% level for the t-statistic, and the Code 1 group has higher 
mean than the Code 0 group. It provides evidence that the increase of leverage ratio 
at announcement is caused by the raise of debt. The post-merger cumulative leverage 
ratio deviations are statistically significant at 1% level for the t-statistic, and the 
Code 1 group is with higher means. It gives evidence that the post-merger leverage 
ratios is more likely to remain at a high level if the firms raise debt. The results of 





Table 5-22 Univariate Tests on Source of Fund 
This table tests the relationship of source of fund with the pre-merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations, the 
announcement deviation changes, and the post-merger cumulative leverage ratio deviations. The dummy 
variable is coded as 1 if the source of fund involves borrowing, bridge loan, debt issue, line of credit and 
preferred issue engage the raise of debt and 0 if the source of fund involves common stock offering and 
internal corporate funds. The independent samples t-t t (two-tailed) examines the equality of means between 
the two samples. The null hypothesis is that the two sample means are equal. ***, ** and * denotes the 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  Year [-3, -1]   Year [-1, 0]  Year [0, +5] 
Code  No.              Mean     t-statistic      Mean     t-statistic      Mean   t-statistic  
 0 510 -0.008 1.192 0.041 -5.265*** 0.089 -3.052*** 






To sum up, the method of payment and source of fundhave significant impact 
on the announcement period deviation changes and on the post-merger leverage ratio 
deviations. When the deal payment involves cash payment and raise debt, the 








This research explores the influence of takeovers on 659 US acquiring firms’ 
capital structures in an 11-year period [-5, +5]. It focuses on two research questions, 
the leverage ratio deviation and the partial adjustment.  
 
The leverage ratio deviation is calculated in three stages. At the first stage, the 
actual leverage ratios are regressed on a number of lagged independent variables by a 
tobit model to estimate coefficients. These independent variables include the market-
to-book ratio, the asset tangibility, the profitability, the R&D expense, the R&D 
dummy, the selling expense, and the firm size. The estimation results support the 
capital structure hypotheses and are coherent with previous research: the negative 
relation between market-to-book and leverage ratio supports the static trade-off 
theory, complex pecking order theory and market timing theory; the positive relation 
between asset tangibility and leverage ratio supports the static trade-off theory; the 
negative relation between profitability and leverage ratio supports the dynamic trade-
off theory and the pecking order hypothesis; the negative relation between R&D 
expense and leverage ratio supports the static trade-off theory; the positive relation 
between firm size and leverage ratio supports the static trade-off theory and pecking 
order hypothesis. The positive relation between selling expense and leverage is 
opposite to the prediction of static trade-off theory, however, the robust check 
(univariate test) supports this result. An OLS regression gives qualitatively the same 
results of these independent variables as the tobit model.  
 
At the second stage, the estimated regression equation is used for predicting the 
value of optimal leverage ratios for given values of independent variables by 
substituting the estimated coefficients into each year of the 11 years. The 659 sample 
firms are divided into two groups according to whether the predicted leverage ratios 
increase or decrease between year 0 and 1. The Incrase Group shows that the 
median of predicted leverage ratios reduces between y ar -5 and 0, jumps from year 
0 to year 1, and keeps at a high level afterwards. The Decrease Group shows that the 




year 1 and 2. These results approve the assumption that M&A changes firms’ 
predicted leverage ratios dramatically in year 1. 
 
At the third stage, these predicted leverage ratios are subtracted from firms’ 
actual leverage ratios to obtain the deviations of leverage ratios. The result of 
deviations is the most important discovery and contribu ion of this research. The 
trend of the deviations in the 11-year window demonstrates that M&A changes 
firms’ leverage ratios considerably at the announcement year, which is consistent 
with the results of Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) andHarford et al. (2007). However, 
this trend presents two differences from previous research. First, the magnitude of 
the deviation change at announcement year is much larger than previous research. 
For the Increase Group, the deviation (median) increases from -4.5% in year -1 to 
7.8% in year 0, this is far beyond the optimal leve. Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) 
report the deviation increases from -7.3% in year -1 to -4.0% in year 0, and increases 
further to 0% in year 2; Harford et al. (2007) find the deviation (median of all firms) 
increases from -6.86% in year -1 to -0.41% in year 0, and increases further to 1.89% 
in year 3. From their results, the deviations are still below the optimal level at the 
announcement year, and it is unexplained what keeps pushing up the leverage ratio 
even 2 or 3 years after the M&A. Second, this research provides explicit evidence 
that firms gradually converge their leverage ratios owards the optimisms in the five 
years after merger, which is consistent with the prdiction of dynamic trade-off 
theory. The previous research did not find this. The new findings of this research are 
due to three improvements on the methodology: the sample selection excludes the 
firms with successive deals in the 11-year period; t predicts the optimal leverage 
ratios by an out-of-sample model, where previous research all uses the in-sample 
model which mix the estimation window and the event window, thus dilutes the 
impact of the event; this research splits sample firms according to whether the 
deviation increases or decreases between year -1 and year 0, where the previous 
research do not distinguish those two groups, thus e leverage deviations of firms 





The partial adjustment is tested by a standard partial adjustment model and 
several modified partial adjustment models. The standard partial adjustment model is 
used to test the speed of adjustment a firm moves towards the optimal leverage ratios 
in the post-merger period on the dynamic trade-off theory. The OLS regression 
results show statistically significant adjustment speed 2.8%~19% for the Increase 
Group, and speed 10.3%~14.9% for the Decrease Group, which are consistent with 
the results of Fama and French (2002) and Flannery and Rangan (2006).  
 
In order to distinguish whether the partial adjustment effect (against complete 
adjustment) is caused by the adjustment cost or by the influence of alternative capital 
structure theories, this research utilizes several modified partial adjustment models to 
test the influences of competing theories on the adjustment speed. The financial 
deficit variable from Kayhan and Titman (2007) is added into the standard partial 
adjustment model to test the pecking order hypothesis. The adjustment speed 
variable shows similar result as in the standard partial adjustment model, and the 
other variables are unaffected by the financial deficit variable, so the pecking order 






Baker and Wurgler (2002) is added to the model to test the market timing hypothesis. 
The stability of adjustment speed and the insignificance of the external finance 
weighted average variable reject the market timing theory. The yearly timing 
variable and long-term timing variable of Kayhan and Titman (2007) are added to the 
model to further test the market timing hypothesis, and it is again rejected. Then the 
share price effect variable from Welch (2004) is added to the model to test the 
managerial inertia theory. The high adjustment speed of the share price effect 
variable indicates that firms actively absorb the eff ct of share price and thus rejects 
the managerial inertia hypothesis. The stability of partial adjustment variable 
supports the dynamic trade-off theory. At last, a stock return variable from Kayhan 
and Titman (2007) is added to the model to test the market timing hypothesis, and 
the results reject it. All of these modified models reject the effect of alternative 




indirect evidence that the partial adjustment effect could be caused by the adjustment 
cost.  
 
This research also tests the influences of method of payment and source of fund 
on leverage ratios. It finds that the method of payment and source of fund have 
significant impact on the announcement period deviation changes between year -1 
and 0, and on the post-merger leverage ratio deviation sums between year 0 and +5. 
When the deal payment involves cash payment and raise debt, the leverage ratio is 





Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This dissertation is made up of two topics in corporate finance.  
 
 The first study, “The Impact of Acquisitions on the Short-Run Returns to 
Shareholders and Bondholders”, investigates the short-run returns of shareholder and 
bondholder with respect to 310 acquisitions in the UK market between 1994 and 
2006. Based upon the theories of M&A motivations and shareholder-bondholder 
conflicts, this study designs five testable hypotheses to investigate M&A’s impact on 
the 41-day and 3-day market-adjusted returns (MAR) and abnormal returns (AR). 
The significant positive target stock return, negative acquirer stock return, positive 
target bond return and negative acquirer bond return are consistent with the wealth 
transfer hypothesis and the hubris hypothesis. The combined security returns show 
that stockholders lose, bondholders gain, target firms gain, acquirer firms lose, and 
shareholders/bondholders of target and acquiring firms as a whole lose. These results 
support the co-insurance hypothesis, wealth transfer hypothesis, and hubris 
hypothesis, and reject the synergy hypothesis. The univariate and multivariate 
analyses on the deal characteristics find that targe  and acquirer stock returns are 
higher with cash payment, acquirer stock returns are higher in friendly and industry 
unrelated takeovers, the acquirer bond returns are higher in industry related takeovers, 
target firm share returns are higher when target size is smaller than the acquirer, 
target and acquirer stock returns are higher in bull market period, and acquirer bond 
returns are higher in the bear market period. 
 
This study has five contributions. First, it is the first empirical research to test UK 
bondholders’ wealth in acquisitions. Second, this study does a thorough review on 
existing theories which explain the shareholder and bondholder wealth in M&A, and 
designs out five testable hypotheses to explain the pot ntial results. Third, the main 
contribution of this study to knowledge is that it detects significant abnormal returns 
for both target firm bonds and acquirer firm bonds. A  the first empirical study in the 
UK market on bondholders’ wealth with respect to M&A, these results are different 
when compared with previous studies for the US market. Rathinasamy et al. (1991) 




managers increase the leverage ratios after merger; Asquith and Kim (1982) and 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) ascribe the mild bondhol er returns to bond covenants 
which effectively protect bondholder wealth. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) study 
the bondholder wealth effects of M&A on European countries, and they do not find 
significant bondholder returns for target firms. AsMacKinlay (1997) and Maxwell 
and Rao (2003) argue, monthly data could bias the sudies against finding any 
significant effects. This study utilizes daily bond data from Datastream, which is 
more powerful to reject the null hypothesis of normal return than the previous studies 
which use monthly bond data. Fourth, this research finds a significantly negative 
Total security return, indicating acquisitions are value destroying, which has never 
been found by previous research. Fifth, this is the first research to test the effect of 
stock market trend on bondholder returns, and it finds significant results. 
 
Although this research benefits from Datastream on its high frequency of bond 
data, there are limitations on the sample size and v li ity of bond-specific diagnostic 
and descriptive information. In this research, there a e only 5 deals that both the 
target and acquirer have valid bond data (Renneboog and Szilagyi 2007 examine all 
European firms between 1995 and 2004, and also find very small sample); in contrast, 
Billett et al. (2004) examine the US market between 1979 and 1997, and report 141 
deals that both the target and acquirer have valid bond data. This difference attributes 
to two factors. First, it is much more popular for US firms to be financed by 
corporate bond than UK/EU firms, so the number of UK firms as the objective of 
corporate bond is smaller. Second, the academic institutions in the UK do not have 
access to Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database (LBFID) as academic institutions 
in the US do. As Hong and Warga (2000), Maxwell andRao (2003) and Billett (2004) 
argue, LBFID is by far the best bond database which provides complete information 
not only on  bond prices, but also on bond-specific diagnostic and descriptive 
information. The database available to this study is Datastream, on which the 
corporate bond price information is incomplete, which diminishes the sample size 
further. The small sample makes the tests less powerful when compared with US 




descriptive information on Datastream makes it impossible to test the risk effect, 
maturity effect and leverage effect.  
 
As discussed in the last paragraph, it is much more p pular for US firms to be 
financed by corporate bond than UK firms to be. Thepotential explanations could be 
the pecking order hypothesis or that bondholders in the US are protected better than 
bondholders in the UK. Hence, further studies could be undertaken to compare the 
capital structures between the US and UK, or to compare the corporate governance 
systems between the two countries on the protection of debtholders with respect to 
takeovers. 
 
The second study, “A Test of the Partial Adjustment Theory of Leverage Using 
Leverage Changes Arising from Takeovers”, investigates firms’ capital structures 
with 659 US acquisitions between 1962 and 2001. Based upon the theories of capital 
structure and hypotheses which link capital structure research with takeovers, this 
study utilizes takeover as an event to investigate its potential influences on acquiring 
firms’ book leverage ratios. The trend of the book leverage ratio deviations in the 11-
year window demonstrates that takeover changes firm’ leverage ratios dramatically 
in the announcement year, which fits the hypotheses that links takeovers and firms’ 
capital structures. The trend also illustrates that firms gradually converge their 
leverage ratios towards the optimal in the years after merger, which is consistent with 
the prediction of dynamic trade-off theory. The stand rd partial adjustment model 
with OLS regression discovers a low but persistent adjustment speed for leverage 
ratios after the takeovers. In order to examine whether this low adjustment speed is 
caused by adjustment costs or by alternative theories competing with the dynamic 
trade-off theory, variables proxy for pecking order theory, market timing theory and 
managerial inertial are added into the partial adjustment model for further tests. 
These tests reject all the alternative theories and find consistent evidence of dynamic 
trade-off effects, thus providing indirect evidence that the low adjustment speed is 
caused by the adjustment costs. Last, this research tests the influences of method of 




of debt are inclined to increase leverage ratios at announcement, and to maintain 
leverage ratios at a high level in the post-merger period.  
 
This study contributes to knowledge in four major ways. First, the sample 
selection process is improved from previous papers. The study of takeover’s impact 
on a firm’s capital structure requires isolating one deal’s influence from another in 
case the firm takes more than one deal in the object window. Previous studies do not 
restrict series acquirers. This research excludes firms that take more than one 
takeovers in the 11-year period, and avoids the overlapping problem. Second, the 
regression process is different. To examine the influe ce of M&A on capital 
structures, M&A is considered as an event, thus the features of capital structures after 
M&A should be quite different from those before M&A. Thereafter, the event period 
itself should not be included in the estimation period to prevent the event from 
influencing the normal performance model parameter stimates. Previous research 
estimate of capital structure coefficients by in-sample models, which could cause a 
problem by mixing the “estimation window” and the “vent window”. This research 
uses out-of-sample regression for the coefficients estimations and the results are 
more objective. Third, the deviation tests split the sample into two groups on whether 
firms’ deviations increase between year -1 and year 0. It is evident that M&A 
increases some firms’ leverage ratios but decreases oth r firms’ leverage ratios, and 
the trend of deviations of those two groups should be quite different. Previous 
research do not distinguish those two groups, therefore the leverage deviations of 
firms that lever up and firms that lever down cancel out with each other, and the 
aggregate deviation trend of the sample is noisy. Due to the above three reasons, this 
research shows more significant influence of takeovers at the announcement year 
than previous research, and gives evidence of dynamic trade-off theory that firms 
reverse back to their optimal leverage ratios gradually in the years after takeovers 
which has not been reported by other papers. Fourth, despite that quite a few papers 
examine the method of payment on capital structures, thi  research is the first one to 





This research relies purely on quantitative financil data. Although it has 
successfully discovered significant impact of takeovers on acquiring firms’ capital 
structure and the evidence of dynamic trade-off, it does not tell the stories beyond 
these data. Quantitative research is unable to reveal th  rationale and process of 
managers’ considerations on capital structures in the event of takeovers. Thus, a 
qualitative research design may compensate for this weakness and investigate 
takeover’s impact on firms’ capital structure in a different way. 
 
This study opens up the door for a number of topics for further work. This study 
focuses on acquiring firms’ capital structures with respect to takeovers; future 
research could examine target firms’ capital structures, and compare them with 
acquiring firms. Takeover is just one type of restructuring operation, and future 
research could look into the impact of asset sale, spin-off, equity carve-out or LBOs 
impact on firms’ capital structure. Moreover, if restructuring operation is a key 
reason for firms’ growth strategy, future studies may explore how to use firms’ 
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